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ABSTRACT
In May 1967 President Lyndon Johnson ordered the creation of a unique
civil/military organization to manage United States advice and support to
the South Vietnamese government's pacification program. This dissertation
-- a discussion of the background and implementation of this decision --
examines why the President took the course he did and what that course
reveals about the use of Presidential power, bureaucratic politics in the
Executive Branch, and organizational response.
The organization created was called Civil Operations and Revolution-
ary Development Support (CORDS) and was an amalgam of all United States
agency staffs in Vietnam dealing with pacification. It was placed in the
U.S. military headquarters under the supervision of the U.S. military
commander. hile the U.S. military had taken over the pacification effort
structurally, the U.S. civilians managed to preserve their own identity
and to control the program through aggressive leadership, bureaucratic
skill, real and perceived Presidential interest, and a degree of cooperat-
ion and tolerance that was remarkable among disparate U.S. foreign policy
agencies.
Years of organizational uncertainty preceded the formation of CORDS.
Numerous attempts were made to bring unity to the U.S. effort in Vietnam,
especially the pacification program. Until 1966 these efforts were large-
ly unsuccessful, but in that year President Johnson turned his attention
to this problem and spent the next eighteen months affecting a change.
The focus of this dissertation is on his efforts during these months.
They show the difficulty but not the impossibility of Presidential action
despite the resistance of important personalities and bureaucracies. The
results of the implementation of his decision are as instructive as the
decision itself. The President's field managers carried out his wishes
so successfully, from his point of view, that he virtually disappears from
the story as an active force. Thus, the President was able not only to
arrive at a difficult decision in the face of strong bureaucratic resist-
ance, but he was able to set up a successful mechanism to see that it was
carried out.
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The decision to set up CORDS shows not only that, despite bureaucrat-
ic/organizational constraints, the President can determine and implement
policy in the Executive Branch, but that success may, as it was in the
CORDS case, be characterized by manipulation rather than by bargaining.
Though a Presidential decision must be fashioned with the restrict-
ions and resistance to innovation and change of large bureaucracies in
mind, the CORDS decision illustrates that directed change is possible.
Even in the most difficult bureaucratic circumstances, Presidents can
move the Executive Branch in the direction they want it to go, and
Presidents can execute decisions that will represent the thrust of Allison's
single rational actor model.
The CORDS decision reveals another important point -- the key issue
need not be whether the President can accomplish change but how he goes
about it. A new focus in studies on decision-making in the Executive
Branch should be on how the President can achieve what he wants rather than
on the limitations to his power.
Thesis Supervisor: William 9. Kaufmann
Title: Professor of Political Science
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INTRODUCTION 007
On the 9th of May 1967 President Lyndon Johnson ordered the creation
of a unique civil/military organization to manage United States advice and
support to the South Vietnamese government's pacification program. This
dissertation -- a discussion of the background and implementation of this
decision -- will examine why the President took the course he did and dis-
cuss what that course reveals about the use of Presidential power, bureau-
cratic politics in the Executive Branch, and organizational response.
The centerpiece of this study is an organization called Civil Opera-
tions and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).2 Established by
Presidential order and headed by a civilian with ambassadorial rank,
Mr. Robert W. Komer and then Mr. William E. Colby, CORDS was an amalgam
of all United States agency staffs in Vietnam dealing with pacification
and civilian field operations (excluding main-force military and covert
CIA operations). It was placed in the U.S. military headquarters (MACV)3
1. See Appendix II for a lengthy definition of pacification.
2. The acronym "CORDS," devised in March 1967, combined the titles of the
then civilian and military staffs for pacification support -- the
Office of Civil Operations and the Revolutionary Development Support
Directorate. In 1970 Ambassador William Colby, then in charge of CORDS,
changed the title to Civil Operations and Rural Development Support to
indicate a different emphasis. Throughout this dissertation I shall
use the acronym "CORDS."
3. "MACV" is the commonly-used acronym for the Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam. I shall use it often in its shortened form. MACV usually
meant the actual headquarters in Saigon, but it was also used to cover
the entire U.S. command in Vietnam and a chain of advisors that
extended all the way down to the districts (the approximate American
equivalent is the county). The commander of MACV was in charge of
all U.S. military forces in Vietnam and while he was subordinate to
the Ambassador in political and basic policy matters, he had a chain
of command and reporting channels direct to the Secretary of Defense.
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at Saigon under the supervision and command of General William C.
Westmoreland and later General Creighton D. Abrams. CORDS was, in title,
a staff section in this headquarters, but it operated in reality as a sub-
sidiary, quasi-independent corporation with direct channels of communication
and command to its field elements. While the U.S. military had taken over
the pacification effort structurally, the U.S. civilians managed both to
preserve their own identity and to control the program through aggressive
leadership, bureaucratic skill, real and perceived Presidential interest,
and a degree of cooperation and tolerance that was remarkable among dis-
parate U.S. foreign policy agencies.
CORDS was unique in U.S. Government history. For the first time there
were civilians in the field commanding military personnel and resources. A
civilian Ambassador was an integral part of a war-time military headquarters,
serving not as a political advisor or coordinator but as a director, a man-
ager, and a component commander.
The U.S. involvement in Vietnam can be faulted on many counts, and
many argue that the American effort in Vietnam was doomed from the start.
In this dissertation I am examining just one aspect of the U.S. role in
Vietnam -- how the United States organized and managed the pacification
program. The United States in Vietnam lacked a unified mechanism of direc-
tion and management and adequate machinery to translate policy into perfor-
mance. Nowhere was this more apparent than in pacification advice and sup-
port before 1967.
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Years of organizational uncertainty preceded the formation of CORDS,
and the very term pacification never was precisely defined.4 The organiza-
tional confusion reflected the conceptual disunity on both the American and
Vietnamese sides. Furthermore, when an official definition was promulgated,
the responsibilities given officials and organizations involved in pacifi-
cation rarely corresponded with those stated or implied by the official
definitions.
Chester Cooper has remarked that the institutional arrangements for
conducting a successful pacification effort were less important than the
basic philosophy behind the programs, implying that if the United States
Government had possessed an agreed philosophy of pacification, any one of
a number of organizational approaches would have worked.5 This overlooks
two basic points. First, for years, despite the existence of numerous
sensible concepts the various agencies could not agree. The organizations
that dealt with pacification were too locked in to their own institutional
repertoires and too powerful in Vietnam and Washington to adopt a common
philosophy without strong outside direction or clear assignment of respon-
sibility to one actor. Second, Cooper, as many others, overlooks the
importance of the second facet of any policy -- its implementation. With-
out a means of ensuring implementation, a policy is but a collection of
phrases waiting to be perverted by the officials and organizations that
carry it out. "Sound policy formulation," as Robert Komer asserts, "must
4. See Appendix II.
5. Chester L. Cooper, et al., Elements of Pacification, Vol. II of The
American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Report R-185
(Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972), p. 273.
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take fully into account the capabilities of the institutions involved to
execute it effectively." 6 This simple proposition was often violated in
the Vietnam War.
Until late in the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. Mission was
coordinated only at its apex by an Ambassador who often faced a de facto
military co-equal and semi-independent officials of several civilian agen-
cies. The fragmented management of the pacification program in Vietnam was
symptomatic of a larger lack of unity in Washington. No one agency, task
force, or individual short of the President controlled American policy and
operations in Vietnam. The disunity among U.S. representatives in Saigon
thus was magnified with their parent agencies in Washington. Almost with-
out exception this situation obtained for the entire period of American
involvement in Vietnam.
From 1954-1961 the Mission in Saigon was organized little differently
from those in other countries except that because of the unusually large
size of the military and civil aid programs there, the U.S. agencies had
substantial power and independence. In 1961 as the war entered a new stage
and America had a new leader, the President was presented with clear-cut
6. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints
on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica, California: RAND
Corporation, 1972), p. 152.
7. The "U.S. Mission," or "Mission" as I will occasionally use it refers
to the group of U.S. government agencies based in Saigon and presided
over by the Ambassador. It is best to think of it as a conglomerate
with a chairman. The principal U.S. agencies involved were the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, the United States Information Agency (USIA),
the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) which in Vietnam was known as the Office of the
Special Assistant to the Ambassador (or OSA for short).
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alternatives on organization for the U.S. effort both in Washington and
Saigon. He cast aside an unconventional solution that would have given
extraordinary powers to a supra-agency task force and would have empha-
sized the work of a few key individuals and close personal relations with
officials in the Vietnamese Government. Instead, he chose to retain the
standard American organizational response of separate agencies controlling
and managing their own parts of the war. One of the most important effects
of this decision was that for a variety of reasons, the size and aggressive-
ness being among the most important, the Department of Defense and the mil-
itary dominated the U.S. response in Vietnam. Another effect was that
because the decision was not clear-cut, the U.S. effort remained fragmented
and often uncoordinated for most of the rest of the war. The President
tried and failed to pull together U.S. programs by concentrating on
Ambassadors and commanders -- a solution based on personalities, which as
much as the organizations and bureaucracies were responsible for his inabil-
ity to effect a change without major reorganization.
By 1966 this disunity and the sheer size of the American programs had
pulled military operations and pacification, or the "other war" as it was
then called, far apart. Lyndon Johnson turned to organizational solutions
as well as personalities and spent the next year and a half effecting a
change. Non-military actions were brought together under a Special Assis-
tant working directly for him. In 1967 the operational cutting edge, paci-
fication, of the non-military effort was unified and placed under General
Westmoreland but with strong civilian influence and control. The CORDS
decision did not unify the American effort completely; important areas such
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as U.S./GVN political relations were excluded. In addition, it did not
unify the Washington effort. The new organization was however a major step
forward. This, combined with a strong Ambassador, gave more unity to the
U.S. operation in Vietnam, despite its enormous size, than it possessed
since 1955.
Two lengthy chapters cover the period from 1954-1965. They provide an
essential background to the President's 1967 decision. The years of dis-
unity, the Kennedy decisions of 1961, and the unsuccessful efforts of
Johnson until 1966 point up the reasons for the problem, the difficulty
of effecting change, and the magnitude of success when he arrived at the
final solution. These two chapters frequently range wider than mere paci-
fication. The uncoordinated nature of American efforts in this area were
directly related to the overall U.S. Government problem of how to respond
organizationally and managerially to the struggle in Vietnam.
Four chapters describe the process and implementation of the President's
decision to give pacification advice and support responsibility to the mil-
itary. In them the reader can see the difficulty but not the impossibility
of Presidential action despite the resistance of important personalities and
bureaucracies. But decision is only half the battle; implementation is as
instructive as the decision itself. The President's field managers carried
out his wishes so successfully that he virtually disappears from the story
as an active force. The contrast between success in this case and the
failures of implementation of past attempts is worth stressing.
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In the past two decades a number of political scientists have
interpreted foreign policy decisions and their implementation in terms
of "bureaucratic politics." 8 Central to this paradigm is the tenet that
the making of foreign policy is an intensely political process, a process
which in the end influences policy content. These theorists have tended
to focus, in recent years, on the Executive Branch and its often-enormous
agencies where power is seen as diffuse and based on bargaining and per-
suasion among many actors of whom the President, although more powerful,
is but one. Great stress is placed on institutions and organizations and
the degree to which they affect the information presented and influence
the actor's position on a particular issue, the policy decision, and its
implementation. The decisions of the U.S. government and the President,
these analysts conclude, are not the result of a directing unified ration-
ality but reflect as much the process of decision itself and the interests
of those officials or agencies that take part. Thus the actions of foreign
nations or the dictates of particular problems are but some, and often not
the most important, sources of a governmental decision.
Graham Allison in his Essence of Decision9 codifies and sets forth
three models of foreign policy decision-making. Model one ("Rational
actor") posits that the U.S. government reaches decisions as a single
8. Often both theories of bureaucratic politics and organizational response
are lumped together under the overall paradigm term of "bureaucratic
politics." I will attempt to keep the two separate, at the risk of
some repetition, but will occasionally use the term generally to encom-
pass both, as has been done in this paragraph.
9. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).
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rational actor, that what a country does in its foreign affairs is an
intentional act of a unified government. Model two ("organizational
process") sees governmental behavior less as deliberate choice and more
as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard pat-
terns of behavior.10 Model three ("bureaucratic politics") proposes that
government actions should be viewed as a process of shared power in which
decisions and actions are the results of a "'political' process of conflict,
bargaining, and consensus-building among competing bureaucratic elements"1 1
with the President as a powerful but not necessarily pre-eminent "player."
While Allison and his colleague Morton Halperin favor "model three,"
they are, upon careful reading, nowhere near as exclusive as their critics
would have us believe. Halperin, in his recent work Bureaucratic Politics
and Foreign Policy, admits the limitations of the bureaucratic politics
paradigm and acknowledges, as does virtually every commentator, that it has
limited value as a predictive method.12 He does feel that at least one must
examine government decisions and actions from this perspective. Few would
disagree with him.
Because governmental decisions usually are part of an extremely complex
process, no exclusive, tight model can possibly hold for more than a limited
number of cases. The very richness and diversity of the governmental pro-
cess (the stress on which is one of the key contributions of the bureau-
cratic politics model) militate against the choice of a strict solution.
10. Ibid., p. 6.
11. James L. Foster, "Bureaucratic Politics: Limitations of the 'Model"'
(unpublished paper prepared for the Department of Political Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1973), p. 1.
12. Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 293,
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Much of the dispute over the validity of "model three" has involved
Presidential power, which in essence is where, over a decade ago, the
13o
argument began. Based on the experience to be related in this disserta-
tion, I would propose that none of Allison's three models be viewed as
exclusive. The solution is not "either or" but really all three. A view
of government behavior that includes all three, with perhaps the addition
of others such as John Steinbruner's "cognitive process,"14 has the virtue
of flexibility and variability which I feel reflects with more accuracy the
imperfect, diverse, and complex government world. The decision to set up
CORDS in 1967 shows that despite bureaucratic/organizational resistance and
constraints the President can determine and implement policy in the Execu-
tive Branch and that success may be characterized by manipulation rather
than bargaining. I emphasize manipulation as more characteristic than bar-
gaining of this process within the Executive Branch. Bargaining becomes
dominant when the policy moves out to Congress and the nation as a whole,
but the CORDS decision was primarily within the Executive Branch; there
was little Congressional influence.
Though a decision must be fashioned with the restrictions and resis-
tance to innovation and change of large bureaucracies in mind, directed
change is possible. Presidents can move the Executive Branch in the
13. See especially Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics
of Leadership (New York: John Wiley, 1960).
14. John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974). Steinbruner's general
focus is on the individual. He notes that officials especially those
higher up who are not specialists but generalists, will focus on a few
key variables and acquire programmed responses to deal with them, thus
filtering out uncertainty and complexity. See his Chapter 4.
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direction they want it to go. A new focus should be on how the President
can achieve what he wants rather than on the limitations to his power.
Few commentators nowadays are rash enough to assume that a Presidential
wish or even a formal directive are tantamount to complaisant execution or
that most decisions are not reached without some degree of implicit if not
explicit bargaining. Yet most students of Presidential power would agree
that unless his domestic political and Congressional support base is
extremely weak, the President can make decisions he wants and see that
they are carried out. The key point is not whether he can but how he goes
about it. The President and those few key assistants who can speak in his
name are too busy to oversee every decision. But, if the President wishes
to devote the time and energy or if he can set up some mechanism for con-
trol, then he can execute decisions that will represent the thrust of the
single rational actor model. The decision to place pacification under the
military exemplified this.
Despite this conclusion, the history of U.S. organization for pacifi-
cation is also a superb example of the limits as well as the strengths of
Presidential power. The entire decision-making process, including the
prior years of disunity in the U.S. effort for Vietnam, is a case study in
which bureaucracies wielded great power and influence. With the exception
of the Treasury Department pacification involved every major foreign policy
agency, but in no case was pacification felt to be an agency's central mis-
sion in Vietnam. Yet for most agencies organization for pacification had
not merely policy but substantial budgetary and personnel implications.
Time and time again, these agencies and their officials acted exactly as
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their organizational repertoires and outlooks would lead one to expect.
The Vietnam War and pacification in particular exemplify what I would
call a "middle-level" crisis -- one of sufficient but not critical (as was
Cuba 1962) importance and spread out over time. The President was weighed
down with many other concerns, and it was not until 1965 that Vietnam really
began to pre-empt the government's attention. Decisions were seldom taken
quickly, and the size and length of the war meant that implementation could
not be overseen always and had to be left, for the most part, to the work-
ings of the agencies concerned. Yet despite the important role of bureau-
cratic politics and organizational response, were not other circumstances,
sheer human incomprehension and error, individuals, and the actions of the
President of greater import?
The President is invariably the key protagonist in discussions of
foreign policy decision-making and must be the focus of any answer. Was
our lack of organization for Vietnam and pacification a conscious act of
Presidential choice? What is misperception or lack of focus on the prob-
lem? Or, was it truly a bargaining process involving substantial Presi-
dential compromise?
A good case can be made that the fault was not inadequate information.
Virtually every observer of the Vietnam War has remarked upon the disorga-
nization of the U.S. effort and its harmful consequences, and it is known
that numerous official comments to this effect reached both Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson. So a basic point to be examined as the dissertation
progresses must be: why were no steps taken to remedy this problem and
why, specifically, did the United States fail to organize sooner and more
efficiently for pacification?
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For the period prior to 1966 it is not always clear just what exactly
the President wanted. For a series of reasons he did not really focus on
pacification or U.S. management of the effort to advise and support it.
This was no longer the case in the actual decision to give pacification
to the military and set up CORDS. There one observes a different process
at work. The President wanted a change and an effective reorganization.
In 1966 he attempted a series of solutions, some more successful than
others. By September of that year, the President had decided to place the
responsibility for pacification support in the U.S. Mission at Saigon under
the military. Yet this did not become a reality until May the next year.
Without doubt the President had to manipulate during the time that inter-
vened, but did he really have to bargain? A possible answer to this ques-
tion is found, I believe, in whether his conception of the desired organi-
zation was altered in the bureaucratic political process.
Lastly, the individual must be a key point of focus in examining deci-
sions. Analysts of bureaucratic politics have underrated the influence of
personality and the individual both in their ability to reinforce or actu-
ally determine a bureaucratic/organizational response and in the ability of
some actors to move organizations in a direction different from what bureau-
cratic politics and organizational theory would suggest. The influence of
individuals can be just as important as the bureaucracies they are battling
or represent. It is my contention that the CORDS decision was the product
of a few important people. Therefore, as much as possible I will focus
on the top decision-makers. One observer has criticized recent bureau-
cratic politics theorists as promoting a system whereby government officials,
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even the President, are relieved of responsibility for their actions.15
The CORDS experience shows the crucial importance of a few key individuals,
how unpredictable their actions can be, and how Presidents can accomplish a
centrally directed action in even the messiest of bureaucratic situations.
Bureaucratic theory should teach us to understand the forces and influences
involved but not the impossibility of concerted action or the abnegation of
responsibility to impersonal forces.
This dissertation is first a history of what actually happened insofar
as it is possible for me to ascertain using the available documents and
interviews. My opening exposure to these events was as an historian, and
I have reconstructed the process with that methodology.1 6
One of the necessary ingredients for a successful study of govern-
mental politics is detailed source material.17 Critics of the bureaucratic
politics paradigm have cited this necessity as one of its weaknesses for it
demands a degree of factual precision that few scholars are privy to. While
I feel that bureaucratic/institutional politics is more useful as a heuris-
tic device for examining decisions and actions than as a precise predictor
of behavior, the number and variety of sources available to me for this
narrative should please even the most rigorous historian. I will discuss
15. Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important?", Foreign Policy,
7 (Summer 1972), pp. 159-179.
16. As an historian serving with the U.S. Army in Vietnam and afterwards
as a civilian historian with the Department of the Army working on
the Army's official history of pacification,
17. Allison admits this. See Allison, The Essence..., op. cit., p. 24.
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the detail and provenance of my sources in the bibliography at the
conclusion, but it should become clear that the narrative chapters are
based primarily on internal U.S. government documents (for the most part
unpublished) and personal interviews. These two source groups are inter-
dependent. To reinforce them I have adopted the device of sending portions
or all of the manuscript to some of the key actors or knowledgeable ob-
servers of the events related. I have incorporated their comments as part
of the record.
Though the availability of detail assists the scholar in his approach
to the truth, one still must be careful lest it unduly favor a particular
paradigm. A mass of information, particularly on the Executive Branch
workings below the White House, can easily lead the observer to exaggerate
importance of the organizational process and bureaucratic politics models.
This is not to say that one should not search for all the facts, but at the
same time one should be careful lest they obscure patterns of direction.
In examining the decision to place pacification under the military in 1966
and 1967, one is struck by the essential irrelevance of much of the bureau-
cracies efforts to re-organize themselves. Despite a veritable flood of
information and paper and a plethora of actors, the key forces in the deci-
sion and its implementation appear to be a few key personalities. Thus
while I would agree that the less information we have about a government
decision (i.e., one by the Soviet Union), the greater tendency there is to
turn to the rational actor model for a solution, the converse is no more
valid. The mass of information that is available if one is let loose in
government archives can create too much noise; it can obscure directing
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themes or the importance of one actor.
Published sources on Vietnam and pacification generally treat pacifi-
cation organization as a peripheral subject worthy of a few lines or at
most a few pages. Two exceptions to this stand out. The first is Robert
Komer's Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN
Performance in Vietnam.18 Despite important analysis and conclusions it
does not treat the process historically but as a participant searching for
lessons. Richard Holbrooke's volume on the Re-emphasis on Pacification in
the so-called Pentagon Papers covers the decision to set up CORDS in great
detail, but he was allowed to use only documents and his personal recollec-
tions but no interviews.19 Furthermore, his coverage of the actual imple-
mentation after May 1967 is limited to a few short pages. Other volumes of
the Pentagon Papers address the problem of organization but not at great
length. Surprisingly, when recent theorists of bureaucratic politics cite
examples from the Vietnam War, organization is not one of them.
Before going further, I wish to stress several key points that must be
kept in mind as the reader progresses through this dissertation.
18. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints
on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica, California: RAND
Corporation, 1972).
19. Richard Holbrooke, Re-emphasis on Pacification: 1964-1967, Volume
IV.C.8. of United States Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967. (Washington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971). These are
the so-called Pentagon Papers or "McNamara Histories." Unless other-
wise stated, I will be using the Government Printing Office edition
throughout this dissertation and will cite it as USVNR. For most of
the volumes the author is unknown.
First, it should be noted that I am dealing with U.S. organization and
management of pacification and not pacification as a whole. To cover paci-
fication properly one must have an intimate understanding of the Vietnamese,
their language, and the Viet Cong. These I do not possess. In addition,
while I realize that one treads a thin line between two areas, the following
deals with organizational decisions and their implementation not an overall
evaluation of the organizations themselves and their success or failure in
the war -- except insofar as they illumine implementation of the President's
decision. I am not trying to defend doctrines of pacification or to say
that CORDS necessarily produced the right solutions.
I have also treated the Vietnamese Government actions peripherally,
mentioning them to provide useful background to U.S. actions or to judge
CORDS implementation. This may appear cavalier as pacification was a
Vietnamese program, but to include the Vietnamese in detail would open up
an entire range of issues too broad for this dissertation. In this case
the U.S. organizational decisions can be discussed in semi-isolation as
U.S. government issues.
Closely related to this point, I cannot emphasize too forcefully that
whenever I refer to American involvement in pacification, I mean the U.S.
advisory and support effort, military and civilian, to the South Vietnamese
Government's pacification program. At no time did the United States take
over the actual program despite a pervasive and often extremely influential
advisory effort.
Chapter I 02 3
SETTIf THE STAGE: 1954-1963
The decision to establish CORDS in 1967 followed a long history of
lack of coordination and centralized direction both in pacification and in
the entire American effort for Vietnam. The problems associated with this
were apparent even in the late 1950's when the U. S. 1itssion and its com-
ponent agencies commitments were miniscule in comparison to what they had
become by 1967. Farthermore, these problems did not go unnoticed. Numer-
ous outside observers and official participants have agreed that this lack
-on unified direction was a critical failure. Dennis Duncanson, an astute
British scholar of the war, has put it as directly as any:
If we can isolate the crux of failure resulting from these
cumulative difficulties facing the American effort in
Vietnam, it was want of coordination nd want of direction
in the duplication of aid and advice.
This chapter will mix discussion of the U. S. organization specifi-
cally for pacification with that of the overall organization for the war.
It is difficult and incorrect, especially during this early period, to
separate the two. They are interrelated. Pacification during some of
these years meant the entire internal effort against the Viet Cong. The
2definitions also were scarcely precise. This in itself is indicative of
lack of organization and direction. In terms of bureaucratic responsibil-
ity pacification crossed more agency lines than any other program in Viet-
nam. Problems in overall U. S. organization were directly related and
transmitted to those for pacification. They set the essential background
1. Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (New York:2 xfo d Tn erjty Press, T950), p T i 532. ~ee pena ix I
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for the reorganizations in 1966-1967.
The period covered in this chapter may be divided conveniently into
two parts. The first covers from 1954-1960 when the war and the American
advisory effort were small, and this effort was handled organizationally
in ways little different from many other missions around the world. Dur-
ing the second part, from 1961-1963, there was not only a new President
with a different style of leadership but the U. S. commitment and the war
itself mushroomed. The President considered but discarded organizational
solutions that would have traversed the grain of the government bureaucra-
cies and instead established a large military advisory command that gave
more, but not pre-eminent power to the agency with the most resources and
aggressiveness, the Defense Department.
Vietnam in the 1950's was not the center of the U. S. government's
attention. It was just one of many problems around the world. So it
should not come as a surprise that the U. S. Mission there was not organ-
ized differently than in other countries. By 1954 the U. S. Government
had established a regular pattern of organization for its missions abroad.
Prior to World War II the U. S. Embassy with subsidiary military attaches
was usually the only American official representation in a foreign country.
After the war however numerous government programs abroad spawned large
missions of U. S. agency representatives to carry out military training,
intelligence, aid, agriculture, and information programs. These agencies
had statutory authority and responsibilities defined by Congress, and
given the lack of unity among them in Washington and the intra-agency
lines of communication it is no wonder that the Ambassador had a hard time
living up to his description as the chief of all U. S. representation in a
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country.
In 1951 General Lucius Clay, then Special Assistant to the Director
of the Office of Defense Mobilization, was able to obtain an understanding
among the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Economic Coop-
eration Administration (a forerunner of the Agency for International De-
velopment or AID) which said that the representatives of these agencies in
a country were to "constitute a team under the leadership of the Ambassador"
and that the Ambassador was:
...responsible for coordination, general direction, and
leadership of the entire effort, for insuring that broad
United States foreign policy in relation to the country
is reflected in all of the operations, and for providing
coordinated recommendations to U. S. regional representa-
tives and Washington...The Ambassador's responsibility
for coordination, general direction, and leadership
shall be given renewed emphasis, and all United States
eleeIts shall be reindoctrinated with respect to the
Ambassador's role s senior representative for the United
States in country.
In practice the "Coun.try Team" as this arrangenent became know- included
all of the agency chiefs in each country in addition to other selected
officials such as the Ambassador's deputy or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).
Three years later President Eisenhower undertook to strengthen this
arrangement by issuing a strongly-worded Executive Order that gave the
Ambassador "general direction and leadership" powers over the entire mis-
sio-. He was to serve as the "channel of authority on foreign policy
and ... provide foreign policy direction to all representatives of United
States agencies..." lie was given specific coordinating responsibilities
3. Leonard Maynard, "UInited States Overseas Mission and Counter-
insurgency," unpublished research paper prepared for the National War
Collegg, 38s8vingn 8 v rnD.iCs, March 1971g Aid4. ~ v 'rr I558Nver r15:Admnistration of Foreign Aid
026
and told to assure "unified development and execution" (my emphasis) of
U. S. programs. While agencies preserved their means of direct communica-
tion and their local representatives could appeal in extremis a Mission
Chief's decision to the Secretary of State and their home agency, the tone
and wording of this order make it clear that the Ambassador had wide au-
thority to manage and coordinate the Mission in every matter that did not
involve merely internal agency affairs. Indeed, this order is far more
forcefully and specifically worded than President Kennedy's May 1961 letter
to Ambassadors (see below).
Yet it was a rare Ambassador who operated with the authority that this
order gave him. There were several causes for this. First, and probably
the most important, was the situation in Washington itself where the same
interagency battles and jurisdictional disputes were magnified and inter-
ests even more solidly entrenched. Rather than having a Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs with an overriding loyalty to the President
and power to prod the bureaucracy, Eisenhower made use of the large and un-
wieldy National Security Council and its two powerful boards, the Opera-
tions Planning Board (OPB) and the Operations Control Board (OCB). Both
were made up of agency officials and were distinguished by thorough, indeed
ponderous, staffing that more often reflected compromise than clear deci-
sion. The OCB was charged with supervising and coordinating the execution
of Presidential decisions, but as Richard Moose has noted that it was the
conclusion of those who knew the OCB best that "effective coordination of
interagency operations requires either White House direction or at a mini-
mum active Presidential backing" but that the cardinal tenet of the system,
respect for departmental authority and responsibility, ran counter to
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this.5 Eisenhower himself seems to have realized the system's deficiencies
and considered the idea of creating a "secretary for international coordin-
ation," but he never pursued it. Thus, since there was no agency in Wash-
ington with directing and coordinating authority over the others, despite
the popular conception of the Secretary of State as primus inter pares, and
since orders from the National Security Council tended to reflect compro-
mise and staffing rather than clear direction, the ability of in-country
agency chiefs to appeal back to their Washington base negated the strong
words of Eisenhower's directive. This is a most compelling example of the
President's inability to command by words only. Without forceful Presi-
dential direction, bureaucratic politics did, in most cases, win the bat-
tle.
In 1963 the 'U. S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing
and Operations, under Senator Henry Jackson, examined the role of the Am-
bassador and the Country Team and drew some conclusions that were as valid
for the 1950's as they were for the following decade. Its study observed
that the amount of cooperation depended on the degree to which the agencies
were involved in operational matters. The ilitary Assistance Advisory
Groups and the CIA tended to be the least responsive to the Ambassador.
It was hard, it said, to have coordinated plans and operations as decisions
and pressures rarely hit the same participants at the same time. Agency
chiefs did not regard themselves as part of the Ambassador's staff but
looked to Washington for guidance and direction. Especially with regard
5. Richard M. Moose, "The White House NSC Staffs Since 1947," in Keith C.
Clark and. Laurence J. Legere (eds.), The President and the Management
of National Security (New Yoxsk: Praeger, 1969), pp. 67-68.
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to decisions that involved budgets and programming, the subcommittee's re-
port noted that "to a degree the primacy of the Ambassador is a polite fic-
tion."6 The situation was not seen as hopeless however, for it did con-
clude that a strong Ambassador could pull a team together though he might
not actually command it.
If personalities rather than organizational strength were seen as the
key to mission coordination, then other difficulties arose. Most Ambassa-
dors were neither trained nor inclined to be managers. Responding to years
of custom, they tended to view the heart of their task as reportorial and
representational but not in terms of organizational leadership and deci-
sions. If they were tempted to exercise more than general coordination
they faced formidable obstacles. Other agencies often far overshadowed the
State Department in terms of personnel and resources committed in a certain
country. The CIA, by its very nature, zealously guarded its operational
secrets. The Defense Department representatives commanded usually not only
the most sizable representation but could appeal to a powerful and wealthy
bureaucracy in Washington with institutionalized ties to Congress and the
American public that far outweighed those of the State Department.
With this as a background, what actually happened in Vietnam? While
there was cooperation initially, by 1960 it had sunk into a swamp of bitter
disagreement and bickering that knew few equals in the history of U. S.
foreign policy.
During the first year of U. S. involvement with the Diem regime how-
6. U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations
of the Committee on Government Operations. The Administration of
National Security: Basic Issues (Washington, D. C.: United States
Government PrintIng Office, 1963), p. 11.
029
ever, pacification advice was handled with remarkable smoothness. The
U. S. Mission in Saigon was run with a firm hand by General J. Lawton
Collins who came to Vietnam as a special envoy of the President with in-
structions to oversee all U. S. operations there. The entire pacification
program as it was then conceived was advised by the National Security Divi-
sion of the Franco-American Training Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM).?
Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, drawing on his key role in defusing the Huk Re-
bellion in the Philippines, served as its chief. Because he was a close
personal advisor to Diem on many subjects, he effectively dominated all
U. S. pacification advice to the Vietnamese, though specific programs of
other U. S. agencies were not directly under his control.
This National Security Division was one of five in TRIM, and it ad-
vised the Vietnamese Government on its National Security Action program to
bring peace, order, and government administration to the countryside, es-
pecially ex-Viet linh areas, and to combat dissidence by political/psycho-
logical action. While its members were mostly military, there were USOM
and USIS representatives. This division shows an unusual degree of unity
of effort among the U. S. agencies in dealing with pacification. However,
the U. S. Mission was relatively small at this point, and the programs the
National Security Division supervised were not as broadly conceived as those
CORDS managed later. Informal coordination was far easier to achieve.
Furthermore, because of Lansdale's personal flexibility and unusually close
7. USMAAG, Monthly Activities Report No. 27 for February 1955. 15 March
1955, SECRET. This can be found among other early MAAS files at the
Washington National Records Center, Job 60A1076, Box 5/6, "mAG Indo-
china General Administrative Files 1955, 319.1 Reports." See also Ap-
pendix IIpp. 13-14, for a discussion of conceptions of pacificition
during this period.
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relations with Diem, it is probable that the degree of coordination was
more a personal than an institutional achievement.
The division, established in January 1955, was dissolved in August
because of poor relations between the French and the Americans.8 Its
functions were divided between the new U. S. Military Assistance Advisory
Group (1MG) and other U. S. and French assistance agencies. Lansdale him-
self formed a staff section in MAG to handle "unconventional" matters
which included National Security Action and other pacification programs.
He remained in Vietnam in this capacity until late 1956 when he returned to
Washington. This ushered in a ten-year period in irhich responsibility for
pacification was scattered among different U. S. Government agencies.
Symtomatic of the Mission's lack of organization was the controversy
over the training of the Civil Guard. This was the local paramilitary
defense force, responsible to the Province Chief. The Civil Guard, and its
even poorer cousin the Self Defense Corps which ostensibly guarded the ham-
lets, were the only forces that were oriented directly toward defending the
people in the countryside. The regular army was organized and equipped to
face an overt North Vietnamese invasion, despite the fact that the pressure
of Viet Cong insurgency, and the inability of the paramilitary forces to
stand up to it, gradually pulled the army away from what originally was
conceived to be its primary mission. Regardless of this slow reorientation
these paramilitary forces bore the brunt of Viet Cong Military action in
the late 1950's.
8. Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper and Row,1972), pp. 218-219, 326. See also personal interview with Edward G.
Lansdale, 14 November 1974.
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The Michigan State University Acvisory Group, under contract to USOM
was given advisory responsibility for the Civil Guard in 1956. They viewed
it as a local police force, only lightly armed, capable of dealing with
small-scale armed dissidence. President Diem and the U. S. MAA3 envisioned
it as a large, semi-conventional but counter-guerrilla force that could deal
with internal security and free the regular army to face North Vietnam.
Right or wrong, the Embassy supported USOM and for almost two years with-
held most U. S. aid to the Civil Guard until Diem agreed to transfer the
force to the Midister of Interior. In late 1960, less than two years after
this, on MAA2's advice and against the Embassy's wishes, Diem gave responsi-
bility for the Civil Guard to the Ministry of Defense. Thus for five
critical years when such a local force possibly could have dealt with the
nascent violence, the U. S. Mission fought among itself over the responsi-
bility and concept for the Civil Guard. Diem, knowing these internal
struggles, was able to play off one part of the Mission against the other
and in the process became the "arbiter of, rather than a participant in,"
the U.S./GVN bargaining process. 9
As mentioned earlier, a key problem for anyone who would exercise
some sort of conceptual unity or centralized direction to the U. S. effort
in Vietnam was the sheer size of the military commitment. While most
would agree that sustained security is essential to pacification, there is
no question that the U. S. effort in Vietnam before 1961 as much as after-
ward was grossly unbalanced in favor of military aid, despite the fact that
by 1958 the U. S. economic aid mission was the largest anywhere. There was
9. USVNR, Vol. IV.A.4, pp. 4.1 and 22-33.
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no integrated program of economic and military assistance, though even be-
fore 1960 more than two billion dollars in aid went to South Vietnam, but
10
over 80" of this was earmarked for security. The MAG had over six
hundred members; the Embassy numbered but an insignificant fraction of this
figure. Even with the most harmonious of personalities it would have been
difficult for the Ambassador to control such a disproportionate effort.
Relations between the MAAG Chief, General Samuel T. Williams and the
Ambassador, G. Frederick Reinhardt, who replaced General Collins, were co-
operative and cordial. When asked by the State Department to review his
Country Team and coordinating procedures, Ambassador Reinhardt wrote to
General 'illiams requesting his views and advice. Williams' reply, while
also friendly, indicated that he had never even heard of President
Eisenhower's 1954 Executive Order. He pressed for better coordination and
exchange of information and for improved staff work for the Country Team
meetings.
In March 1957 Elbridge Durbrow replaced Reinhardt. Without making
a judgment between one or the other, it may be said safely that there was a
personality clash between Durbrow and Williams. The Ambassador set out to
bring the U. S. Mission under his command, to interpret the President's
Executive Order in the strongest light possible. In August he created a
Mission Coordination Staff responsible to his Deputy Chief of Mission.12
10. Ibid., p. 1.1.
11. Meimrandum, Ambassador to Chief, MAAG et al., Subj.: Coordination of
U. S. Programs Abroad at the Country Level, 28 May 1956. Memorandum,
LTG Williams to Mr. Reinhardt, Subj.: Coordination of United States
Program, 4 June 1956.
12. Memorandum, Daniel V. Anderson (DCM) to U. S. Mission Members,
30 July 1957.
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Four months later he informed the Mission's members that the Executive
order would be adhered to with forcefulness. All incoming and outgoing
correspondence had to be routed through the Embassy and at least coordinated
with other Mission agencies. His deputy would be the Mission's overall ex-
ecutive officer. The Ambassador declared that no document or information on
any program should be withheld if he requested it.13 Durbrow followed this
up by chastising Williams for failing to bring information to his attention,
for interpreting and reporting back Diem's "disappointment" with the U. S.
aid budget differently than did the Ambassador, for not coordinating road
building contracts, and for refusal to give intelligence sources in a re-
14 1
port. The General icily answered each of these charges. -' When inter-
viewed thirteen years later, he observed that the Embassy clearly was trying
to assert its power, to the extent of controlling every outgoing message,
briefing, or visitor, and he admitted that there was confusion as to just
who his superior was.16 In 1959 the battle was still on; the Ambassador
told Williams that he wished "to be informed of all communications of any
sort dealing with substantive matters sent by U. S. agencies in Vietnam"
prior to dispatch--which would indicate that his earlier efforts had been
1?
unsuccessful.
13. Memorandum, Ambassador Durbrow to the U. S. Mission, Subj.s Delegation
of Authority, Responsibilities, and Coordination, 26 November 1957.
14. Memorandum, Ambassador to General Williams, Subj.: Coordination, 17
December 1957.
15. Memorandum, General Williams to Ambassador, Subj.: Coordination, 23
December 1957, SECRET.
16. Personal Interview of General Williams conducted by Mr. Charles
von Luttichau, 12 November 1970, on file at the Center for Military
History.
17. Memorandum, Ambassador to General Williams, 25 July 1959.
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The state of Embassy/MAAG relations by this point was clear even to
outsiders. When Senators Albert Gore and Gale McGhee held hearings in
Saigon in December 1959, the Ambassador was asked pointed questions about
disagreements and lack of coordination and taken to task for his "apparent
inability to exert required leadership over concerted, coordinated Country
18
Team efforts." Relations between the two had so deteriorated that in
1960 Williams noted that he was subject to "yelling, cursing, and other
verbal abuse" from the Ambassador.1 9
A major policy issue that divided the two was support for Diem himself.
Williams was personally close to the Vietnamese leader. Durbrow by 1959
was fed up with Diem, constantly pressuring him to the point that Diem was
no longer receptive to his advice. Diem's enmity was set in cement when in
November 1960 he believed that Durbrow had advance warning of a coup and
did not inform him. Since the poor relations between Durbrow and Williams
were known to Diem, he was able to negate any Embassy pressure for reform
by turning to the U. S. military. It is beyond the intent of this disser-
tation to choose sides between the two; neither possessed the answer to the
insurgency, and the personalities of both no doubt exacerbated the disa-
greement. However, that the two should be able to disagree on such pro-
found issues with such emnity indicates a telling lack of leadership in
the U. S. Mission and an even more disturbing one in Washington which was
well aware of the problem. At a time when South Vietnam was faced with
mushrooming internal subversion under a unified politico/military leader-
ship, the U. S. riposte was fragmented, at times bitterly divided, and
18. morandum, author unknown, Subj.: Report on Meetings of Se r
bert Gore a d 'ale McGhee withMembers of U.S. Mission of 7-9September 19 oDecember 159.
19. Letter, General Wlliams to eneral Lansdale, 9 May 1960.
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lacking a clear conceptual response.
The generar problem of Country Team coordination was addressed by the
Draper Committee on military assistance which visited Saigon in February
1959 and reported to the President in June. It came out forcefully in
favor of the Ambassador's exercising "strong leadership in the planning
and programming of military assistance" and even said that the MAAG should
"function as his immediate staff for military assistance purposes.'20 yet
this was practically contradicted by their recommendation that the Presi-
dent give clearer responsibility for executing the entire U. S. military
assistance program to the Secretary of Defense. Later, the latter proposal
was adopted, but no change was made to tighten the Ambassador's powers. The
end result was that MAA chiefs looked more to Washington and less to the
Embassy for direction.
There were no organizational changes in the U.S. effort in 1960 though
in August General Williams went home to reti rement, bitter over his feud
with the Embassy and the fact that the State Department appeared to have
backed its subordinate with more power than did the Defense Department its
21
own. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr whose
personal relations with- the Ambassador were somewhat more harmonious,
though MAAG and the Embassy still had major policy differences.
This year did witness the first attempt by the U. S. Mission to
develop a unified conception and plan for dealing with the now highly-
20. Letter to the President of the United States from the President's
Committee to Study the United States Military Assistanee Program and
the Committee's Second Interim Report (Washington, D. C., 3 June 1959),
21. tetter, General Williams to General Lansdale, 28 June 1960.
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visible insurgency. In 1960 all elements of the Mission awoke to the
seriousness of the situation. In March the Joint Chiefs of Staff (note
the actor) initiated action to devise a plan to coordinate U. S. agencies
assistance programs and rationalize the Vietnamese Government's efforts in
the countryside. Three months later they recommended that U. S. Government
agencies (note that they did not say the Ambassador) "encourage the GVN to
adopt a national emergency organization to integrate civil and military
resources under centralized direction for the conduct of counterinsurgency
operations," yet nothing was said to remedy the fragmentation on the Ameri-
can side.22
The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) as this planning exercise in 1960 be-
came known occupied the Mission for much of the year. In so far as coordi-
nation and cooperation went, it was a successful Country Team effort. No
real disharmony appears to have marked its progress through the Mission,
though by the points it recommended it clearly was not a victory for
23Durbrow's "get tough" policy with Diem.2 In the CIP, internal security
did assume primacy for the first time; the fear of immediate North Viet-
namese invasion gradually was laid to rest. The plan however said nothing
about the organization of the U. S. effort. Instead, it complained about
poor organization in the Vietnamese military chain of command. Just as
MAAG wanted the Vietnamese military high command to control all military
forces including the paramilitary Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, it
wished to control U. S. advice to all these forces. This may not have
been wrong in conception since U. S. civilian advice and support to the
22. USVNR, IV.A-5, p. 60.
23. See Message, Saigon to State 276, 4 January 1961 for a copy of the
plan.
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paramilitary forces had been woefully inadequate, but this meant assigning
a secondary role to MAAG which, given its clear interest in the conventional
forces, would result in Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps receiving the
diminutive share of MAAG's interest, emphasis, and understanding. Advisory
responsibility for these forces was transferred to MAAG in December, and
for seven years these forces languished on the back burner until two force-
ful personalities, General Abrams and Ambassador Komer, took an interest in
them and U. S. responsibility for their support was transferred to CORDS
which viewed them as the key to its undertaking.
1960 was a transition year between the 1950's when Vietnam was one of
many small trouble spots and 1961 and beyond which saw it occupy more and
more of the government's and the President's attention. While there were
no organizational changes, on issues the Department of Defense/MAAG axis
began to win out over that of the State Department/Embassy. This and the
sheer pressure of events in Vietnam began to drive the U. S. toward an em-
phasis on physical security and military response.
1961 was more eventful. President Kennedy made decisions during this
year about U. S. organization for Vietnam that remained largely unaltered
until 1966. In fact in this year the general structure of the American
24
organizational response to Vietnam for the entire war was set. In May
he decided not to create an extra-bureaucratic manager for Vietnam but to
leave responsibility for coordination and direction to himself and his
staff, the government agencies concerned, and ad hoc interagency task
forces. In November and December he decided to set up a full Military As-
24. See C. M. Cooke, Jr., "Organizational Constraints on U. S. Performance
in Vietnam" (Unpublished paper on file at the Center for Military
History, 1971),. pp. 12-13.
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sistance Command in Vietnam of which the old M.AAG would be but a subsidiary
element.
Before detailing these events, one must appreciate that Kennedy's ar-
rival in the White House meant a substantial change in the management of
foreign policy. He was against bureaucratic restraints, though he recog-
nized their existence. To begin with he immediately downgraded the cumber-
some National Security Council and used it only infrequently. Eisenhower's
Operations Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board were abolished
in February. Action was to be at the center; Kennedy, one observer felt,
viewed policy less as a tool and more as a set of reasons behind the action
25program.
Instead of the large boards, Kennedy used a small, select staff under
his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy,
responsible directly to him to funnel both formal agency information and
policy proposals and also to seek out and strengthen the position of people
in the bureaucracies whose ideas might not make it up through normal chan-
nels. The same informality applied to implementation. Arthur Schlesinger
noted that the Kennedy staff realized they were "powerless without allies
throughout the permanent government," that merely expressing a wish was not
26
enough. To aid in this control and to increase the diversity of informa-
tion reaching the President, Kennedy insisted on the White House receiving
raw intelligence information or cables from the field. His staff was to act
as his eyes and ears. Interagency coordination usually was dominated by
25. Moose, op. cit., p. 71.
26. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1965), p. 413.
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McGeorge 3undy and his staff.27 though from time to time Kennedy resorted
to the device of interagency task forces to deal with particular problems.
The President had earnestly hoped that the State Department would serve as
his agent of coordination,28 but because of White House dissatisfaction with
the responsiveness of the department and the unwillingness of Secretary Rusk
to play a stronger role, this was not to occur.
Despite this air of prescience presented by Schlesinger and others,
Kennedy, especially in his first year as President, may have realized im-
perfectly the difficulties of organization and getting implementation
through the bureaucracies. He appears often to have expressed a wish and
then assumed it would be handled by his staff and the agencies without
persistent Presidential follow-up. The case of the Jupiter missiles in
Turkey in 1962 and his surprise that they still were in place show that this
problem lasted beyor.the first year. One Presidential assistant said that
Kennedy had no sense of how to move the bureaucracies that'he would casually
mention a problem to some official and say: "Why don't you handle it?"
without realizing that the official had to work with and through many
others.29 This was not a case of bureaucracies defying the President's
27. Moose, op. cit., p. 71.
28. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 426.
29. Personal Interview with General Taylor, 14 May 1975. General Lansdale
who operated at a level below that of Schlesinger and was far more vul-
nerable to bureaucratic and organizational attack, takes the same view,
but one that may be more colored by his experiences and personality. He
stated that he did not think that Kennedy was suited by background and
training to let him be an executive who would conceive of things and
then see that they were carried out. "He wouldn't understand whether
his ideas were being carried out or not, and didn't realize that he had
to be very strong in authority. He expected his agents to get things
done, though he didn't always back them up enough."--Personal inter-
view with Edward Lansdale, 14 November 1974 in Alexandria, Virginia.
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orders, but rather of his telling individuals to do something and these
same individuals then would make their own compromises with fellow staff
members and the bureaucracies without the President's really knowing it.
In January Brigadier General Lansdale, then the Special Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, returned from a visit to
Vietnam and submitted a significant report on the situation. President
Kennedy read the report with interest and alarm, even considering sending
Lansdale out as the new Ambassador. Hilsman stated that Kennedy had "all
but decided" on the appointment but that this move raised a storm in the
Pentagon where Lansdale was viewed as "too political an officer." 3 0
Lansdale himself felt that it was blocked by the State Department, Rusk ap-
parently having said he would resign if it was forced on him. The opposi-
tion, according to Lansdale, was personal as well as organizational.31
In his report Lansdale proposed that the U. S. Government pick and send
to Vietnam a small group of its best and most experienced people, tie them
in closely to Vietnamese leaders, free them from bureaucratic and agency en-
cumbrances, and back them up. He recommended that Durbrow and Arthur
Gardiner, the USOM Chief, be replaced, but he did not advocate a proconsular
ambassador merely a better leader. He did however go on to recommend that
the Mission needed a special man for political operations to help the Viet-
namese create a foundation of their own style for a more democratic yet
strong government. This man must, he said, combine a sense of national
30. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 419.
31. Lansdale Interview, op. cit.
32. Memorandum, Lansdale to Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Subj.: Vietnam, 17 Janary 1960 as reprinted in USVNR, Vol.
V.B.4.I, pp. 1-13.
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security with sensitivity to Vietnamese feelings. He can only have been ad-
vocating his own appointment. Indeed, during 1960 he had tried unsuccess-
fully to return to Vietnam as a confidential advisor to President Diem but
had been rejected by the State Department.33
Meanwhile resistance to Durbrow's attempts to assert Ambassadorial con-
trol was growing in Defense Department and spreading from Saigon to
Washington. On March 27th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Secretary
McNamara who expressed dissatisfaction with the Country Team situation in
Saigon. MAAG, he felt, should have a direct military line of command to the
34i
Department of Defense. The next day Lieutenant General T.J.H. Trapnell,
returning from a visit to Vietnam, reported to the Joint Chiefs that there
should be a change in the American chain of command. Echoing the growing
frustration of General McGarr with Ambassador Durbrow, he noted that mili-
tary problems were being reviewed by the Country Team and changes made on
military not political grounds. The Country Team, he charged, had over-
controlled and overcoordinated military matters. In a statement that re-
flected the institutional military view, he recommended:
When the internal security situation of a country
deteriorates to the point where it is obvious that
military action of intervention is the only answer,
I feel that the Country Team concept of control and
coordination under the Ambassador should not apply and
33. There is extensive documentation on this in the following files:
General Williams Papers File No. 136 "Lansdale" at the Center for
Military History, and the State Department's East Asia/Vietnam rec-
ords, Job No. 66D193, Box 5378, File on "General Lansdale."
34. Memorandum for Record, William Bundy, Subj.: JCS-SECDEF Meeting
on March 27 to discuss Laos and Vietnam, 27 March 1961, TOP SECRET.
General Trapnell presented the findings of his trip verbally, and
there was a long discussion on the advisability of the Country Team
mechanism as applied to Laos and Vietnam.
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that pure military matters should be the responsibil-
ity of the senior U. S. officer in the country concerned.
Military directives should not come through the Ambassa-
dor for his review but directly through military channels
in order that military directives and policy decisions will
not be influenced by noAmilitary thinking and direction
in a hot war situation."'
The Joint Chiefs asked the Secretary of Defense to study this problem as
they realized that any change would require interdepartmental action and
Presidential approval.36 While nothing was done immediately, these ideas
would bear fruit later in the year.
The U. S. Government was groping at this point for some kind of solu-
tion. The President had decided to replace Durbrow with Frederick E.
Nblting, previously the Deputy Ambassador to NATO, but both within the
White House and the Defense Department officials were proposing more radi-
cal solutions. At a middle-level planning luncheon on March 28th, Walt
Rostow, then a White House Special Assistant, stressed the necessity for
better cooperation between the new Ambassador and General McGarr. He said
that he had discussed reorganizing Washington support for "areas directly
threatened," such as Laos and Vietnam, with McNamara. George McGhee of the
State Department said that he had been sponsoring the idea of a "crisis
commander" in the State Department with a full-time duty officer and a "war
35. Ralph Stavins, Richard Barnet, and Marcus Raskin, Washirgton Plans
Agressive War (New Yorks Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 29-30. The
authors obtained a direct quotation from the original report.
Trapnell's visit to Vietnam was directed by the Secretary of Defense.
36. Memorandum, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary
of Defense, JCSM-202-61, Subj.a South Vietnam, 31 March 1961, SECRET.
Gilpatric sent a rather short reply noting that direct military com-
munication with Washington was being discussed with the State Depart-
ment--Memorandum, Roswell Gilpatric to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Subj.a South Vietnam, 12 April 1961, SECRET.
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room." William Bundy, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of In-
ternational Security Affairs, observed that there was general approval of
this suggestion.37
On the 12th of April Rostow told the President that he should appoint
a "full-time, first-rate back-stop man in Washington" for Vietnam, and in-
formed him that "McNamara, as well as your staff, believes this to be es-
sential.,,38 Shortly after this Mc'amara came to Lansdale following an "in-
tellectual" dinner at the house of Robert Kennedy and asked him to come up
with ideas for what to do about Vietnam and counterinsurgency. This was
the genesis of the Gilpatric Task Force. He presented his reconmenda-
tions on the 19th. A task force should be established to "supervise and co-
ordinate" the activities of every U. S. agency carrying out operations in
Vietnam. It should be of interagency composition but administratively sup-
ported by whichever organization p.rovided the director. The new Ambassador
was to be presented with an action plan and a special three-man Task Force
staff to accompany him. Lansdale asked that he be sent to Vietnam with the
Ambassador to make use of his close contacts with the Vietnamese and to com-
mand the initial implementation of the Task Force proposals.40
McNamara took these ideas to the cabinet meeting the next day, and the
President directed that Roswell Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
37. William P. Bundy, Memorandum for Record, Subj.: Planning Luncheon
March 28th, 28 March 1961, SECRET.
38. Memorandum, Walt Rostow to President, 12 April 1961 as quoted in USVNR,
Vol. IVB.l, p. 23.
39. Lansdale Interview, op. cit.
40. Memorandum, Lansdale(u-nsigned) to Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Subj.: Vietnam, 19 April 1961 as reprinted in USVNR, Vol.
V.B.4.I. pp. 22-35.
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should head an ad hoc task force on Vietnam to prepare a plan to counter
the Viet Cong and then carry it out Lansdale was to be the operations
41
officer.
lansdale's recommendations closely foreshadowed those formally made
by Gilpatric when the Task Force reported back to the President a week
later.42 The President, he said, should declare Vietnam a "critical area"
and give "overall direction, interagency coordination, and support of the
program" to a Presidential Task Force, of interagency composition but with
the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the Director and Lansdale as its opera-
tions officer in Vietnam. Lansdale, he stated, "will proceed to Vietnam
immediately after the program receives Presidential approval. Following
on-the-spot discussions with U. S. and Vietnamese officials, he will for-
ward to the Director of the Task Fbrce specific recommendations for action
... " Recognizing the obvious jurisdictional problems, he sidestepped
gingerly around relations with the new Ambassador, who had sat in on the
drafting of the Task Force Report:
The Ambassador as head of the Country Team is
assigned the authority and responsibility to see that
the program is carried out in the field and to determine
the timing of the actions. He is authorized to advise
the Director of the Task Force of any changes which he
believes should be made in the program.
41. Meimorandum, William Bundy to Paul Mitze, Subj.: South Vietnam Task
Force, 21 April 1961, SECRET. Chester Bowles, the State Under Secre-
tary was substituting for Rusk at this meeting which _ma account for
the lack of State Department opposition at this point--Personal In-
terview with Mr. William Moss of the John F. Kennedy Library, 13 May
1975.
42. Memorandum, Roswell Gilpatric to President, Subj.: Vietnam, 27 April.
1961 with attachment, "A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domi-
nation of South Vietnam, 26 April 1961, both TOP SECRET but virtually
all of these are reprinted in USVNR, V.B.4.I, pp. 42-56.
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In carrying out his duties in the field the opera-
tions officer of the Task Farce 1611 cooperate with the
Ambassador and the Country Team.
While it was not directly stated, the implication was that for activities
related to the counterinsurgency program in Vietnam, the Ambassador would
report to the Task Force Director.
President Kennedy made no immediate decision on organization. At a
meeting two days after the report was submitted, he approved only the
limited military proposals of the draft.
In the next weeks, Gilpatric and Lansdale's organizational innovations
were altered so as to constitute little change from the current practice.
The State Department appears to have taken the lead in this, though
Lansdale's possible appointment did not sit well with the military
either. Under George Ball, then Deputy Under Secretary, the State De-
partment drastically revised the organizational proposals, deleting en-
tirely Lansdale's special role and advocating abolishing the existing Task
Force. A new Task Force was to be formed with Ball as its Director.
iansdale was so strongly opposed to these developments that he advised
McNamara and Gilpatric that the Defense Department should:
stay completely out of the Task Force directorship
as now proposed by State...Having a defense officer,
myself or someone else, placed in a position of only
partial influence and of no decision permissibility
43. Ibid.
44. Both volumes IV.B.1 (pp. 29 and 35) and IV.B.3 (p.19) of USVNR point
to the State Department as does Mr. Robert Komer--personal~dcussion
in September 1974. Hilsman, op. cit., p. 419 and 439 singles out the
military. The Joint Chiefs opposition to Lansdale does not appear to
have been open for in their comments on the original draft, they
agreed with the military recommendations but did not specifically re-
ject the organizational changes proposed--Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of
Staff for Secretary of Defense JCSM-288-61, Subj.: A Program of Ac-
tion for Vietnam, 28 April 1961. Lansdale Interview, op. cit.
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would be only to provide State with a scapegoat to
share the blame when we have a flop...The U.S. past
performance and theory of action, which State ap-
parent.y desires to continue, simply offers no sound
basis for winning, as desired by President Kennedy.,5
In the State Department's final recommendations, the proposed Task
Force was even further downgraded to a conventional interagency committee
below even the Assistant Secretary level.46 Established in and directed by
State, the Task Fbrce was to have as its director Sterling Cottrell whose
highest previous post was that of Political Advisor to the Commander in
Chief of U. S. Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC). For Vietnam, the Ambas-
sador was asked to "consider" special field arrangements to assure rapid
Country Team response to problems--scarcely a radical recommendation. The
President adopted these on May llth, thus implicitly rejecting any radical
organizational change.
Why did the President discard the Gilpatric/Lansdale proposals and re-
tain an organizational apparatus that many, including perhaps himself,
realized to be inadequate? Specifically, did the President back down in
the face of strong resistance from the State Department and the military or
was his choice a conscious decision to leave relationships largely as they
were for other reasons?
There is no doubt that the State Department took the lead among the
bureaucracies in fighting these proposals. The authors of the Pentagon
Papers on this period felt that the responsibility was primarily State's,
and the flow of documents supports this viewpoint. Having just had a bat-
tle of several years duration between the MAAG Chief and the Ambassador
45. USVNR, IV.B.l, p. 36.
46. a 6aem
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with Lansdale strongly opposing the Ambassador and advocating views, such
as full support for Diem, that were questioned by the Department, State had
ample reason to oppose the Task Force as originally conceived. In addition
the original April proposals would have flown in the face of the concept of
Ambassadorial primacy. The Ambassador, for operations at least, would have
been reporting to a Defense-dominated Task Force with its own representa-
tive running operations in Vietnam.
It should be appreciated however that U. S. military resistance ex-
isted also. The Task Force, whose two most important positions were to be
held by officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and not the
Joint Chiefs or military services, would have violated the usual chain of
command, shortcircuiting the MAA Chief, the Pacific Commander, and the
Joint Chiefs. It has already been seen just how sensitive the Joint Chiefs
and General McGarr were to outside interference, and the Pacific Commander
would demonstrate his own sensitivities on this subject later in the year
when the question of a military command came up. The Task Force and its
operations officer could not have avoided making detailed military opera-
tional decisions. Lansdale was known also as an unconventional officer,
much of whose career had been divorced from normal military career patterns.
His ties with the CIA would also raise bureaucratic hackles. The effect,
in essence, would have been to remove the Joint Chiefs from their key
decision-making position for Vietnam. During 1961 one can observe a clear
desire of the Joint Chiefs to increase Military independence, culminating in
setting up of a military command in Vietnam in early 1962. This push was
well in evidence by early May. The creation of an independent super Task
Force would have quashed all this.
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Thus, bureaucratically and organizationally these agencies had good
reason to battle against the arrangements proposed by Gilpatric and
Lansdale. The available documentation supports the importance of their
resistance, Yet there is no clear evidence that the President actually
backed away because of it. The story is far more complex, and if the
President did retreat from a once personally-preferred solution, bureau-
cratic opposition seems to be only one of many reasons. In enumerating
these, one must appreciate that there is no first-hand evidence on what
the President actually thought nor any that he had a clear preference. He
may simply have postponed the decision in his mind and then lost track of
it altogether in the press of more urgent business.
To begin with, these decisions were taken in the shadow of the crisis
in Laos; the real focus of the Administration's worry in this period was on
Laos, not Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers have observed that there is no in-
dication in the available record that the immediate Vietnam situation was a
major influence in the decision to create a new program. Instead the
hypothesis was advanced that the Gilpatric Task Force itself and the
programs it recommended had as their object using a U. S. response in Viet-
nam to be a signal for Laos, to show that we did not mean to be expelled
from Southeast Asia; reassuring the Vietnamese was only a secondary ob-
jective. If the situation was not judged an emergency at this point,
then a major organizational shake-up, which would have implied an emer-
gency, was unlikely.
Lansdale himself may have been a factor. In the initial days of the
47. USVNR, Vol. IV.B.l, pp. 20-21 and 31.
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new administration his experience and unconventional approach commended him
to the White House leadership, but further exposure to his ideas may have
dampened their enthusiasm. The authors of the Pentagon Papers volume on
this period observed, in contrast to others who saw Lansdale's demise merely
in terms of bureaucratic resistance, that on several issues, such as the
liberation of North Vietnam and full support for Diem, his views "went well
beyond what the Administration judged reasonable." Furthermore, his un-
questioned abilities in personal political relations may have been can-
celled out by his already-recognized problems with management and organiza-
tion.
There are also indications that the Administration's interest in
developing count-erinsurgency were more important to starting the Gilpatric
exercise than the desire to improve organization for Vietnam specifically.
Organizational innovation for Vietnam was quickly advocated and just as
rapidly discarded. Indeed, the organizational changes that were Presi-
dentially generated, the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) and the Joint
Chief's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (see
below), dealt with counterinsurgency worldwide, though the pressure of
events dictated in practice an overwhelming emphasis on Vietnam. Perhaps
the more basic, underlying reason for the President's unwillingness to
create a strong, centrally-directed organization relates to more general
theories of Presidential conduct. Presidents, not unlike many executives,
abhor making difficult, unpleasant decisions. They would rather stall on
them. Most important is to preserve the President's options and freedom of
48. lid.., p. 36.
49. Ibid., pp. 20-21 and Lansdale Interview, op. it.
050
action as much as possible. TUrning problems over to a committee is a
time-tested way of avoiding or at least postponing hard choices. The send-
ing of special missions and the formation of various task forces during
Kennedy's first two years show that he had no intention of giving directive
power for Vietnam to one man short of himself. Lansdale, indeed any strong
single manager, probably would have come up with an action program that
would have been far more difficult to refuse or put off coming from one
man, publicly designated as "Mr. Vietnam" rather than as the product of
lengthy interagency battling at lower levels. Turning the war over to
single supra-agency management would have tended also to cut off aixiliary
lines of communication to the President, for he could not easily avoid hav-
ing Vietnam information first channeled through the man designated as in
charge of Vietnam. Richard Neustadt, in his book Presidential Politics
which was influential with Kennedy, said that the President must keep com-
petition and clashes within and among bureaucracies, a policy of divide and
rule, which produces choice, due notice, and time to defer a decision.50
One should, he observed, avoid too much structuring, lest the President
lose his personal hold, and build competition into the system. There are
strong similarities between these views and the way Kennedy actually ran
the government.
Thus the decision not to accept the Gilpatric/Lansdale proposals con-
tains far more than the very obvious bureaucratic resistance would suggest.
Organizational dissatisfaction existed, but an equally strong case can be
made for rational calculation and Presidential indecision.
50. Bichard E. Neustadt Presidential P9wer: the Politics of Leadership(New York: John Wiley & son5s, .yv), unapter 7.
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In late May the President did take one step to improve coordination
of U. S. programs in foreign countries by sending a letter to all U. S. Am-
bassadors of Chiefs of Mission. Chester Bowles, the Under Secretary of
State, was given the task of drafting it; Kennedy wanted U. S. agencies
abroad to speak with a common voice and avoid situations where one agency
could be played off against another by a foreign government. Schlesinger
noted that the letter, aimed especially at the C.I.A., was resisted not
only by them, but by the Defeinse Department, the Peace Corps, and even some
Poreign Service Officers who did not want to be involved in management. 5 1
Such resistance is hard to understand for the letter changed little and
actually was weaker than President Eisenhower's 1954 Executive Order and a
later Presidential memorandum that replaced it in 1960. The letter, which
was identical to all Ambassadors, told Nolting that he was to "oversee and
coordinate all the activities of the U. S. Government" in Vietnam.52 it
said "supervise" not "direct." The Ambassador was to communicate problems
to the Department of State not directly to the President. Given the De-
partment's known weakness, this could not enhance his position in inter-
agency disputes. Other agencies were allowed full communication with their
home offices and could appeal Ambassadorial decisions to Washington through
their own agencies. The Mission Chief could have agency members removed
from the country, but the President was "confident" that this would seldom
happen. Military attaches and MUs were placed under the Ambassador,
but operational military forces under a U. S. area military commander were
excluded and given a direct line of authority to the Joint Chiefs, the
51. Schlesinger, o i p. 426.
52. USMVN, Vol. IV.B.3, pp. 19-20.
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Secretary of Defense, and the President. Tnere is no doubt that the two
were at least to be co-equal, and the tone and emphasis indicate that the
military commander actually was thought to be the more senior. When the
military command was created in early 1962 in Vietnam, this is exactly what
happened. As the Pentagon Papers observed, the effect in Vietnam of the
President's letter was "to preserve claims for independent authority for
each of the major governmental departments involved."5 3
The Vietnam Task Fbrce under Sterling Cottrell functioned throughout
Kennedy's Presidency, but it is hard to discover anywhere that it had major
influence or played an important role. It had no control over resources,
no independent information system, and no field contingent in Vietnam. It
was involved in day-to-day matters and did little directing. Instead the
President dispatched three major missions, each ad hoc and non-insUtiutional,
to Vietnam. The first was by Vice President Johnson who had the following
to say about the American effort on his return:
WVe must have coordination of purpose in our country team,
diplomatic and military. The Saigon Embassy, USIS, MAA
and related operations leave much to be desired. They
should be brought up to maximum efficiency. The most im-
portant thing is imaginative, creative, American manage-
ment of our military aid program.
If not calling for direct central management, he joined a lengthening line
of senior officials who recognized that all was not well with American or-
ganization for Vietnam.
less than a month later the President sent an economic mission under
Dr. Eugene Staley to Vietnam to work out a joint U.S./GVN program to tackle
53. Ibid.
54. Memorandum, Vice President to Presi ent,Subj.: Mission to Southeast
4. d a P stan, 23 May 191 as reprinted in USVNR, Vol.
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economic issues. The mission actually became more of a vehicle for mili-
tary recommendations. It did adopt, however, a conceptual point of view,
not necessarily new, that as much as any characterized the government's
sense of pacification. Security should be given first priority, it said,
but lasting success depended on social and economic programs to be applied
in conjunction with those of the military; longer-range development pro-
grams were to follow after these. 55 A specific action program was proposed
in conjunction with these sequences. They also recommended parallel U. S.
and GVN committees each of which would unify their country's efforts and
have military and economic/social subcommittees to implement the action
program. Had this been carried out fully, the U. S. pacification program
would have been unified significantly. President Kennedy, and it would ap-
pear the rest of the U. S. Government also, chose to ignore the organiza&.
tional proposals but did agree formally with the three basic tenets of'
security first, then economic/social action, and finally long-term develop-
ment. Ie did however state that:
...the chief responsibility for the planning and
execution of the U. S. share of the program will, more
than ever, rest with the Amb sador and under his di-
rection, with MAAG and USOM.
The final and most important mission sent in 1961 was initiated at an
October llth meeting of the National Security Council at which the President
decided to send a special group, led by Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to
55. Report, Vu Quoc Thuc and Eugene Staley to President Ngo Dinh Diem and
President John F. Kennedy, Subj.: Joint Action Program Proposed by the
Vietnam-United States Special Financial Groups, July 1961 as reprinted
in USVNR, Vol. V.B.4.I, pp. 182-226.
56 National Security Action Memorandum No. 65, Subj.: Joint Program of Ac-
tB IG p t 24.Vietnam, 11 August 1961 as reprinted in
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Vietnam primarily to see whether U. S. ground force intervention was feas-
ible and desirable but also to make an appraisal of the overall situation
and "explore ways in which assistance of all types might be more effec-
tive."57
No senior State Department official was included, their highest rank-
ing representative being Sterling Cottrell. Schlesinger felt that "the
very composition" of this mission "expressed a conscious decision by the
Secretary of State" to turn Vietnam over to the Secretary of Defense.5 8
Rusk, he said, decided to do this as the military aspects seemed the most
urgent, and Kennedy agreed because he had more confidence in McNamara and
Taylor than theState Department. Ambassador Nolting has stated that
Secretary Rusk felt that his department had been "burned" over Laos and
59that he was happy to see Defense step in. Dealing with Vietnam, he ob-
served, was a job that nobody really wanted and that McNamara was filling
a void reluctantly. Rostow confirmed this reluctance saying that McNamara
consciously and systematically deferred to Rusk whenever the Secretary of
60
State took a firm position. Taylor took a different view; Defense was
more energetic with more resources whereas State and AID were not used to
57. National Security Action Memorandum No. 104, Subj.: Southeast Asia, 13
October 1961 as reprinted in USVR, V.B.4.I, p.328. Kennedy's personal
letter of instruction while emphasizing the military threat also
stressed the importance of the Vietnamese doing the job themselves,
and, he noted that "While the military part of the problem is of great
importance in South Vietnam, its political, social, and economic ele-
ments are equally significant, and I shall expect your appraisal and
your recommendations to take full acccount of them."--Letter, President
Kennedy to General Taylor, 13 Ootober 1961 as reprinted in USVNR, Vol.
V.B.4.I, p. 327.
58. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 545.
59. Personal Interview with Ambassador Noiting, 7 November 1974.
60. -Alt 'W Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan Co.,1972),
p. 161. -tI
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planning and programming. He still faulted State for not assuming more of
a coordinating and supervisory role however. 6 1 But Taylor also believed
that Rusk felt that the preponderance of the U. S. effort in Vietnam was
military and for that reason McNamara and the Department of Defense should
have a stronger leadership role. 62 Rixsk and McNamara, he said, carefully
deferred to the other in each other's bailiwick.
General Taylor and his mission traveled to Vietnam in October and re-
ported back to the President in early November. Despite the President's in-
structions he focused on the sending of American troops, but the complexity
of the entire program prompted him to tell the President that:
...it will be a major challenge to our governmental
machinery in Washington to see that the many segments
of the program which involve many departments and
agencies are executed with maximum energy and proper
timing. I would suggest that a formalized procedure be
established and pro-mulggted to insure effective and
orderly implementation. 3
While Taylor did not pursue this point in detail, his admonition was one
more indication that there was need for unity and coordination in Washing-
ton. His proposal for organization in Vietnam itself was slightly more
specific. The United States, he said, should establish a "limited
partnership" with the Vietnamese at all levels, one aspect of which might
be the appointment of Lansdale as a personal advisor to President Diem-.64
At least four times Diem requested Lansdale in this capacity, but the Presi-
dent never sent him out. Rostow blamed Nolting, McGarr, and their respec-
61. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: Norton & Co.,
1972), p. 161.
62. Personal Interview with'General Taylor, 14 May 1975.
63. Letter, General Taylor to President, 3 November 1961, TOP SECRET.
64. "Eval ions and Conclusions" from the Taylor-Rostow Report, 3 Novem-
ber 191TOP SECRET.
tive Washington agencies, saying that none of them wanted another American
so close to Diem.65
Lansdale himself made the most radical recommendations. The President
should go before Congress with a declaration of "sublimited" war and create
an executive agency to:
carry out the President's desires...The agency must be
able to devote all of its time and energies to the task.
It must be elevated high enough to demand and get ef-
fective contributions from all U. S. entities, including
State and Defense, and be quickly responsive to the
Executive will. The present rask Forces have neither
the stature nor the permanent personnel required. It
would be preferable to have a small task force headed
by a Presidential Assistant, with members from each
U. S. department and agency assigned to it full time,
with its own channel of communication to the field, with
complete control of the budget to counter the emergency
in the country involved, and with a clear statement of
its priggities in drawing on the men, money, and material
needed.
This new executive agency would send an operational manager to Vietnam who
would pull together the entire U. S. counterinsurgency effort with only
general guidance from the Ambassador. Local trouble spots in Vietnam would
have their own special task forces whose directors would command support
and personnel from all U. S. agencies involved.
Lansdale's proposal was ignored, but it is interesting as it was by far
the most clear and precise "radical" proposal for U. S. organization for
Vietnam during the early years.6 7
65. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, op. cit., p. 278. Even Sterling
Cottrell, the State Department representative on the mission, approved
the idea of sending Lansdale out as a special advisor.
66. Memorandum, Lansdale to General Taylor, Subj.: Vietnam, no date,
SECRET. This was included as an annex to the Taylor-Rostow Report.
67. Taylor states that it probabl never was included in the final set of
ars ttw en the Presient--Personal Interview with General
General Taylor's trip did lead to a major organizational change. The
change was foreshadowed when he advocated in his report that there was a
need to change the charter, spirit, and organization of MAAG, shifting it
to "something nearer--but not quite--an operational headquarters in a
theater of war." While the Joint Chiefs had been on record in favor of
an operational command earlier in the year, Taylor's comment was followed
almost immediately by two months of decision-making over just this idea.
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara seconded Taylor when they made their
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own recommendations to Kennedy a week later. 9But, the real impetus came
two days after their meeting with the President when McNamara asked the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Lyman Lemnitzer, for his comments on
the possibility of setting up a command structure in which the military
commander in Vietnam would assume responsibility for all activities re-
lated to the counterinsurgehcy effort.70 This would have placed pacifica-
tion clearly under the military, and the new commander would have reported
directly to the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary, by-passing both the Ambas-
sador and the Pacific Commander. McNamara considered the latter an ob-
struction and was anxious to remove him from the chain of command. 71
68. "Evaluations and Conclusions" from the Taylor-Rostow Report, .* cit.,
Top secret, p. 13.
69. Memorandum, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to the President, Subj:
South Vietnam, 11 November 1961 as reprinted in USVNR, V.B.4.I,
pp. 359-366.
70. Memorandum, McNamara to General Lemnitzer, Subj.: Command Structure
for South Vietnam, 13 November 1961, TOP SECRET (Grp. 3).
71. Personal discussion with Mr. Vincent Demma of the Center for Military
History, November 1974. Confirmed in personal interview with General
Taylor, 14 May 1975.
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Curiously, the Joint Chiefs do not appear to have understood this
proposal, so McNamara reiterated it in more detail and went on to note
specifically that he and Rusk envisaged military responsibility for the
part of the economic aid program that directly related to pacification.72
William Bundy of ISA meanwhile was holding exploratory discussions with AID
officials.
The Joint Chiefs did not enthusiastically accept McNamara's proposal.
The stumbling block lay in having the field commander report directly to
them rather than going through the Pacific Command. More serious resist-
ance came from the State Department, though not from Secretary Rusk who
initially supported McNamara's position. Ambassador Nolting strongly
opposed the plan. Alexis Johnson preferred to find the "right man," rather
than change the organization and observed that the title "commander" would
indicate a violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords. This and other diffi-
culties he argued to Dean Rusk.
On November 22nd General Lemnitzer replied formally to McNamara, opt-
ing for the idea of a subordinate unified command under CINJCPAC. This not
72. Memorandum, William Bundy to McNamara, 14 November 1961. UNCIASSIFIED
with attached draft memorandum, McNamara to Lemnitzer, Subj.: Command
Structure for South Vietnam, 14 November 1961, TOP SECRET (Grp. 3).
The Joint Chiefs appear to have been thinking only about increasing
MAAG and changing its terms of reference--See Memorandum, Director of
Joint Staff for Chairman, Subj.i South Vietnam, 14 November 1961 as
reprinted in USVN, Vol. V.B.4.I, pp. 368-399 especially pp. 397-398.
73. Note, William Bundy to McNamara, Subj.s Re the Vietnam Command
Problem, 17 November 1961, TOP SECRET (Grp. 3).
74. Memorandum, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of
Defense, JCSM-812-61, Subj.: South Vietnam, 22 November 1961, TOP
SECRET (Grp. 3).
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only kept the Pacific Commander in the chain of command thus skirting a
jurisdictional battle with Admiral Harry Felt, but to the Joint Chiefs it
meant that, in accordance with the President's May 29 letter to Nolting,
the new commander would be co-equal to and separate from the Ambassador.
Pacification activities, they agreed, should be given to the U.S. military
chief in Vietnam. McNamara approved the Chiefs concept and gave up on his
attempt to bypass CINCPAC.75
By the beginning of December Alexis Johnson had won over Rusk. The
State Department, worried that a new command would mean a "100% commitment
to saving South Vietnam," said that the military man should have neither a
new title nor a fourth star, though surprisingly they did not object to the
concept of co-equal status. The C.I.A., while not resisting coordination,
did not want the military to have command over any of their activities as
McNamara had envisaged originally. William Bundy observed to McNamara that
while AID and CIA objections were resolvable, State's would "gut" the
proposals. 76
McNamara tried to persuade Rusk that such a command was necessary and
that while the commander would be co-equal with the Ambassador, the Presi-
dent's May 29th letter would be adhered to especially as regards keeping the
Ambassador fully informed.77
No military man would be nominated who could not work under this ar-
75. Memorandum, William Bundy to Alexis Johnson et al., Subj.: Command
Arrangements for Vietnam, 28 November, 1961, TOP SECRET
76. Memorandum, William Bundy to McNamara, Subj.: Vietnam Command Ar-
rangements, 1 December 1961, TOP SECRET.
77. Letter, McNamara to Rusk, 7 'December 1961, TOP SECRET with Annex,
"Concept for the Establishment of a Subordinate Unified Command,United States Forces, Vietnam," TOp SECRET.
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rangement. He restated his desire to see all counter-insurgency activities
drawn together under the U.S. commander. The State Department, however,
continued to resist, though this resistance was far stronger below Rusk's
level; the military commander should be limited to "clearly military" af-
78.fairs. Objection now was raised to the idea of the commander as co-
equal with the Ambassador since Vietnam was not to be an area command.
On December 18th, McNamara met with Rusk and the two worked out the
79eventual agreement. The new military chief would be called "Commander,
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam" and would have re-
sponsibility for all U.S. military policy, operations, and assistance in
South Vietnam with direct access to the Secretary of Defense through
CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs. The Ambassador was responsible for political
and basic policy matters, and the commander was required to consult with
him on these matters. However, each could communicate policy differences
to their respective agencies in Washington. Both were to keep each other
fully informed.
The result was a compromise that preserved at least the veneer of
78. Memorandum, William Bundy to McNamara, Subj.: Honolulu Meeting, 14
December 1961, SECRET (Grp. 3).
79* Memorandum, McNamara to President, Subj.: Military Command in South
Vietnam, 22 December 1961, SECRET with attached "State-Defense Agree-
ment on Command Structure for South Vietnam," SECRET. Earlier that
day McNamara had proposed slightly different terms of reference to Rusk
that would have given the Commander the title of "Commander, United
States Military Assistance Abrces-VIetnam"--See Memorandum, McNamara to'
Rusk, 18 December 1961 as reprinted in USVNR, V.B.4.I, p. 426. Rask
objected to the word "Fbrces" as it wou =dsack too much of "troops"and
military action.--See Letter, Rusk to McNamara,18 December 1961,SECRET.
Rusk seems to have been able to get Mc~amara to make the eventual
agreement slightly more restrictive on the military commander than
McNamara originally proposed in his opening memorandum that day.
Greater specificity would be perhaps a better way to view it.
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Ambassadorial primacy and kept any one man from controlling the U.S. paci-
fication and counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam. But, it is also plain
that while McNamara may not have received the full loaf, the Defense/
military position in Vietnam was stronger and more independent. Now the
double lines of authority were openly codified.
The Joint Chiefs approved the agreement, and on the 22d McNamara asked
the President to approve General Paul D. Harkins, then the U.S. Army's
Pacific Commander, for the position. The agreed terms of reference were
presented, and, as if the whole process had been smooth, he noted that he
had "consulted" with Dean Rusk and reached an understanding on the terms.80
81
Taylor observed that the two Secretaries frequently did this. They would
get together, iron out their differences, and then present their compromise
to the President as if there had never been any problem in the first place.
What did the President do during all of this? Was he merely presented
a decision that masked weeks of bureaucratic disagreement? Ambassador
82Nolting cast a different, but perhaps supplementary, light on these events.
Hearing of the plan to set up a strong commander, he decided in early
December to fly back to Washington to argue against it. The trip did not
take place until early January, after McNamara and Rusk has agreed on the
80. Memorandum, General Lemnitzer. to Mclamara, JCSM-878-61, Subj.: Vietnam,
20 December 1961, SECRET (Grp. 3) and Memorandum, McNamara to President,
22 December 1961, oE. cit., SECRET.
81. Personal Interview with General Taylor, 14 May 1975.
82. Personal Interview with Ambassador Nolting, 7 December 1974. See also
Memorandum, Lemnitzer (drafted by J-5 Staff) for Joint Chiefs, Subj.:
Vietnam, 19 December 1961, SECRET which refers to "the activities of
Nolting." Hilsmzan, To Move a Nation, oU. cit., confirms much of the
Nolting account though he does not mention the meeting with President
Kennedy.
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terms and presented them to the President. Nolting had no objection to
creating a command as such but felt that it would give too much American
military emphasis to a problem he considered political, economic, and Viet-
namese. Rusk however would not support him, and McNamara would make no
concessions, but Averell Harriman, then Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs, agreed with Nolting and took him over to the White
House where both, along with General Taylor, met with Kennedy. The Presi-
dent, according to Nblting, was absolutely unequivocal that there had to be
only one head, one Ambassador, and he instructed Taylor to draft the terms
of reference for the new commander to reflect this. Nolting felt strongly
that the final terms did not reflect what the President requested. Yet by
this point the President had already received Mc7lamara's recommendations.
His order to Taylor _ma have been a gambit to satisfy the Ambassador. It is
difficult to believe that Kennedy would not have noticed that the McNamara/
Rusk agreement in December was identical to the terms actually promulgated
in February.
Regardless of the President's concept of the relationship, the actual
solution was never clearly worked out. Instead, it was felt that impreci-
sion of terms and organization could be negated by concentrating on harmoni-
ous personal relations. McNamara had openly stated this when he worked out
the agreement with Rusk in December. Nolting felt that he "got on very
well" with Harkins. On his return trip to Saigon he stopped at Honolulu and
spent a day discussing the new arrangements with Harkins. Both wanted to
make sure that they understood each other. Nolting avoided Durbrow's posi-
tion by saying that he was not a military man and would stay out of strictly
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military matters but that he did want to be informed.8 The result was, as
Hilsman has suggested, a "mutual forebearance that probably foredoomed the
two halves of the American effort to proceed independently of each
other."
In late January 1962 Kennedy approved the terms of reference for the
new commander and on the 6th of February the Joint Chiefs passed them on to
Admiral Felt and General Harkins instructing them to establish the com-
mand.85 While the AAG Chief still was to answer to the Ambassador, MAAG
was also under General Harkins. The MAAG Chief could appeal unresolved
differences with the Ambassador back to Washington through military chan-
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nels. MAAG continued to exist until it was absorbed into MACV in 1964.
The new arrangement, despite Nolting's meeting with Harkins in January,
did not begin smoothly. When press stories indicated that Harkinsiwould be
totally beyond the Ambassador's control, Nolting acted to correct this im-
pression by leaking his side to Homer Bigart of the New York Times. General
Lemnitzer also flatly indicated that McGarr and not Harkins would attend
Country Team meetings which would have downgraded the Ambassador's position
and signaled that the military commander was wholly free of Ambassadorial
control. McNamara was advised to change Harkins' instructions so that he
87
would attend. This he did, and Harkins attended the meetings.
While this process of change was occurring, the Administration was also
83. Nolting lnterviow,7 ))&,*mbr 1 , o, cit.
84. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, o. cit., p.
85. Message, JCS 3180, 062339Z Febri ry 1962, Exclusive for Admiral Felt
and General Harkins, SECRET (Grp. 3)
86. Message, CINCPAC 5000, Ser. 0180, 7 April 1962, to COMUSMACV and
CHMAAG/V, CONFIDENTIAL.
87. Memorandum, William Bundy to Secretary of Defense, Subj.:
064
thrashing out the problem of how to organize Washington support for Viet-
nam. Pacification was never considered a separate entity but as part of
the overall counterinsurgency effort. Though there was an attempt to
create a single Vietnam manager in Washington, the real interest lay in
creating an organization to handle counterinsurgency around the world. The
events in Vietnam were seen as just one part of a world Communist strategy
of insurgency. Several organizational efforts took place at the same time.
In late November President Kennedy told Maxwell Taylor that he wanted
to know just whom he should regard as "personally responsible for the
effectiveness" of Washington support for the new Vietnam program recom-
mended as a result of the Taylor Rostow Mission. He wanted a proposal from
the relevant advisors on this point and indicated that one individual
should be identified with the program as was Mr. Foy Kohler for Berlin.
No further mention was made of this proposal which was probably one of many
ideas raised but not pursued by the President.
More significant was the establishment of the Special Group (Counter-
insurgency) in January 1962. This was a special concern of President
Kennedy who in 1961 and 1962 took a deep, personal interest in counter-
insurgency. Taylor, who became the Group's first head, states that the
concept grew out of the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs when a Strategic Re-
sources Group was proposed to handle the Cold War but was turned down by
State-Defenseo2RelationshiAps",W~etamj712 ebary71962i coNixiI
(Grp. 4). Fbr the Bigart story see the New York Times, 11 February,
1962, p. 16.
88. Memorandum, Maxwell Taylor to Secretary Rusk et al., Subj: Meeting
on Southeast Asia, 5:30 p.m., 27 November 196 T7aTreprinted in
USVNR, V.B.4.I, pp. 423-424.
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Rusk who felt that it would infringe on the State Department's responsibili-
ties. The immediate impetus came from the CIA and Joint Chiefs who urged
Kennedy to establish a single high authority to develop an integrated
counterinsurgency program.89  These proposals marked the end of the
Kennedy Administration's serious effort to give the State Department
authority to coordinate all foreign operations. State had neither the
ability nor the inclination, and the activities of Rusk bear out the latter,
to accept this role especially in areas with sub-limited wars. Neither
the "Bissell Group" (CIA) nor the Joint Chiefs recommended that the Defense
Department take over in these critical areas threatened by insurgency, but
the former did advocate that special task forces for critical countries be
chaired by Defense but with a Special Group under the National Security
Council over them. This was the framework for the proposal drawn up by
General Taylor.90
Taylor intended the Special Group to involve itself in actual opera-
tions, but this was resisted by all the major agencies concerned, especially
the Department of Defense. William Bundy, then Acting Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs, recommended giving Defense
primary responsibility for coordination and execution of interdepartmental
89. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. cit., pp. 192 ard 201.
90. On the formation oT the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) see the fol-
lowing: Memorandum, William Bundy to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subj.
Report of the Bissell Group, "Elements of U.S. Strategy to Deal with
'Wars of National Liberation,"' 21 December 1961, SECRET; Memorandum,
14lliam Bandy to Gilpatric, Subj.: Talking Paper Concerning Cold War
Organization, 29 December 1961, SECRET; Memorandum, V4lliam Bundy to
Maxwell Taylor, Subj.: Draft NSAM re Establishment of the Special Group
(Counterinsurgency, 1 ' 6 January 1962, SECRET; and Taylor, Swords and
Plowshares, op. it, pp. 192 and 201.
066
counterinsurgency programs, especially in Vietnam. He attempted to sepa-
rate policy formation from execution by saying that State could still be
the senior advisor to the President on foreign policy but that planning,
programming, and execution should rest with the Defense Department. 9 1
Other agencies, including State, resisted Taylor's plan and the end result
was a considerable watering down.
Set up by Presidential order on 18 January, the Special Group (CI)
never really lived up to the hopes some may have entertained for it. The
92NSAM made it look formidable as its membership certainly was. Of its
four stated functions the first three related to emphasizing counter-
insurgency and improving U.S. organizational response and resource alloca-
tion to this task--all of which reflected the direct personal interest of
President Kennedy. Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam were assigned to the
Special Group which was given authority to insure development of inter-
departmental counterinsurgency programs for these countries and to resolve
any interagency problems over them. Wile the Special Group was placed
above any other interdepartmental task forces, agency independence was left
largely intact. It was to resolve problems and coordinate actions not
91. Memorandum, William Bundy to Gilpatric, Subj.: Talking Paper Concern-
ing Cold War Organization, 29-December 1961, SECRET.
92. National Security Action Memorandum No. 124, Subj.: Establishment of
the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 18 January 1962 as reprinted in
UVR, Vol. V.B.4.II, pp. 442-444. General Taylor was the Chairman.
The other regular members werea The Attorney General, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director
of Central Intelligence, Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, Administrator of the Agency for Inter"
national Development, and the Director of the United States Informa-
tion Agency.
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manage and direct.
The Special Group by even the mild standards of its directive did not
significantly affect the U.S. effort in Vietnam. To begin with, its focus
was wider than Vietnam, and all of its members were burdened with their
regular jobs. Most of them also represented their large bureaucracies; they
were not independent. By placing his brother on the Group, Kennedy
evinced a strong Presidential interest, and one observer reports that
Robert Kennedy pointedly grilled agency representatives at meetings. The
Attorney General was trying to install fear into them to let them know that
they were being watched by the Pres;ident--perhaps a useful method for White
House control of the bureaucracy. Yet it is hard to point to any major
accomplishments by the Group as regards Vietnam. The lack 6f coordination
continued, and certainly no forceful direction was given to the Vietnam
effort. When General Taylor left in October 1962 to become Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, the Special Group declined, and in 1966 it was merged into the
new Senior Interdepartmental Group system.
Also during this period the President was responsible for another or-
ganizational change regarding Vietnam. While this change is indicative of
the difficulty of forcing organizations to act against the grain of their
repertoire, it also shows the President's ability to get compliance if he
places enough emphasis on an issue. As I have said earlier, a recurring
93. U.S. Department of State, "United States Overseas Internal Defense
Policy," September, 1962, SECRET, which notes that "members of the
Special Group (CI) will act on behalf of their respective departments
and agencies."
94. Stavins et al., o. cit., p. 73.
Presidential theme in 1961 and 1962 was the interest in improving the U.S.
response to insurgency, something that was not shared by Services which
looked primarily to World War II, Korea, and Europe. During these years
the President published a series of NSAMs that illustrate an involvement
in the fine details of the problem. On January 10th General C. V. Clifton,
the President's Defense Liaison Officer, stressed this interest in details
to General Taylor and noted that some Presidential queries had not even
been replied to. The President, he said, wanted a senior officer in
charge of counterinsurgency high up in the Army. 9 5 The next day Kennedy
sent a strongly-worded reminder to McNamara:
I am not satisfied that the Department of Defense,
and in particular the Army, is according the necessary
degree of attention and efft to the threat of in-
surgency and guerrilla war.
Reflecting the difficulty of getting the Army to change its orientation, he
emphasized that counterinsurgency should be comparable in importance to con-
ventional war preparations. It should be understood that Kennedy was not
complaining here about overall government coordination and primarily was
interested in general counterinsurgency programs. He did state emphatic-
ally that he wanted two general officers to be designated immediately as
Army and Joint Staff focal points for activities in this new type of war-
fare. This brought action. In less than two weeks he was presented with
and approved the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense's proposals to im-
plement his wishes.97 Even before final Presidential approval the Army
95. Memorandum M C.V. Clifton to General Taylor, 10 January 1962, SECRET.
96. Memorandum, President to Secretary of Defense, 11 January 1962, SECRET.
97* Memorandum, McNamara to President, Subj.: Counterinsurgency, 24
January 1962, SECRET and Memorandum, MG C. V. Clifton to McNamara, 24
January 1962.
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placed a rising Major General, William B. Rosson, in charge of Special
Operations in the Army's military operations staff. This however had
little influence on Vietnam as most of Rleson's effort concerned the
counterinsurgency response. The Joint Chiefs created the position of
Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA),
held first by Major General Victor H. Krulak, which handled not only world-
wide counterinsurgency but which was operationally involved with Vietnam,
becoming until 1965 the major planning agency for Vietnam actions on the
Joint Staff. It did become the focal point for Washington military ac-
tion on pacification.
The creation of SACSA, the Special Group (CI), and MACV ended a year
of stopping and starting on U. S. organization for Vietnam and pacifica-
tion. In it one can see a clear trend toward giving greater leadership to
the military and the Department of Defense which was assisted by the open
distaste of Secretary Rusk for such a role and his willingness to step
aside. The creation of MACV, despite the efforts of Ambassador Nolting
and his close personal relationship with General Harkins, sealed the mili-
tary's independence from direct Ambassadorial control. The civilian
agencies too retained their separate lines of communication and rights of
appeal to Washington. These organizational decisions, except for some
98. Interview with Mr. Vincent Demma of the Center for Military History,
13 November 1974. SACSA was authorized in: Memorandum, Lemnitzer to
Joint Chiefs, CM-560-62, Subj.: Establishment within the Joint Staff
to the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and
Special Activities, 23 February 1962, CONFIDENTIAL.
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minor adjustments and the more radical pacification organization changes of
1966-1967, stayed unaltered for the rest of the Vietnam War. Coordination
and direction came to depend on personalities rather than specific organi-
zation.
Throughout this year it is hard to pick out a consistent thread of
Presidential preference. He toyed with the idea of an unconventional
single manager on both ends, but then rejected it in favor of ad hoc task
forces and reliance on the traditional agency system. Bureaucratic re-
sistance to change naturally was there, but the real fighting seems to have
been among the agencies not between the bureaucracies and the President,
and this resistance was not the dominant factor in the President's mind.
He did not feel strongly enough to overrule the agencies. If a case can
be made for bureaucratic influence on these decisions, a far stronger one
can be made for Presidential inattention and choice, be it indecision or a
conscious choice that the available system was about as good as any of the
proposed alternatives.
What were the results of all these changes? Opinion is divided. John
Mecklin, who served in the Mission during this period, described the U.S.
effort in Vietnam in the early 1960's as:
like a contest among a dozen teams of carpenters to
see who can buil the same house fastest, simultaneously,
on the same lot.
Yet he praised Nolting and Harkins for avoiding jealousies and interagency
fights and working together to make the arrangement work. Nolting himself,
as mentioned earlier, gave credit to the personal relationship and not the
99. Joh Mecklin, Mission in Torment (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965),
P. .
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organizational system they were presented with. As for controlling the
civilian agencies, Nolting felt that no one man regardless of formal title
could have spent more time on their business than he did.100 To correspond
to the Vietnam Task Bbrce in Washington, he renamed the Country Team the
"Saigon Task Force" which had regularly scheduled meetings once a week.
These meetings included General Harkins and the MAAG Chief, though they
tended to be informal gatherings with only occasional use of agendas,
minutes, and decision papers.
Others were more critical. In March 1962 an Army general told the
Special Warfare Advisory Group that there wass
little unity of command in Vietnam--neither among
the indigenous forces nor the Americans. There is 101little or no coordination between CIA, USIA and MAAG.
In May General Rosson told the same group that "there is virtually no
liaison between the U.S. agencies" in Vietnam. 02  Eight months later in
January 1963 at a time when many observers, especially official, felt that
the war was going well for the South Vietnamese, Roger Hilsman, then head
of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, and Michael Forrestal,
of the White House, returned from a trip to Vietnam and gave the following
report to the President. Large portions of it are worth repeating for the
problems were not new then and never were completely eliminated. Their
description of an alternative Ambassador is exactly what took place when
100. Nolting Interview, 7 November 1974, op. cit. and Nolting Interview,
18 Augut 1975.
101. Memorandum for Record, Subj.: Meeting of the Special Warfare Coordi-
nating Group, 23 March 1962, CONFIDENTIAL.
102. Memorandum for Record, Subj.s Meeting of the Special Warfare Coordi-
nating Group (Focal Point) for 4 May 1962, CONFIDENTIAL.
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Henry Cabot Iodge was dispatched later in the years
(1) There is no overall planning effort that effec-
tively ties together the civilian and military effort.
(2) There is little or no long-range thinking about
the kind of country that should come out of a victory
and about what we do now to contribute to this longer-
range goal...(3) Among both civilians and military
there is still some confusion over the way to conduct
a counter-guerrilla war. Many of the lower-ranking
people out in the field in actual contact with the
problems seem fully conscious of the importance of the
civil and political aspects, but in the middle and higher
levels understanding is far from perfect. The American
military mission must share some of the blame for the
excessive emphasis on large-scale operations and air
interdiction which have had the bad political and use-
less military effects described in our report...
The real trouble, however, is that the rather
large U.S. effort in South Vietnam is managed by a
multitude of independent U.S. agencies and people with
little or no overall direction. No one man is in charge.
What coordination there is results mainly from the sort of
treaty arrangements that are arrived at in the country
team meetings... The result is that the U.S. effort is
fragmented and duplicative...
What is needed ideally is to give authority to a
single executive, a man with perhaps a military back-
ground but who understands that this war is essentially
a struggle to build a nation out of the chaos of revolution.
one possibility would be to appoint the right kind of
general as Ambassador. A better alternative would be to
appoint as Ambassador a civilian public figure whose char-
acter and reputation would permit him to dominate the
representatives of all other departments and agencies.
There are, of course some formidable political and
bureaucratic problems in taking either of these steps.
What is more, we cannot say that the matter is urgent or
that disaster would inevitby or immediately follow if
things remain as they are.
There is no direct link between these recommendations and Presidential ac-
tion, but it is interesting that both Ambassadorial solutions were tried
later.. .Lodge the civilian and General Taylor the military. Each solution
103. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, oE. cit., pp. 465-466.
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emphasized a policy of relying on individual rather than the more disruptive
organizational change.
Within Vietnam itself, at the corps level and below, there were
several experiments, generated at those levels, to improve management and
coordination. In the 1st and 2nd Corps areas the Senior Advisors, both
military, tried to bring some unity to pacification advice and support.
The 1st Corps advisor designated a corps "Rehabilitation Officer" to co-
ordinate all U.S. agencies for pacification. The 2nd Corps advisor had mis-
sions for the U.S. civilian agencies written into his operational plans. In
the 4th Corps area a Division Senior Advisor set up a detailed military and
civilian planning and operations advisory group that unified American ad-
vice in several provinces. These coordination efforts were the result of
personal initiative on their part, not direction or inspiration from above.
Participation was voluntary. Nothing was established to last beyond the
foresight of the personalities involved. 1 04
In 1962 and 1963 the operational and conceptual center of the South
Vietnamese Government's pacification program was the Strategic Hamlet
Program. It involved grouping much of the rural population into fortified
hamlets that were expected to resist both Viet Cong political influence and
military attack. Regardless of its merits and success or failure, for two
years this was the pacification program, and the bulk of American attention
to pacification was focused on it. The Vietnamese Government set up an
104. Nighswonger, op. cit., p. 196; COL Bryce F. Denno, End of Tour Report
by SA/ICTZ ARVN from 7 July 1962-9 June 1963; COL Hal D. McCown, End
of Tour Report by SA/IICTZ ARVN, 13 December 1963; File of personal
papers of 1G John Cushman xeroxed and held at the Center for Military
History.
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Interministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets under the President's
brother, Counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu. Ambassador Solting followed suit in March
1962 with the Committee on Province Rehabilitation, or "Trueheart Commit-
tee," chaired by his Deputy Chief of Mssion, 'William Trueheart. Every
major U*S. agency in Vietnam was represented. As the Strategic Hamlet
Program declined and Diem and Nhu were overthrown, the Trueheart Committee
slipped into oblivion. The Vietnamese committee on strategic hamlets had
become such a creature of Nhu that when he was toppled the Vietnamese co-
ordinating mechanism for the program collapsed along with his power. When
McGeorge Bundy asked how the United States would communicate its recommenda-
tions for the hamlet program now that Nhu was dead, Trueheart replied that
each agency would work through its own lines to influence the GVN. 1 0 5
The Trueheart Committee was authorized to develop a Mission position
on pacification plans and operations, to represent the Mission on overall
pacification matters, and to coordinate U.S. pacification plans, programs,
and advice and assistance to the Vietnamese. The committee had no directive
power; new programs or disagreements were to be submitted to the Ambassa-
dor.106 It also had no secretariat and in actuality involved only informal
interagency coordination. Opinion is mixed as to just how successful the
Trueheart Committee really was.107 Hilsman felt that while it may have been
105. HQS, CINCPAC, Record of Special Meeting on the Republic of Vietnam,held on 20 November 1963, SECRET (Grp. 1).
1u6. SO State Deartme East A ia/Vietnam Records, Job o 16oD194tBo~
with file on teCoottee, or Province Rehabl on. is is
ver ninv fil ont-.~nxse Thragve ,g nujeeencesn th I co nttainsef r aopee .O
107. COL Carl W. Schaad, The Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam; the Role
of the People in Counterinsurgency Warfare, 6 March 1964, CONFIDENTIAL
Grp. , an Army War Colllege Thesis. Leonard Maynard, o. cit.,
p. 30. The former gives it a favorable assessment; the latter does
not.
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a success in terms of assembling logistic support, the military continued
with their own "shooting war" not coordinating it with the hamlet program:
From the beginning, the United States effort lacked
both from the "unified civilian, police, and military
system of command and control" and the "subordination
of civic, police, social, and military measures to an
overall counter-guerrilla program" that were the first
prin iples of the strategic concept that had been worked
out.
This was the legacy of military "independence" and the lack of a single
manager.
Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Nolting as Ambassador in late August 1963,
and with his arrival the surface Mission unity faded swiftly. Pacifi-
cation was not directly the issue that split the Mission. The fissure
between upper (especially Nolting/Harkins) and lower Mission levels ex-
ploded in all directions when lodge arrived and began to back away from
support for Diem. In much the same way as in 1959-1960 the U.S. Mission
split over Diem largely along military/civil lines. William L. Sullivan,
then an assistant to Harriman, analyzed this split and broadened the issue
into the whole qestion of the correct strategy for winning the war...the
military interested in tangible, active, physical operations, both pacifi-
cation and regular unit, and the civilians focusing on political aspects
109
and mental attitudes. Nolting and Harkins had kept the disagreements
below the surface. Lodge arrived and overnight the whole power order in
108. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, op. cit., p. 442.
109. Memorandum, William Sullivan to McNamara, Subj.t Divergent Attitudes
in the U.S. Official Cormunity, exact date not known but certainly in
September 1963, SECRET. This is an extremely valuable source, the
type of material that rarely shows up in official documents.
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Vietnam changed. Instead of a co-equal arrangement with Harkins at times
more equal, Lodge asserted himself as the senior American in Vietnam. He
had international stature, was an experienced Ambassador, and possessed
110
the President's assurances that he was to be first in the Mission. He
also began to ride the crest of an official U.S. change of policy towards
the government of South Vietnam.
It soon became quickly apparent that while lodge may have been an ex-
cellent choice to manage the change in policy toward Diem in Vietnam, he
was not a success in managing the Mission and drawing together its diverse
elements. Veiled and not-so-veiled references to this were rife throughout
his tenure as Ambassador. Secretary McNamara summed it up well in December
1963 when he told President Johnson that:
The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks
leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working
to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been
conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the
Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the
military budget. Above all, lodge has virtually no official
contact with Harkins. lodge sends in reports with major
military implications without showing them to Harkins, and
does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. 1y im-
pression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct
a coordinated administration. This has of course been
stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by
John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously reject-
ing our advice; he has just operate 1!s a loner all his
life and cannot readily change now.
110. Ibid. Sullivan felt in 1962 that Harkins appeared to be "top banana'
in the U.S. official community. Harkins was a senior officer with
considerable experience and disposed far more resources. Mr Nolting
it was his first Ambassadorial post, and he was a "fairly junior"
Fbreign Service Officer. It is interesting to note also that at the
Secretary of Defense Conference at CINCPAC Headquarters on 21 March
1962, Nolting was ranked after Harkins by protocol.
111. Memorandum, McNamara to President, Subj.: Vietnam Situation, 21
December 1963, as reprinted in the New York Times, 13 June 1971, p. 35.
One observer present during this period later -remarked (continued)
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A system that was premised on personal relations and cooperation rather
than firm direction and clear assignment of responsibility had broken down.
The change in Ambassadors, the fall of Diem, and the sudden elevation
of Lyndon Johnson to the Presidency mark a significant transition period.
All over the countryside the situation deteriorated rapidly as Diem's paci-
fication program and his control apparatus disintegrated. In Saigon the
change in government ushered in over a year of instability. The direct
American involvement both in the war and in the Vietnamese Government began
to grow. The situation had finally, visibly burst the bounds of the
limited response assigned to it. The expanding war, the governmental decay
and instability, and the gradual assumption of a far larger American role
all contrived to create a different seedbed for organizational change. By
comparison the period prior to mid-1963 looks deceptively simple. In the
next two years the American effort would'mushroom, but despite numerous
proposals for organizational change and widespread perception of their
necessity, the U.S. structure to deal with pacification, indeed the entire
war, looked much the same two years after the upheavals of 1963.
Several conclusions may be drawn as one looks back over the years
from 1954-1963. The most obvious is that perception was far ahead of 're-
medial action. During the later Eisenhower years, the organizational
problems and lack of unity certainly were appreciated within the bureauc-
racies though probably only dimly perceived, if at all, by the President.
During Kennedy's Presidency perception extended from the bottom to the top.
Yet under neither was strong action taken to pull together the effort in
that "Iodge and Harkins hated each other's guts."--see Interview with
Geral Sternberg by member of the USMACV History Office, A.d., on
ie at the Center ror Military History.
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Vietnam or in Washington. Why?
First, and this is most important to understanding the other reasons,
Vietnam was not the center of Presidential or governmental attention. De-
cisions taken on Vietnam, however fateful they may have been to later in-
volvement and problems, were taken in the shadow of crises and areas of
concern that seemed then far more threatening--U.S./Soviet relations.
Taiwanthe Congo, Berlin, and Cuba. Even within Southeast Asia, Laos pre-
empted policymakers' attention in 1961. Vietnam was not perceived as being
of central import in these years. It was a problem that was left largely
to the bureaucracies, to committees, and to Presidential Special Assistants.
Clearly the degree to which a problem is deemed to be important will de-
termine the time, energy, and force the President can personally apply to a
problem. This would explain another conclusion--the striking lack of Presi-
dential involvement. Much of what has been related is a tale of bureau-
cratic battling. But, it is among the bureaucracies and not between them
and them and the President. There are two levels of action. The Presi-
dent is presented with choices conditioned by yet masking the decision
process at the bureaucratic level. Yet he is not a prisoner of their
alternatives. He can interject his own as he did when he considered
Lansdale as Ambassador er asked McNamara to set up what became known as
SACSA. He is a qualitatively different actor, not one of a circle, on a
different plane and not always aware of the detail of the manoeuvering go-
ing on beneath him. This said, his power still is circumscribed. He
governs not by word or order but by attention, emphasis, and re-emphasis.
The questions of organization for Vietnam and pacification in these
years shows a failure, however understandable, of leadership. President
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Eisenhower issued firm orders but there was no follow-up. He was effectively
insulated by the NSC/OCB system, and Vietnam was such a marginal area that it
rarely surfaced above it. Kennedy's failure is less excusable, for by nature
and system he was far less insulated; the problem was visibly graver; and he
had numerous warnings that all was not well with the organization. He also
was presented with clear alternatives. Yet his behavior was equivocal. He
insisted on Ambassadorial primacy yet decisions he took whittled away at it.
He expressed an interest in having one man in charge of Vietnam, but he did
not pursue it. He began his Administration by attempting to have the State
Department take on a leadership role in foreign policy, yet by the end of
his first year Kennedy let policy formation and implementation for Vietnam
devolve more and more into the hands of his White House staff and Defense
Department. The picture thus is contradictory, but it does not point to
the impossibility of strong Presidential action. There is no evidence that
bureaucratic resistance was the major motivating factor in his decisions or
lack of them. The decision to change may simply have fallen past his atten-
tion and been lost in the press of more important business. Ultimately, he
may not have had confidence that the advantages of major change outweighed
those of leaving the structure and relationships largely as they were.
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Chapter II
1964 AND 1965
This chapter examines in detail two years in which a veritable stream
of suggestions for organizational improvement of the overall U.S. effort and
that for pacification were presented. These suggestions, and concrete ex-
periments in some cases, came from every agency involved in Vietnam as well
as the White House. The President, for the most part unsuccessfully, took
part in some of these proposals and experiments, but the bulk of them came
from the bureaucracies themselves and were fought over among them with, it
appears, little White House input. It was seldom clear what the President
wanted, even in hindsight, and his wishes, when they were made known, were
not followed by persistent Presidential attention. The bureaucracies'
groping for a solution was even more of a failure. Without strong 'White
House direction the field managers and home agencies clearly were unable to
arrive at a satisfactory outcome. This failure would fuel the logic of a
Presidentially imposed solution.
A remarkable aspect of these two years is how little the American or-
ganization for the Vietnam War and for pacification changed. Despite a
vastly bigger U.S. effort and an enormous commitment of military and civil-
ian resources, a change in Ambassadors and commanders in-Saigon, and an ex-
pnded war, the U.S. organization at the end of 1965 was not radically dif-
ferent from what it had been two years previously. As before one must ask
why. Lack of perception is not the answer. The problems with U.S. organi-
zation were appreciated at all levels, and numerous proposals for change,
some general and others highly specific, were made. The President himself
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gave his Ambassadors authority unprecedented in Vietnam, but they failed to
make use of it.
These two years were ones of building pressure for an alteration in
the American organization. Pacification was at the center of this pressure.
More than any other aspect of the U.S. effort, pacification figured most
frequently in proposals for change. Washington impetus to reorganize the
Mission was at first shunted to the side in 1965 by resistance from the
Mission, the onset of the Air War in the Nbrth, and the introduction of
American troops which momentarily distracted policymakers at home. But by
the end of 1965 the increased war made the inadequacies of the existing
organization more obvious, fueling both the necessity and the pressures for
reorganization. The changes in 1966 and 1967 were a direct outgrowth of
this pressure.
Richard Holbrooke, writing in the Pentagon Papers, felt that the
impetus for reorganization was largely Washington-generated with resistance
usually coming from the Saigon Mission. While this is generally true, and
especially so after in 1966, the reality is more complex. Proposals for
change came from both Washington and Saigon, and they were opposed in each
locale. There was also an element of resistance to ashington, to outside
direction, rather than only to the change itself. Despite their own per-
sonal doubts, the Saigon-based officials would respond to Washington that
U.S. Mission organization was adequate and seldom admit the need for altera-
tions. No Washington-suggested reorganization was successfully carried out,
1. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 20
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but the pressure remained. The day when change would be imposed was post-
poned but not eliminated.
Several factors were responsible for the renewed interest in reorgani-
zation--the expanding war, the organization of the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment for pacification combined with that government's overall weakness and
instability, and the growing U.S. effort.
The expanding and more overtly military war, combined with the
dominant perception of the struggle as a military one and the predilection
of organizations for reacting in terms of their training and capabilities at
hand, meant simply that the U.S. and GVN military response would grow and
their total war strategies become even further imbalanced in favor of mili-
tary actions. Especially in 1965 the obvious military war diverted U.S. and
GVN resources and attention from pacification. Though many would claim even
then that it was the key to the war, pacification did not have the same em-
phasis when priorities were set and resources disposed. The new war was at
first a diversion from the more difficult and intractable problems of paci-
fication. It appeared to offer an easier answer, one more in keeping with
the traditional American response to conflict and the response which had
been taught to the strongest Vietnamese institution, their military. The
war's stepping up also generated U.S. military proposals to create an over-
all Southeast Asia Command that would have taken over more of the total U.S.
effort and also been free of Ambassadorial control.
The Vietnamese Government itself influenced reorganization of the U.S.
effort. Following eight years of relatively stable rule under Diem, the
country in November 1963 was suddenly turned over to politically-inexperi-
enced generals. Coup followed coup. The glue of Diem's leadership and
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police which had held the government together no longer was there. More
and more the Americans found themselves involved in internal Vietnamese
politics and administration in a way Diem never would have countenanced.
On several occasions in Washington and Saigon, joint U.S.-Vietnamese com-
mands and infusions of U.S. advisors directly into the Vietnamese Govern-
ment were advocated though eventually rejected. These perforce would have
meant a more unified American advisory effort.
The Vietnamese Government's organization for pacification also influ-
enced the pressure for change. With the dissolution of the Strategic Ham-
let Program which had been under Nhu's firm civilian leadership, the new
government placed its remains and the direction of the new Chien Thang
pacification plan under the military high command. There was ostensible
unity to the Vietnamese program; a Central Pacification Committee, composed
of the Prime-Mtinister, the Vice-Prime-Minister, appropriate civilian
ministers, and the four military corps commanders, was in charge of pacifi-
cation. Executive direction however was to come from the new Rural Life
Directorate, under a colonel, of the high command. This prompted more than
one U.S. military suggestion that the same be done on the American side.
Similarly, the.1965 creation of a separate Ministry of Rural Construction
(later Revolutionary Development) supported civilian contentions that USAID
or the Embassy should be the unifying agent for the American pacification
effort.
Probably the most forceful generator of pressure for change was the
growth of the U.S. effort itself. In these two years the military component
in Vietnam grew from less than 20,000 to nearly ten times that figure, and
the civilian representation increased correspondingly. Each agency became a
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separate bureaucratic empire in Vietnam. Prior to 1964 each had its own
ideas on what needed to be accomplished, its own communication channels with
the parent agency in Washington, and its own personnel and administrative
structure. They also had field personnel, operating under separate but
parallel chains of command, out in the countryside away from Saigon. This
process did not begin in 1964, but in previous years U.S. field representa-
tion was far smaller. A major increase started in early 1964 when MACV be-
gan to establish small advisory teams in South Vietnamese districts. While
the program began with thirteen test districts in March, in a year most
districts had military teams. As this went on, the military province (or
sector) teams themselves expanded. The U.S. m.Liitary in the field, particu-
larly at province level, were joined by civilian agency representatives, who
sometimes were ex-military or active duty officers on detached service, re-
porting back to their own organizations. The end result of this was that
the advisory effort in the field grew even more remote from the ability of
the Saigon-based Ambassador to control it, and often several U.S. bureauc-
racies presented conflicting advice to harassed Vietnamese officials at all
levels, particularly in the provinces.
In Washington there were no substantial organizational changes to
handle the Vietnam war as it expanded. President Johnson clearly was the
man in charge of Vietnam, but only on those issues of high policy or immedi-
ate necessity that he had time to deal with. More so even than under
Kennedy, final policy decisions on Vietnam centered on the Preoident who
tended also to go outside the government for advice. In 1965 an informal
war cabinet for Vietnam, the "Tuesday Lunch" group, grew up. Cdnsisting of
but a few of the President's most senior officials, this body met regularly
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with the President to discuss the war and reach decisions on key issues. It
was however not a formal structure and had no full-time supporting machinery.
Richard Moose felt that individuals were more important to President Johnson
than institutions. Johnson believed that the key to the U.S. effort there
lay in finding the right man to lead it. It was not until mid-1966 that the
President began to act the premise of organizational change as well as that
of personalities.
The State Department continued to play much the same role that it had
under Kennedy. In early 1964 William Bundy moved from his position as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to become
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. However, he concen-
trated on high-level policy decisions and diplomacy not day-to-day manage-
ment and implementation of programs. President Johnson, after consulting
with Rusk and McNamara, put him in charge of coordinating the recommenda-
tions for Vietnam that McNamara presented upon returning from his trip
there in March 1964, but there is no indication that he was actively in-
volved in coordination of the U.S. programs. What State Department involve-
ment there was below major policy actions was turned over to one of his
deputies and the State-chaired Vietnam Coordinating Committee. Chester
Cooper, who served on the White House staff during these years, has noted
that "time after time" Secretary McNamara and his subordinates seemed to be
2. Richard M. Moose, "The White House NSC Staffs Since 1947," in Keith C.
Clark and Lawrence J. Legere (eds.), The President and the Management
of National Security (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 82.
3. National Security Action Memorandum No. 288, Subj.: Implementation of
South Vietnam Programs, 17 March 1964, SECRET. Partially reprinted in
the New York Times, 13 June 1971, pp. 35-36.
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"crying for political guidance and leadership from the State Department"...
but..."it was slow in coming." The State Department, he felt, was resigned
to playing a reactive, peripheral role. It certainly did not lead, and as
the other agencies commitments to Vietnam grew, especially those of the De-
partment of Defense, their extensions in Vietnam became more and more
independent. The Defense Department in 1965 overwhelmed the other agencies
with their vast advantage in terms of personnel and resources committed.
The President did make one organizational change in Washington during
these years when he revitalized the old Vietnam Task Force in February 1964
giving it a new name, the Vietnam Coordinating Committee (or VNCC), and a
new boss, William L. Sullivan of the State Department. The VNCC was set up
to manage policy and operations in South Vietnam, and its members had to
give priority to work for the Committee.5 However, major questions of
policy and operations were subject to Presidential approval "in consultation
with heads of departments and agencies as appropriate." The President hoped
to keep departmental appeal from VNCC decisions at a minimum.
The VNCC was one more example of strong authority on paper negated by
weakness in practice. It shows the futility of Presidential leadership by
directive alone. From reading the records of VNCC meetings it is clear that
the Committee did not deal in high policy except to provide back-up papers or
lower-level staff work, and it did not "manage" operations in Vietnam. Its
4. Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade (New 'York; Dodcd, Mead & Co., 1970),
p. 255. Cooper's assertion may be only partially correct, for the mili-
tary at least appear to have wanted political appioval as much as they
wanted political guidance.
5. National Security Action Memorandum No. 280, 14 February 1964, SECRET.
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leadership went back and forth from the State Department to the White House
ending up for most of 1965 under the leadership of one of William Bundy's
deputies, Leonard Unger. It was at its strongest under William Sullivan,
but he was in charge for less than five months. Michael Frrestal, the
White House SPecial Assistant who headed the Committee from July 1964 to
January 1965, put it gently enough when he admitted that the VNCC was "not
able to deal with problems of highest national policy" but had been useful
in assuring that Saigon's military, political and economic programs got
6
fairly quick and sympathetic attention from Washington agencies. He did
not mention leadership, management, or even coordination. Chester Cooper,
who served on it, called it an "information clearinghouse" with little
bureaucratic or administrative "clout." Major policy decisions and dis-
position of resources, he said, continued to be dealt with at the top of
each agency, and none of them, especially the military, wanted the VNCC get-
ting into their operations. Furthermore, most of the important decisions
and actions taken during these two years were military, a fact that helped
restrict the Committee to the role described above. It was unrealistic to
expect a middle-ranking committee, based in the State Department, to exer-
cise much policy or managerial power on issues that deeply affected the re-
sources and programs of several larger bureaucracies. Even those on the
Committee who disagreed with fellow members could always appeal to higher
officials in their own departments. But finally, the Committee was Ce far
6. Memorandum, Michael V. Forrestal to William Bandy, 30 December 1964,
CONIDENTIAL.
7. Chester L. Cooper, et al., Elements of Pacification, Vol. II of The
American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam? Report R-185(Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972), p. 277.
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removed from the highest decision-maker who after signing its implementing
NSAM dues not appear to have shown much interest in it, provided much sup-
port, or made use of it.
Washington dissatisfaction with U.S. organization in Vietnam generated
a series of attempts in late 1963 and the first half of 1964 to improve it.
It was far easier to try to change the machinery in Saigon than to attempt
to overhaul it at home. Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland was sent
out in January 1964 as Harkins' deputy and probable eventual successor. One
of his goals was to pull the military organization together. This resulted
in the complete absorption of MAAG into MACV in May. Westmoreland did not
confine his ideas on reorganization to the military side. He advocated also
unifying all U.S. pacification efforts under his direction (see below).
Similarly, Lodge's new Deputy Chief of Mission, lavid Aes, was also
dispatched to Vietnam with instructions to improve the coordination and
unity of the U.S. team below the level of Lodge who, it was recognized, was
not g&ing to do it himself. The effort to compensate for Lodpe's lack of
leadership by installing a managerial deputy was pressed most strongly by
McNamara who told the President in December 1963 that:
Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David ies, was
with us and seems a highly competent team player. I
have stated the situation frankly to him and he has
said he would do all he could to constitute what would
kn effect be an executivg committee operating below the
level of the Ambassador.
Nes formed the "pacification Committee," or "Nes Committee" as it was
also known, chaired by himself with the deputy chiefs of the other U.S.
8. Memorandum, McNamara to President, Subj.s Vietnam Situation, 21 De-
cember 1963, as reprinted in the New York Times, 13 June 1971, p. 35.
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Mission agencies as members. It never was a success. As early as February
1964 General Westmoreland, still Harkins' deputy, told Nes that the commit-
tee was too large and needed an agenda and more meeting time. Nes agreed
that his group had not met the "highly complex problems effectively" and
tightened its organization, also naming Westmoreland as Vice-Chairman, but,
he stated, the committee was to coordinate not direct. It would only rec-
commend actions to the Ambassador.9 This was scarcely accomplished before
10
the committee was summarily disbanded by Lodge in April. 1Nes may not have
been the manager that Washington hoped for, but lodge was responsible for
the Nes Committee's lack of success and eventual demise. He was suspicious
of the committee and did not want authority to reside in his deputy. The
Pentagon Papers reported that every attempt Nes made to establish an "ex-
ecutive committee," as he promised McNamara, "further alienated him from
the Ambassador."t
Meanwhile the U.S. military services in Washington were pressing for
a more significant change in U.S. command arrangements in Vietnam. In
late January General Maxwell Taylor, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
9. Letter, Westmoreland to Nes, 27 February 1964 and Memorandum, Nes
to Chiefs of U.S. Mission Agencies, 29 February 1964, CONFIDEZTIAL.
10. Record of Meeting of Pacification Committee, 7 April 1964 and
Interview, Charles B. MacDonald with Iestmoreland, 12 March 1973.
11. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 59. See also Interview, Charles B. MacDonald with
Westmoreland, 12 March 1973.
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advocated that the United States prepare for a major escalation of the
war.12 Despite the necessity for winning the war in the South, the United
States, he said, must stop North Vietnamese support. In conjunction with
his proposed course of action, he recommended that the U.S. military com-
mander in Saigon have responsibility for the total U.S. program in VietAam.
In addition an integrated political/military/economic approach for all of
Southeast Asia should be developed. Finally, he advocated that the United
States should induce the Vietnamese Government to turn over tactical
direction of the war to the U.S. commander--a complete contrast from the
position he would take on this issue later when he was Ambassador.
McNamara submitted these proposals to Dean Rusk. Given the magnitude
of the Joint Chiefs recommendations, his reply was curiously terse and
non-committal. He did however object to any broad command changes that
would give the military more power: "this war, like other guerrilla
wars, is essentially political, an important factor to bear in mind in
determining command and control arrangements."1 3  The war, he said, must
be fought and won in the minds of the people. While his interest in the
political side of the war was commendable, he did not follow this up with
any proposals of his own and merely noted that the State Department would
consider promptly any Defense Department or Joint Chiefs recommendations.
12. Memorandum, JCSM-46-64, Taylor to Mcamara, Subj.: Vietnam and South-
east Asia, 22 January 1964, as reprinted in the New York Times,
13 June 1971, p. 35. This memorandum was originally drafted by
General Krulak's SACSA office.
13. Letter, Rusk to McNamara, 5 February 1964, TOP SECRET (Grp. 1).
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The U.S. Army staff agreed with the Joint Chiefs idea of an inter-
related counterinsurgency approach in Vietnam, noting the need for close co-
14
ordination among U.S. agencies. Ideally, the U.S. command arrangements
should parallel the organization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The Army
was interested also in creating a full Southeast Asia Command whose respon-
sibilities would not be limited to South Vietnam but include Laos, Thailand,
and North Vietnam if necessary. It saw three advantages to this. If U.S.
troops were sent, then there would be a command to handle them. The
Pacific Commander would be removed from the chain of command. And finally,
they openly admitted that it would reduce Ambassadorial intrusion into
military affairs in Southeast Asia. The Army's recommendations never were
acted upon as U.S. troops were not sent at this time, and there were strong
disagreements about them among the services and even within the Army
staff.15
In Vietnam the situation was not much better than in Washington. Am-
bassador Lodge did not wish to manage the Mission, yet he was unwilling to
turn this task over to anyone else. He preferred working with a small,
personal staff directly responsible to him, and during his first Ambassador-
ship the Country Team existed more in form than in substance.16 Relations
between Harkins and lodge were distinctly cool.17 Even President Johnson
14. See CSAM4 77-64, "Army Statement of Non-Concurrence," Enclosure B to JCS
2343/317-1, 1 February 1964, TOP SECRET and Army Staff Memorandum 2-64,
Dir, of Special Warfare, ODCSOPS to SACSA, Subj.: Revitalized South
Vietnam Campaign (JCS 2343/317), 9 February 1964, TOP SECRET.
15. Ibid.
16. Chester Cooper, et._al.., Elements..., op. cit., p. 284. See also Inter-
view, Major Paul Miles with Westmoreland, 10 April 1971, CONFIDENTIAL.
17. Philadelphia Enquirer, 13 January 1964, and Interview, Major Paul Miles
with Westmoreland, 10 April 1971, CONFIDENrIAL.
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realized that Lodge was no manager. In late May this prompted him to
cable Lodge:
... we believe it is essential for you to have a top-
ranking officer...as chief of staff for country team
operations. My own impression is that this should be
either a newly appointed civilian of wide governmental 18
experience and high understanding, or General Westmoreland."
This deficiency was seconded by William Bundy who wrote to Rusk that the
U.S. Mission was as coordinated as possible given Lodge's basic nature,
but that there was a need for a good executive as Deputy Chief of Mis-
19
sion. Bundy's perception may have been off-base, for Lodge consistently
demonstrated that though he was unwilling to exercise managerial authority,
he certainly was not going to delegate it. All of this came at a time
when the U.S. Mission was still relatively small. The President's sugges-
tion never was implemented as Lodge resigned in June to participate in
Republican politics.
The available record contains numerous complaints about the organiza-
tion of the U.S. efrort in Vietnam in 1964. Several examples are worth
noting. In March General John M. Finn reported to the Army' s Chief of
Staff that the United States had no single unified concept for its effort
in Vietnam, and that the IIssion needed a mutually acceptable concept of
20
counterinsurgency obligatory to all members of the Country Team. A
RAND paper in late 1964 saw lack of full coordination in policy-making
18. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 21.
19. Memorandum, William Bundy to Rusk, Subj.: Higulights of the
Honolulu Conference, 3 June 1964, SECRET.
20. Report, BG John M. Finn to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subj.:
Report of Actions to Improve US/GVN Operations in South Vietnam,
21 March 1964, SECRET (Grp. 1).
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among U.S. agencies in Saigon as a major problem; with few Country Team
21
meetings, the agencies were largely on their own. General Charles
Timmes, the departing MAAG Chief, stressed the need for integration of the
U*S. effort and the "absolute necessity" for joint planning and programming
by all U.S. agencies.22 In October, a joint State/Defense/AID/USIA/CIA
message was dispatched to Saigon in an effort to improve coordinated plan-
ning among all agencies. It observed that:
Although we have available here a considerable amount
of information on the military aspects of the Chien
Thang Pacification Plan, we do not seem to have a co-
herent and integrated description of the programs as
a whole. For example, detailed plans and requirements
for the essential integration of civilian resources
into the -Hop Tac Program are completely lacking. We
are also without any idea of the relative time-phasing
of the military and civilian effort. 2 3
And a few weeks later General Westmoreland admitted that:
In many areas the pace of military operations has not
been synchronized with capabilities of province,
district, and village to provide administrative and
police follow-up. In some cases, the military pace
has been too fast considering the paucity of admini-
stratis and police follow-up. In some cases, the
military pace has been too fast considering the
paucity of administrative talent; and in other cases,
pace has been too slow with the result that admini-2
strative cadres have piled up behind security forces.2
While civilian agencies planning was generally acknowledged to be far
inferior to that of MACV, one Joint Chiefs of Staff planner at the time
posed an important question:
21. Unidentified RAND paper iin Center of Military History Files, probably
late 1964.
22. MG Charles Timmes, Debriefing Report, 10 June 1964, CONFIDEMNIAL
(Grp. 4).
23. Message, State 853 to Saigon, 16 October 1964, SECRET.
24. Message, COMUSMACV to JCS, 291235z OCT 1964.
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How could a military plan be -prepared to support an
inter-agency effort without knowledge of the details
of other agencies' plans? Viewed in this light, the
advanced position of the military planners appears
more as a unilateral effort which is not necessarily
coherent and not ne ssarily responsive to the counter-
insurgency mission.
Furthermore, though the U.S. military advisory structure was unified
in May, there were still deep conceptual divisions within USOM which was
roughly separated into two factions. Fi.rst were the traditional AID
offices that were a feature of most United States AID missions around the
world. These still saw their role in Vietnam as that of assisting in con-
ventional economic, educational, and administrative development. Economic
assistance, their officials felt, should be directed primarily towards long-
range development. Pacification to them meant security, and thus it should
be left to the military. Opposed to them were the "counterinsurgents" or
field operations oriented officers who believed that USOM should back
short-term, high-impact projects that would give immediate help to the popu-
lation.26 Developmental activities could not wait for full security but
must be pursued immediately as the war was a battleground for the peasants'
loyalty.
USOM's Office of Rural Affairs (later Office of Operations, then
Office of Provincial Operations, then Office of Field Operations) began in
1962 and was the operating arm of the "counterinsurgents." During the
criitical year of mid-1964 to mid-1965 it was the center of a dispute between
25. Draft Memorandum, LTC Dalby (ox SACSA) for Director of the Joint Staff,
Subj.: Concept for Integrated U.S. Mission Planning, 7 December 1964,
SECRET.
26. For much of this paragraph I am indebted to Chester Cooper, et al.,
Elements..., . cit., pp. 155-156.
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them and USOM Director James Killen who was a traditionalist.27  While
Killen was able to diminish its role, his prompt removal when Lodge re-
turned in July 1965, the growth of USAID (USOM under a new name), and the
new pacification cadre programsgave it another lease on life. It was this
aspect of USAID operations in Vietnam that brought it most frequently into
interagency conflicts and pacification. The dichotomy with USAID always
persisted and was heightened when the "counterinsurgent" faction, along
with some, but far fewer, of the traditionalists, were removed from USAID
and placed in CORDS in 1967.
These problems of disunity, especially the conceptual one of how to
deal with the struggle in Vietnam, were not unique to AID. Every agency
had the division between those who wanted their agency's program to be the
same as what it had always sponsored elsewhere under different situations
and those who felt that the circumstances in Vietnam demanded a new re-
sponse. Thus not only was there disunity among U.S. agencies over pacifi-
cation but differences within each of them.
Just as indicative of the widespread perception of the problem of
organization were the specific proposals for change that were put forth.
Implicit in the President's recommendation to Lodge that he have a chief of
staff and his broad letter of authority to Ambassador Taylor (see below)
was the understanding that all was not well with the organization of the
U.S. effort,
27. Itid., pp. 157-159 and pp. 182-183. See also william A. Nighswonger,
Rural Pacification in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 199-203;
Memorandum, Alfred Hart to James Killen, Subj.: Problems, 5 November
1964, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE; and George K. Tanham, War Without Guns
(New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 30.
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In February William Colby, then Chief of CIA's Far East Division, and
Chester Cooper, also of the CIA, proposed to their Director John McCone
that the United States should appoint a single American counterpart to the
Vietnamese Government's Vice-Prime-Minister in charge of rural pacifica-
tion who would be directly responsible to the Ambassador, have a military
deputy, and command pacification advisory elements of all U.S. agencies. 28
This was necessary, they said, because the U.S. and GVN response to the
insurgency had been dominated by the offensive aimed at destroying large
enemy units at the expense of the political war in the Vietnamese villages.
This was never adopted. The formation of the VNCC shortly afterwards by-
passed it.29
It is interesting that in 1964 General Westmoreland and his staff took
an active interest in reorganization and made several proposals to
strengthen and unify the American advisory effort including two that, if
implemented, would have seen the military commander take over pacification
advice and support. This is in marked contrast to 1965 and 1966 when
Westmoreland backed off from ideas of reorganizing, let alone taking it
over himself. His interest was spurred by a visit he made to Kuala Lampur
in June 1964 accompanied by Sir Robert Thompson, the USOM Deputy Director
and USIS Director from Vietnam, and some of his staff. Thompson, who
headed the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam from 1961-1965, had
been one of the key architects of the successful countersurinsurgency in
Malaya which featured a unified civil-military command.30
28. Memorandum, William Colby and Chester Cooper to McCone, Subj.: South
Vietnam--A Proposal, 13 February 1964, SECRET.
29. Personal Interview with Chester Cooper, 6 May 1975.
30. See R. W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, R-957-ARPA
(Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1972).
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However, this visit only reinforced Westmoreland's thinking. From the
day of his arrival, the disunity in the American effort was apparent to him.
In March General Richard Stillwell, then chief of MACV's operations staff
(or J-3), presented Westmoreland with a detailed plan to make the U.S.
military commander the Ambassador's executive agent for pacification. Since
the Vietnamese Government had placed pacification under its military, the
same should be done with the U.S. side. The Country Team's inadequacies
were freely admitted:
It does not provide an in-country executive mechanism
with directive authority and supervisory responsibility
that is necessary to insure unity of effort and rapid
reaction in an emergency insurgency situation
In the proposed organization policy formulation and policy advice would
still rest with the Ambassador and the agency chiefs, but execution would
be under the military. MACV would however become an interagency joint
staff. At each administrative level below in the field the senior military
advisor would unify U.S. planning, programming, and budgeting, but agency
representatives would still have access to their GVN counterparts and own
agency supervisors. Thus one sees here a halfway measure that would have
put the military in charge of what they could do best but somehow kept
policy formulation and execution separate. This separation probably would
have jeopardized the success of this recommendation had it ever been
adopted.
Stillwell's proposal did not spring entirely from within MACV. Secre-
tary McNamara and General Taylor visited Vietnam in early March for a major
review of the situation and the U.S. effort. Prior to their arrival they
31. Staff Stud r, MG Richard Stillwell, Subj.: Counterinsurgency Vitaliza-tion, 10 14.rcn 1964, SECRET.
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informed the Mission that they wanted to discuss, among things U.S. organi-
zation for pacification.32 This should be viewed as a continuation of the
unsettled nature of Washington's views on how to organize for pacification
as already shown in the January JCS proposal and the Feoruary recommenda-
tions of Chester Cooper and William Colby. McNamara's visit did result in
a plan to abolish MAAG and place its personnel and functions under MACV,
but when McNamara reported to the President, there were no recommendations
for any broader reorganization and no hint of Stillwell's idea of MACV
becoming the executive agency for pacification. Stillwell lamented to
General Harold K. Johnson, then the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Mili-
tary Operations, that major questions had not been addressed at the con-
ference with McNamara and his party. "Reorganization of MACV/MAAG is one
thing," he observed, "integration of the U.S. Mission is vastly more im-
portant."3 It is probable that the relations between Lodge and Harkins
precluded such a change, particularly one that would have placed more of
the overall U.S. program under MACV.
In early June Westmoreland, who was returning with Lodge from a
32. Joint State/Defense Message to Saigon, No. 1307, 25 February 1964,
SECRET.
J3. National Security Action Memorandum No.* 288, Subj.: Implementation of
South Vietnam Programs, 17 March 1964, SECRET. McNamara's pre-trip
draft of the report to the President saids "...though more can be
done, perhaps, in integrating the U.S. effort and meshing it with the
GVN effort... "--see Draft Memorandum, McNamara to President, Subj.s
Soutzi Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 5 March 1964, SECRET. This was re-
moved in the final recommendations after the trip.
34. Letter, Stillwell to Johnson, 12 March 1964. The abolition of MAAG
did end the unfortunate situation of military advisors having two
masters--COMUSMACV and the Chief of MAAG.
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Mission/Washington conference at Honolulu, talked at length with him,
pointing out that responsibilities within the Mission were not clearly
established and that there was a serious lack of coordination especially in
regard to pacification.35 The Embassy, he said, was ill-prepared to deal
with large managerial problems due tA its small size and lack of experience.
lodge agreed, and Westmoreland suggested three alternatives: have the
Deputy Chief of Mission serve as chief of staff for pacification, appoint a
military officer to the Embassy to serve as the pacification executive, or
designate COMUSMACV (the U.S. military commander) as executive agent for
coordination of all U.S. efforts in pacification. Lodge, accepting that
his staff had their hands full with non-pacification activities and prefer-
ring the third alternative, tentatively approved it but refused to take any
initiative and replied that he would express his views only if queried by
Washington.36
This idea of Westmoreland's was overtaken by events. The President
shortly thereafter replaced Harkins with Westmoreland who took over on
June 20th. Iodge resigned and his place was taken by General Taylor with
Alexis Johnson, a senior Foreign Service Officer, as his deputy.
The new deputy, who arrived in Saigon ahead of Taylor asked the Mis-
sion's agency chiefs to give him their recommendations for organization.
Westmoreland did present a detailed proposal.37  It was an attempt to define
35. Message, MAC 2815, 060245z June 1964, Westmoreland to Taylor CONFIDEN-
TIAL.
36. The "tentative approval" is from a personal interview with General
Westmoreland, 18 April 1975.
37. Memorandum, Westmoreland to Ambassador Johnson, Subj.: Recommenda-
tions of Organization of U.S. Mission and Echelons of GVN in Coordina-
tion with our Advisory Efforts, 1 July 1964, SECRET, with charts.
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more precisely agency responsibilities for key Mission tasks. While he
originally wished MACV to be made the executive agent for pacification and
USOM for development, after discussions with USOM officials this was changed
to "responsible agent for coordination" of pacification. It is worth not-
ing that pacification was conceptualized as a two-stage operation. The
first was called pacification and the military were envisaged as the lead-
ing force. The second was,.ealled development with USOM to be the most
interested agent. AID and long-term development, according to Westmoreland,
would take over only after the country was secure, a solution that, given
the state of the countryside, would have left the military in charge of
pacification for many years.
Iyndon Johnson's choice of Taylor and Johnson to go to Vietnam may be
thought of as the apex of his attempt to find the "right man" for pulling
the U.S. effort together and reversing the course of the war. Taylor, then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the most well-known military man
in America on active duty, a figure who commanded respect within the mili-
tary. He was the one man who, the President reasoned, should be able to
control the military effort and mesh it with the civilian and political as-
pects of the war. Alexis Johnson was the Deputy Undersecretary of State
and the most senior Fbreign Service Officer. By sending him out as deputy
he significantly upgraded the position while calming civilian worries about
38. Westmoreland said that he got the idea of each agency being executive
agent for parts of the Mission's funcgions from the military organiza-
tion of a "proponent" commander. This is best exemplified in the
example of the Navy's "proponency" in the Pacific and the Army's in
Europe--Personal Interview with General Westmoreland, 18 April 1975.
39. Interview, Charles B. MacDonald with Westmoreland, 19 March 1973.
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a military takeover.
One observer believed that by sending Taylor and Johnson out the
President effectively put off any Washington-initiated reorganization as no
40
one could tell the former Joint Chiefs Chairman how to run a mission.
Taylor's resistance to Washington suggestions on how to improve the war
effort, even when they came from the President himself, has been well
documented.41 Generally, these suggestions veered away from direct refer-
ence to the Mission itself and instead pressed for schemes that would have
forced indirectly more U.S. integration such as infusions of civil affairs
advisors into the Vietnamese Government, joint U.S./GVN command, and en-
cadrement of U.S. troops with the Vietnamese. The senior members of the
Mission were unanimous on these issues and strenuously rejected all of them,
usually with the justification that such measures would smack of colonial-
ism and increase Vietnamese dependence on Americans. On few issues was
there such consistent and long-trm agreement within the Iission and such a
stream of resisted suggestions from Washington.
With the difficulties between Lodge and Harkins in mind, before he left
for Saigon, Taylor got President Johnson to provide him with the strongest
possible terms of reference:
... my desire that you have and exercise full responsi-
bility for the effort of the United States Government
in South Vietnam. In general terms this authority is
parallel to that set forth in President Kennedy's letter
of May 29, 1961, to all American Ambassadors; specifi-
cally, I wish it clearly understood that this overall
responsibility includes the whole military effort in
40. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 21.
41. USVNR, IV.B.3., pp. 44-45 and 59-62.
South Vietnam and authorizes the degre32of command and
control that you consider appropriate.
He went on to tell Taylor that he wanted to know what arrangements Taylor
would devise to meet this instruction in order that supporting action could
be taken in the "defense Department and elsewhere."
Though the original impetus came from the new Ambassador, this letter
indicates the support the President gave Taylor and his willingness to step
on any Washington bureaucratic toes to back him up. His use of the word
$exercise" makes it clear that these powers were to be actively used. Few,
if any, other U.S. Ambassadors have ever entered on their assignments with
such a formidable combination of personal command and respect combined with
Presidential authority and backing. Yet Taylor was little more effective
in solving the coordination problem than his predecessors who never were
given the power he was. At the end of his tenure a year later, the U.S.
Mission was, if anything, more fragmented with larger bureaucratic fiefdoms
than before. -What went wrong?
Taylor, for one, did not feel that major organizational changes needed
to be made. If he did have any doubts about the organization in Saigon,
they were not translated into any major alterations. Indeed, he was more
worried about the broad powers conferred by the President as upsetting the
military chain of command. He hastened to assure the Joint Chiefs, the
42. Letter, President to Taylor, 2 July 1964, CONFIDENrIAL which is quoted
in full in Message, JCS 7217 to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, 2 July 1964,
CONFIDEI'IAL (Grp. 4). Part of this is quoted in USVNR, IV.C.o., p. 9.
Taylor stated that he went to the President and requested that he be
given a strong letter of authority from the President. Juhnson told
Taylor to draft it, which he did.-- Personal Interview with General
Taylor, 14 May 1975.
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Pacific Commander, and General Westmoreland that he would not interfere with
the existing command arrangements. lie did not want to put Westmoreland "in
the unhappy position of having two military masters." He thus was unable
to break out of the mould of years of military training and instruction in
the importance of the chain of command--a perfect organizational response
from a man whose intellectual attainments and White House assignment might
have led one to hope otherwise.
He did ask Westmoreland to clear all policy cables going to Washington
by military channels, but only so that he could dissent, if necessary,
through State channels. That alone reveals how he saw his role. In an
interesting admission he later remarked:
Largely because the parties involved were reasonable
people, this arrangement worked well, although I would
not defend the propriety of the arr gement as a
matter of organizational principle.
General Westmoreland confirmed this arrangement:
I was in full agreement with making Ambassador Taylor
the person in overall charge of the Mission and sub-
ordinating myself to him with the understanding--which
was made clear, that he would not be in the military
chain-of-command. But at the same time it was his
prerogative to keep abreast of military matters and it
was my responsibility to keep him informed...We didn't
always agree on matters, and he was always very careful
to make my independent views known when there was dis-
agreement. In other words, he didn't try to superimpose
his military advice over mine. On the other hand, he wasn't
reluctant to make known his views which may have been -
different from mine. This did t happen very often but
did happen an afew occasions.
43. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swurds and Plowshares (New York: W. W. NorTon & Co.,
1972), p. 316
44. Ibid.
45. Interview, Major Paul Miles with Westmoreland, 10 April 1971,
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Taylor did make one organizational change. He formalized the Country
Team concept setting up what was called the Mission Council in July. The
organizational structure of the Mission Council was not vastly different
from Lodge's "Mission Team," and most of it was developed by Westmoreland
and the civilian agencies after Alexis Johnson's arrival but prior to
Taylor's. Its members were the Ambassador, his Deputy, the Embassy
political and economic counselors, and the heads of U.S. agencies in
Vietnam. An Executive Secretary, soon to be known as the Mission Coordi-
nator, prepared the agenda, recorded decisions, and followed them up. The
Council met once a week by itself and also had regular joint meetings with
the Vietnamese National Security Council. Interagency subcommittees,
chaired by the agency which had primary interest, dealt with special areas
of concern. While the Ambassador was the final decision-maker, the object
was to try to achieve a consensus, especially among staff officers before
issues even reached the formal meetings. Taylor saw it as a miniature
National Security Council. He allowed, however, each agency to appeal
Council decisions to Washington, another indication of the agencies' ulti-
mate independence.
In a letter to Elbridge Durbrow in 1965 Alexis Johnson took some pride
in the Mission Council pointing out that "we established the habit of
Mission elements and the GWN and the Mission working together in a more
effective way." Yet, the hands-off philosophy was evident for Johnson
46. A key document for this is cited in footnote 37.
47. Taylor, Swords..., op. cit., p. 318.
48. Letter, Johnson to Durbrow, 26 November 1965, as quoted in USVNR,
IV.C.8., pp. 21-22.
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also said:
...the Mission Council and the Joint Council were
important not so much for what was in face decided
at the meetings but for the fact that their existence,
and the necessity of reporting to them, acted as a
spur to the staff people to gelgthings done and to
resolve issues on their level.
Consensus was the guiding motto; decision from the Ambassador was to come
only as a last resort, and even from his decisions, agencies could appeal
to Washington.
One former member of the Mission, who saw the Council system at close-
hand, felt that it had an uneven record as a coordinating device.50 Co-
ordination did not really flow downward from the highest level; little
effect was felt in the field. No member of the Council was willing to sub-
ordinate the operation of his particular program to the Council as a whole,
and staff work was done by the agencies themselves, not by a separate body
with a primary interest in the Council. Its existence did relieve some of
the pressure for tighter organization from Washington. On paper it looked
effective, and it at least increased the flow of information among the
agencies. ]it, as far as substantive leadership regarding pacification or
as far as truly alleviating the competition for resources among agencies
went, it is difficult to judge the Council a success. Even General
Westmoreland who helped design it has observed in retrospect that "the
Mission Council failed to provide the tight management needed for pacifica-
tion."5 1
49. Ibid.
50. Leonard Maynard, "United States Overseas Mission and Counterinsurgency,"
unpublidh1d National War College Research Paper, March 1971, p. 26,
and Cooper, et al., Elements..., j. cit., p. 285.
51. Interview, Charles B. MacDonald with Westmoreland, 19 March 1973.
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All this is not meant to imply that Taylor was powerless or that the
agency chiefs could disobey him easily. The situation was in no way com-
parable to that between Durbrow and Williams or even Nolting and Harkins.
Ambassador Taylor was unquestionably the figure of authority in the Mis-
sion.52  What happened was not open defiance but rather a lack of positive
leadership in pulling it together which was aggravated as the resources and
manpower committed by all U.S. agencies grew. He appears not to have felt
that firmer interagency coordination and direction were necessary.53
Taylor, furthermore, was weighted down with events in a momentous year that
involved major escalation and an extremely unstable Vietnamese Government.
The major pacification effort in 1964 was the Hop Tac Program around
Saigon which spawned a flurry of organizational proposals for the U.S.
Mission. It grew out of a desire to concentrate on a few critical
provinces, those of greatest import where the Vietnamese Government's situ-
ation was the most precarious.
Hop Tac had its roots in late 1963 when thirteen highly-contested
provinces were singled out for special attention at the November 20th meet-
ing at Honolulu of Mission and Washington officials. Even at this early
date the focus was on the area around Saigon, and the Americans were able
to persuade the Vietnamese to emphasize their pacification efforts there.
By May 1964 the number of critical provinces was narrowed to eight, and
52. Interviews of General Westmoreland make this point clear. See for
example Interview, Charles B. MacDonald with Westmoreland, 4-5 Febru-
ary, 1973.
53. Taylor, Swords..., o. cit., and Personal Interview with General
Taylor, 14 May 1975.
54. Draft Memorandum, LTC Robert M. Montague, Jr., untitled, 7 August 1964.
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when the actual operation of go2 Tac was launched in September, it em-
braced the four provinces immediately adjacent to the capital. The concept
of Hop Tac operation was to concentrate Vietnamese resources on this central
core, expanding out in concentric rings as each successive area was paci-
fied. The operation was not a success. From the beginning the Vietnamese
viewed it as an American program. Its proximity to Saigon involved the
forces assigned to it in Vietnamese political turbulence. The Vietnamese
had a different conception of its strategy and what was entailed than the
Americans. Above all, it had little military or pacification effect on the
Viet Cong. The program drifted along more in name than in substance until
in July 1966 even its organizational trappings were done away with.55
Ho Tac did generate a series of proposals for organization of the U.S.
effort that do bear examination. It came at a time when there was a sudden
concentration of major changes in the U.S. Mission's senior membership, and
the planning for it began during the same period that both Westmoreland and
President Johnson were recommending to Lodge that the Mission effort be more
tightly managed.
The original planning was done by the MACV staff and then presented by
Lodge and Westmoreland to the Honolulu Conference with McNamara and Rusk in
early June.56 Central to the operational concept was military/civilian and
U.S./Vietnamese unity. Even its name meant "cooperation." Civilian pro-
5 . The Ho Tac, Program, both in concept and execution has been well-docu.
mented . Richard Holbbrooke's treatment of it in the Pentagon Papers
(USVNR, IV.C*6,9 pp. 1-9) is probably the best unclassified source
avaliable. Official documentation is extensive and includes not only
some of the earliest planning papers but detailed "progress'' reports a
and evaluations.
56. Memorandum for Record, William Bundy, Subj.: Tuesday Afternoon Ses-
sion in Honolulu 2 June 1964, 3 June 1964, TOP SECRET.
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grams and officials were to follow the military forces into each area as
soon as the security situation permitted.
U.S. advisory responsibility in each province affected was to be given
to a single individual or "Team Captain" who would be military as long as
security was a paramount consideration. CIA activities, however, were to
be excluded from his jurisdiction.57 The U.S. team was then to form half of
a joint U.S./Vietnamese group. This team concept was reinforced by the
aforementioned visit of Westmoreland and other Mission members to Malaysia
in mid-June. Alfred Hurt, the USOM Deputy Director, told Westvoreland that
he agreed that in insecure areas the provincial "executive agent" should be
military, but that the British "committee consensus" approach should be used
also. There was no need, he felt, for a command relationship between USOM
and MCV in each province since USOM was "only too ready to cooperate." 5 8
The general substance of his reply was positive to the idea of' more unified
direction even if it was under the military. While this province team
proposal never evolved into an effective mechanism, it is indicative of the
concern felt in the Mission that provincial advisory efforts of the differ-
ent U.S. agencies needed more unity. The proposal surfaced a year later
again when an actual experiment with a team chief was tried in three
57. Message, Saigon 2478 to State, Lodge to Rusk, 13 June 1964, probably
SECRET (Grp. 3). William Sullivan, head of the VNCC, told Rusk that
placing the province team under the military advisor "may be advis-
able."--Memorandum, William Sullivan to Rusk, Subj.: Measures to
Strengthen the Situation in South Vietnam, 5 June 1964, SECRET with
attached draft Joint State/Defense/AID Message to Saigon,,SECRET. See
also Draft Working Paper, MACV Staff, Subj.: U.S./VN Proince Task
Force Executive and Administrative Mission (TEAM), 2 June 1964, SECRET.
See also Ltter, Westmoreland to Mr. Leonard, 29 September 1970.
58. Memorandum, Hurt to Westmoreland, 22 June 1964, SECRET.
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scattered provinces.
Along with the province team idea, Lodge also recommended that
Westmoreland be made the Mission's executive agent for the U.S. effort in
all the critical provinces (this was before Hop Tac was narrowed down).
This would have made Westmoreland the de facto American pacification chief.
Hurt agreed to lodge's plan also, though Westmoreland made it clear that he
viewed his role in terms of consensus and coordination, not command:
I intend to work through committee arrangements designed
to provide a consensus approach. The point is that some
designated individual must be appointed to exercise initi-
ative in getting all interest- parties together so as to
effect an integrated program.
Later, Taylor did go ahead and designate MACV as the coordinator during the
initial (i.e., military) phase of Hop Tac, but Westmoreland's authority
never went beyond coordination, and as Hop Tac bogged down and the war
escalated, this role had little meaning.60
A joint. U.S./GVN Pacification Working Committee was set up consisting
of the MACV Chief of Staff, the Vietnamese Armed Forces Chief of Staff, and
the Chief of USOM's Rural Affairs division which, while told to concentrate
on the Hop Tac provinces, was also to keep track of all pacification prob-
61
lems. However, all problems requiring high-level policy decisions were to
be referred to the GVN's Central Patification Committee. There is little
indicition that this Working Committee did anything more than exchange view-
points.
59. Memorandum, Hurt to Westmoreland, 29 June 1964, SECRET
60. Memorandum, Westmoreland to Mr. James Killen, Subj.: Terms of Refer-
ence, 2 September 1964.
61. HQS. MACV, Staff Memorandum 15-1, Subj.: Joint U.S.-RVNAF Pacifica-
tion Working Committee, 15 June 1964.
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When the actual Hop Tac operation itself was launched in September, it
did have a ok Tac Council with a secretariat. This was a joint body with
the U.S. component led by the Senior Advisor to the III Corps area, a U.S.
Army colonel, and included representatives of all U.S. agencies. But, as
with other organizational aspects connected with Ho Tac, it had scarcely
more effect than the operation itself.
In hovember Westmoreland admitted to Ambassador Taylor that "the
present pacification program is not progressing at all well under the pres-
ent form of organizational and conceptual direction" and proposed that the
United States assume operational control of the entire GVN pacification
program.62 This would have involved a joint planning staff under the aegis
of the Vietnamese National Security Council and the U.S. Mission Council
with U.S. "watchdogs" in the Armed Forces Command and all ministries con-
cerned with pacification to make sure that execution matched the plans. Am-
bassador Taylor did not adopt this, and instead chose the less radical
alternative that Westmoreland also proposed--extending Hop Tac to the other
three corps areas which was tried in 1965. Taylor who had his hands full
with the Vietnamese Government's instability and sensitivity was not about
to try such a course of action. What is remarkable is that Westmoreland
proposed it at all. He had otherwise consistently opposed detailed, and es-
pecially visible, American involvement in the Government of Vietnam. 'While
he did not specifically deal with U.S. organization in his proposal, its
adoption would have given MACV more control over the U.S. side of the paci-
62. Memorandum, Westmoreland to Taylor, Subj.: Assumption by U.S. of Op-
erational Control of the Pacification Program in South Vietnam, 14
November 1964, SECRET.
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fication effort.
Meanwhile, the seeds of further disunity were being sown by the begin-
nings of what later was called the Revolutionary Development Cadre Program.
Cadres of government personnel to go out and work in the countryside were
scarcely new to Vietnam. The French had used teams of government workers
and officials in rural pacification as did President Diem with his "Civic
Action" cadres in the id-1950's. Some government ministries, such as that
of Information, had their own field cadres. In 1964 and 1965 there were
several large pacification cadre programs underway, each of varying size and
effectiveness.
The most important for the future was the Peoples Action Team (PAT)
program. Started first in Quang Ngai Province under CIA sponsorship, it was
the direct precursor of the larger Revolutionary Development Cadre effort.
These teams originally were specially trained, with heavy emphasis on
political indoctrination and motivation, Popular Force platoons that lived
and worked among the people. They also were recruited and trained in the
province where they worked. From 1964 to 1966 this program was expanded
greatly, not only absorbing some of the other cadre programs but also re-
cruiting new members. Its character was altered. The core of the 59-man
teams, as they eventually grew to, was a large security component but not
a Popular Force platoon. A National Training Center turned out more teams
and sent the existing ones through refresher courses.
The PAT program, especially as originally conceived, reflected the
CIA's organizational repertoire. But, it grew also as a result of a
genuine perception that the U.S. and Vietnamese military were not devoting
enough emphasis and resources to pacification, and that the military efforts
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in this area were unsuccessful and inadequate to the character of the task
at hand. 63 Essentially the cadre program, which was quickly supported by
the Mission's civilian components, became their pacification force
structure. While some pacification staff officers in MACV felt that it
would be better to give the same role to the Popular Forces and concentrate
on improving them, the cadre program generated such strong civilian support
that their viewpoint never was adopted. However, the cadre program, indeed
all civilian efforts in the countryside, produced requirements for scarce
Vietnamese manpower that directly conflicted with military needs. This
became a major point of contention among U.S. agencies in 1965 and 1966.
Peer de Silva, the CIA station chief, responding to Westmoreland's
proposal to have the U.S. assume operational control of all pacification,
reiterated the concepts of the PAT program to Ambassador Taylor and
strenuously objected to any thought of turning the cadre program over to
the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense and MACV.64 Instead, the Vietnamese
province chief should run the program with support by USOM not MACV. The
CIA would assist USOM in this role from two to four years.
In late January 1965 De Silva formally asked the Mission to accept the
CIA-developed cadre concepts and action program and designate USOM, with
63. See for example, Memorandum, Peer de Silva to Taylor, Subj.: Problem
of sealing with VC Subversive Structure within the Province, and Its
Relationship to the Province Chief, His Authority, and the Policing
Agencies under his Exclusive Control, 19 November 1964, SECRET. For
a USOM view of the same problem see Memorandum, Alfred Hurt to James
Killen, Subj.s Problems, 5 November 1964, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.
64. De Silva memorandum, 19 iovember 1964, 2.cit., SECRET.
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initial CIA assistance, as the primary U.S. support agency.6 5 General
William Depuy, then MACV's chief of operations, recommended to Westmoreland
that MACV accept the CIA cadre program because "we cannot afford at this
critical juncture to spurn any reasonable program having prospects of con-
tributing to ultimate victory.',66 But he did stress that the CIA should be
asked to coordinate its programs with MACV. Westmoreland agreed to this
position and maintained it even when faced with a substantial increase of
the PAT program in April and May.
On April 26th the Mission Council approved an expansion of the PAT's
which raised conflicts with military manpower needs. It also assigned
responsibility for the program to the CIA with the provision that it would
be gradually phased over to USOM's control.67 MACV was unquestionably
placed in a peripheral role as regards the cadre and objected, asking to be
included in the PAT program reporting at least and recommending that the man-
power for the PAT's be charged against that to be given to the National
Police, a civilian-sponsored program.68 This last point shows just how far
the military were willing to go in support of civilian-sponsored pacifica-
tion efforts, especially if these conflicted with their own requirements.
The military also were objecting to having a separate advisory system, yet
the civilians could legitimately point to the ineffectiveness of military
65. CIA Draft Joint Mission Directive, Stuoj.: Doctrine of Pacification as
it Applies to the Rural Population, 13 February 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
66. Memorandum, Depuy to Westmoreland, Subj.: "Doctrine of Pacification
as It Applies to the Rural Population," 13 February 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
67. Ybsion Council Action Memorandum No. 92, 2? April 1965, SECRET.
68. Memorandum, BG Depuy to MACV Chief of Staff, Subj.: CAS Briering On
Its Action Program, 9 May 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
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support for pacification. Taylor, who wanted to build up the Mission's
civilian elements, decided to keep the division, and as both the military
and civilian efforts in Vietnam grew, their mass (i.e., agency resources
committed) moved them further apart.
In 1965 the Vietnamese created a Ministry of Rural Construction to
handle pacification, particularly the various cadre programs which in
November were entirely transferred to this office. Ostensibly a civilian
ministry, it nonetheless was run by a military officer. This helped to
preserve both U.S. military and civilian claims in having a legitimate
interest in the pacification effort and the cadre program.
1965 was a turbulent, eventful year for the Americans in Vietnam.
Regular bombing of North Vietnam began in February and in March the first
U.S. ground forces came ashore at Da Nang. Following these two events the
entire American effort mushroomed. By the end of the year the disunity in
the Mission was, if anything, greater than at the beginning despite numerous
proposals to reorganize during the year. The attention and emphasis of the
U.S. military were drawn away from pacification in favor of the large-unit
war, logistics, base development, and operating the U.S. forces. The
civilians, now immersed in their own expanding pacification programs and
feeling a widening conceptual gulf between the military war and what they
were trying to achieve, asserted that while pacification organization might
be tightened up, the program should be under civilian direction. The mili-
tary, who were contributing most of the resources in advisors and materiel
69. From September 1965-1967 this was the able but mercurial General Nguyen
Duc Thang. Originally it was scalled Rural Reconstruction.
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and who are responsible for pacification's security, preferred to keep the
existing organizational disunity rather than place their pacification as-
sets under civilian management.
When McGeorge Bundy gave his important February report to the President
which advocated a bombing reprisal program against N4orth Vietnam, he had
the following to say about pacification organization:
If we suppose that new hopes are raised--at least
temporarily--by a reprisal program, and if we suppose
further that a government somewhat better than the
bare minimum is established, the most urgent order of
business will then be the improvement and broadening
of the pacification program, especially in its non-
military elements.
The mission fully concurs in the importance of this
effort. We believe, however, that consideration should
be given to import modifications in its organization for
this purpose. In particular we believe that there should
be intensive effort to strengthen our program at the
margin between military advice and economic development--
in the area which implies civil government for the
soldiers and police action for the aid mission. These
efforts, important as they are understood to be, are
somehow at the edge of vision for both parties. General
Westmoreland and his people inevitably think first of
military programs, though they have been imaginative and
understanding about the importance of other aspects.
Mr. Killen and the USOM people are centrally concerned with
problems of aid and economic improvement 'although they talk
with conviction and energy about their increasing police
effort. It remains a fact that its own organization for
helping to provide real security for an area which has
been "cleared" in crude militaf terms is unfinished
business for the U.S. mission.
Here, from the President's closest national security advisor was evidence
that U.S. agencies were neglecting the important task that fell between the
orbits of their organizational repertoires and that the Mission was inade-
70. Memorandum, McGeorge Bandy to President, Subj.: The Situation in
Vietnam, 7 February 1965, TOP SECRET.
quately structured to deal with it.
McGeorge Bundy did not offer any substantive suggestions, and no
organizational changes resulted from his observations, but what he said did
reflect Washington's concern over the pacification program and the lack of
unity among U.S. agencies. If his comments themselves did not lead to any
changes, the next two months saw a series of proposals for pacification re-
organization, all generated in Washington, some of which were directly
related to his, and we may presume the President's, concern.
It was generally agreed, even in the Mission, that security had not
been provided to the Vietnamese population except when the Government's
regular military forces were operating in a particular area. This was
undermining attempts at pacification. General Harold K. Johnson, the
Army's Chief of Staff, discussed this with Secretary McNamara who told him
that security was the Army's function and that the Army should take steps to
provide it.'1 General Johnson began to set up a small study team for this,
but its efforts were superseded by those of Leonard Unger's interagency
Vietnam Coordinating Committee which, stimulated by McGeorge Bundy's com-
ments, was looking into the entire pacification program.
Meanwhile in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Rollen Anthis, the
SACSA, on General Andrew Goodpaster's direction, advocated that the U.S.
pacification advisory program be given a single chain of command and placed
under General Westmoreland until pacification had progressed into the later,
71. Draft Memorandum, COL James Taylor, Jr. to General Arthur Collins,
Subj.: Security in Vietnam, 25 February 1965, SECRET.
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more peaceful "development" phase.72 He recommended also that the mili-
tary take over USOM's advisory function with the Vietnamese National
Police. AID objected to this aspect and would only concede that the is-
sion might consider letting military advisors in the provinces and dis-
tricts give operational advice to police-type units.7 3
The Vietnam Coordinating Committee, under the stimulus of both Bundys,
wanted a complete review of pacification concepts, security, and the ad-
visory effort for the entire program. The questions they put to Ambassador
Taylor themselves are an indication both of the state of the program and
how poorly it was managed. They did propose that the Ambassador create an
interagency "action group for pacification under a chief of staff to the
Ambassador." 7 4  It would have had both executive and directive powers.
William Bundy sent also a message of his own to Taylor summarizing the VNCC
proposals and prefacing his remarks with the words: "As you are aware,
there is intense interest at highest levels in maximizing effectiveness
pacification program."?5 Ambassador Taylor quickly replied saying there
was no need to extensively restudy the theory and practice of pacifica-
tion.76 Defects in the pacification program, he said , were the result of
inadequate security and ineffective government not lack of understanding of
72. Memorandum, Anthis to Goodpaster, Subj.: RVN Pacification, 24 February
1965, SECRET. General Goodpaster was at this time Directur of the
Joint Staff. Admiral F. J. Blouin, the Director of the Far East Region
office of ISA, mde a similar proposal a short time later--see Memo-
randum, Blouin to John McNaughton, Subj.: Vietnam, 2 March 1965,
TOP SECRET (Grp. 1).
73. Draft Joint State/Defense/AID/USIA/CIA Mes6sage to Saigon, c.24 Febru-
ary 1965, SECRET.
74. Ibid.
75. Message, State 1820 to Saigon, 251720Z Feoruary 1965, SECRET (Grp. 3).
76. Message, Saigon 2767 to State, 260746Z February 1965, SECRET.
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the requirements of pacification. He did not even answer the organiza-
tional proposals. When William Bundy met with Alexis Johnson at Baguio in
the Philippines in March, the latter was totally negative on the idea of
MACV taking over the police advisory function or USO4's role, and he re-
ported that Westmoreland felt the same--a contrast from the General's
earlier positions.
Nb sooner had Taylor batted away these proposals from Washington than
he was faced with more from the same source. The Administration went
through an intensive discussion on how to improve the effort in South
Vietnam to take advantage of the effect of the air strikes against the
North. Taylor was queried for his ideas on how to improve U.S./GVN per-
formance with South Vietnam, and the VNCC developed its own suggestions.78
Taylor's recommendations showed a preference to assign more pacification
responsibility to USOM but avoided any organizational change. His views
and those of the VNCC were combined and sent by Secretary Rusk to President
Johnson as the '41 Points." One of these, a VNCC product, was that the
government should study the possibility of establishing a "U.S. interagency
action group directed by a senior Mission officer" who would report directly
to the Ambassador.80 This group would have responsibility for overseeing
77. Memorandum for Record, William Bundy, Subj.: Highlights of Conversa-
tion with Ambassador Johnson at Baguio, 15 March 1965, TOP SECRET. This
was sent to Rusk, McNamara, McGeurge BiAuy and others.
78. Message, State 2033 to Saigon, 19 March 1965, SECRET (Grp. 3).
79. Message, Saigon 3045 to State, 221023Z March 1965, SECRET.
80. Memorandum, Rusk to President, Subj.: Actions to Expand and Make More
Effective Joint U.S.,GVN Activi.ties in the Non-Miitary Sphere in South
Vietnam, March 1965, SECRET. See also Message State 2064 to Saigon, 23
March 1965, SECRET (Grp.3) which indicates that Rusk's memorandum actu-
ally was sent to the President. It is curious that these 41 Points be-
came known as Taylor's 41 Points. Most were originally conceived by the
VNCC with Taylor's contributions definitely in the minority. Indeed,
he rejected some of them later.
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the execution of the U.S. pacification support effort and coordination of
it with the Vietnamese. On April lst, President Johnson approved all 41
Points, but within three weeks the Mission had killed the idea of an inter-
agency action group saying that pacificagion guidance and coordination were
already adequately handled by the Mission Council.81
Unified interagency action for a particular aspect of the conflict
however was not necessarily an impossibility. In May the Ambassador es-
tablished the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) under the
head of the USIS in Vietnam, Mr. Barry Zorthian.82 He was given Ministerial
rank and made responsible for the entire Mission's psychological warfare
operations and press relations. For these matters JUSPAO was made the
central point of contact with the Vietnamese Government. Zorthian's powers
were directive and included execution; he was not merely a coordinator.
USIS officers and those from all other agencies served under him. Indeed,
he had more soldiers than civilians. JUSPAO as an organization was re-
markably free of criticism. It was an interesting smaller precedent to
CORDS for the management of programs that cut across agency lines.
Through most proposals for organizational change in 1964 and 1965 is
the realization that the U.S. field advisory effort, particularly in the
81. National Security Action Memorandum No. 238, 6 April 1965, as re-
printed in full in USVNR, IV.C.5., pp. 124-126. The rejection can be
found in Memorandum, Leonard Unger to Chester Cooper, Subj.: Status
of Non-Military Actions (Forty-One Points), 23 April 196, SECRET.
82. HQS, MACV, Command History 1965, TOP SECRET, p. 253. This page is
UNCLASSIFIED. Taylor's action did not spring out of a desert. Gen-
eral Harold Johnson, Taylor himself, and Mr. Carl Ruwan (head of
USIA) had recommended a series of improvements to the information and
psychological warfare programs in Vietnam. The President specifically
approved those of Mr. Rowan in NSAM 328.
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provinces, needed to be pulled together. In connection with the origins
of the Hop TacProgram a "Team Captain" in the critical pacification
provinces was discussed but never adopted. In April however the idea was
revived again. It reappeared when President Johnson advocated the experi-
mental introduction of teams of U.S. officials into the Vietnamese
83
provincial governments under unified U.S. leadership. This was but one
of several radical proposals by the President. Supplemental details from
the State and Defense Departments soon followed; there would be one or two
test provinces in which the Army's province advisor would have responsi-
bility for all U.S. activities in that province. U.S. Army civil affairs
teams, "or other similarly qualified personnel," would help stabilize and
run the provincial governments. This was before American troops had ar-
rived in substantial numbers.
Ambassador Taylor's rejection of this was explosive and the idea was
dropped immediately.85 Alexis Johnson did however say to William Bundy
that it might be of value to have a single senior representative, military
86
or civilian, in each province. At a hastily-called conference at
Honolulu on April 20th, which the Pentagon Papers implied was arranged to
soothe Taylor's ruffled feelings, Taylor did agree to experiment in three
83. Message, State 2332 to Saigon, McGeorge Bundy to Taylor, 151545Z April
1965, as quoted in USVNR, IV.C.1., pp. 117-118. The Army had con-
sidered this idea a month earlier, but the President's proposal does
not seem to have resulted Irom any Army advocacy.
84. Joint State/Defense Message 9164 to Saigon, 152339Z April 1965 and
Mesbage, Department of the Army to COMUSMACV, lb,459Z April 1965--both
referred to in USVNR, IV.C.±., pp. 116-117.
85. Message, Saigon 3+19 to State, Taylor to McGeorge Bunay, 17 April 1965
as quoted in USVNR, IV.C.l., pp. 117-118.
86. Message, Saigon 332 to State, 17 April 1965, TOP SECRET.
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provinces with team chiefs, one of which would be civilian.87
The team chief experiment began in May with a 90-day trial period.
Three provinces were selected, and the chiefs were given their assignments
based on the level of security in the province. MACV, the Embassy, and
USOM provided the officers. What might have been a useful exercise was
weakened at the start by the terms of reference given each chief. While
he was made chairman of the U.S. Provincial Committee, he could exercise
only general guidance over other agencies and could not restrict their
members contacts with the GVN provincial officials. Disagreements that
he could not resolve were to be bucked up to the Ambassador.
Even though the experiment was judged to be the lost successful in the
province headed by the MACV advisor, the U.S. military were in the lead to
discontinue it, which is what happened at the end of August. General Depuy
called it only partially successful and "inconclusive" and noted that it did
not materially improve the overall province situation. Depuy's lack of en-
thusiasm appears to have been motivated by his own long-range solution of
placing the entire military and civilian advisory efforts under the Ameri-
can division and corps commanders. 9 0  The team chief concept however did not
die. In two of the provinces the chiefs were kept on as "team coordinators,"
87. USVNR, IV.C.l., p. 120 and Memorandum, Mc.Laimara to President, 21 April
TOP SECRET.
88. Memorandum, Jack A. Herfurt to Taylor, Subj.: Appointment of U.S. Team
Chiefs in Selected Provinces on a Trial Basis, 7 May 1965. CONFIDENW
TIAL. See also L. Maynard, o,. cit., pp. 32-33.
89. Memorandum, Deput to Westmoreland, Subj.: Team Chief Experiment 31
August 1965, SECRET.
90. Memorandum, Depuy to Westmoreland, Subj.: Team Chief Concept, 25 July
1965, CONFIDETIAL. See also Memorandum, BG James L. Collins to Ex-
ecutive Secretary of Mission Council, Subj.: Committee Report: Mission
Council Meio #121, Item 1, 10 August 1965, SECRET.
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a weak designation that General Depuy still opposed. 9 The concept was re-
stated at the Warrenton Conference in January 1966 (see next ahapter); the
persistence of the underlying problem kept bringing it to life. The idea of
unified advice in each province was an integral part of several proposed re-
organizations and eventually was engraved as one of the most impoftant
principles in the final CORDS structure.
Despite the recognition of 4ashington observers and most senior U.S.
officials in Saigon of the imperfections and disunity in the U.S. organiza-
tion at the province level, no agreement could be reached among the agencies
for a better solution. Characteristic of this was the recommendation of a
special Mission Council Working Group, set up by Ambassador Taylor to ex-
amine the organization of U.S. provincial operations, that no changes be
made in interagency working arrangements in province.92 Each would keep
their own chains of command. Despite the growing presence of U.S. tactical
units which further complicated coordination and had a significant, though
not always positive, pacification impact in areas where they operated, USAID
and JUSPAO field advisors were told only to assist these units "as appropri-
ate or directed by their superiors." Interagency liaison was the best that
could be achieved--a small accomplishment for a war where political and
military aspects were so interrelated.
In late July Henry Cabot Lodge returned to Saigon for his second tour
91. Memorandum, Depuy to Westmoreland, Subj.: U.S. Provincial Team Coor-
dination, 5 December 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
92. HQS. MACV, Command History 1965, TOP SECRET, pp. 405-406 and Mission
Council Action Memorandum No. 12), 17 August 1965, SECRET which is
discussed in detail therein. These pages are SECRET. The Mission
Council approved the Working Group's recommendations.
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as Ambassador, replacing General Taylor, who never had -wished to
stay more than a year. Lodge's inabilities as a manager had been well rec-
ognized during his first tour so the continuing disunity among the agencies
in Saigon should have come as no surprise. However, lest there be a
repetition of Lodge's problems with Harkins, President Johnson armed him
with a letter of authority just as powerful as that given to Taylor:
...as Ambassador you exercise full responsibility
for the work of the United States Government in South
Vietnam. In general terms this authority is parallel
to that set fort3 in my letter to Ambassador Taylor
of July 2, 1964.
If the President had entertained any illusions that Lodge would use this
mandate to manage the Mission forcefully, he might better have commanded
that snowmen be built in the Sahara, for, as the Pentagon Papers have as-
serted, Lodge did not see himself as the administrator or manager of the
Mission but as the President's personal representative in Saigon. He-
just did not visualize his being responsible for operations of U.S.
agencies in Vietnam. While the following was not directly related to paci-
fication, it is a good example of the independence he permitted the agen-
cies:
...I have learned of Zorthian's wire to Marks (the USIA
Director), which of course he has the right to send,
since I hold that Zorthian, like U.S. agency chiefs here,
has and should have an open channel to his agency. It
is a statement of Zorthian's opinion which, f course,
was sent without my approval or direction.
93. Letter, President Johnson to Lodge, July 1965, as quoted in USV.NR,
IV.C.8., pp. 8-9.
94. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 8.
95 Ibid.
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Richard Holbroake has observed that "each agency could ignore him when he
,96told them to do something and usually get away with it., The President's
letter of authority was never used in part because lodge does not appear to
have challenged the military in their own area of concern. In September
General Westmoreland told General Wheeler, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, and
Admiral Sharp, the Pacific Commander:
I have every reason to believe that he (Lodge) will
agree to my approach in that there has never been any
tendency by Ambassador lodge to interfere qn military
matters or pre-empt my military judgment.
lodge was willing to exhort, but in at least one case his exhortations
better serve as a measure of his isolation from what was happening among
U.S. agencies in the field. In December he told the Mission Council that:
...in general, relationships among U.S. advisors (at the
provincial level) from all agencies are cordial and
productive. Mutual goodwill and dedication to a common
cause normally serve to balance the natural tendency of
each advisor to see as paramount the activities with
which he is most intimately involved...It is not the intent
of this memorandum to prescribe formal coordination
procedures, but rather to provide guidelines for improving
existing procedures. Frequent meetings, joint planning,
full exchange of ideas, and wholehearted coop ration can...
enhance the total impact of U.S. assistance.
Ambassador lodge's tour did begin with an interesting experiment.
Lansdale, by then retired, was sent out with a small, hand-picked team of
specialists to serve as an informal political staff for the Ambassador and
to act as liaison between the Mission and Vietnamese officials responsible
for pacification. To this end lansdale was made Chairman of the inter-
96. tIbid. p. 10
97. Message, MAC 4642, 170215Z September 1965, Westmoreland to Wheeler and
Sharp, TOP SECRET.
98. Memorandum, Lodge to Mission, Subj.: U.S. Provincial Team Coordination,
6 December 1965, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.
125
agency Mission Liaison Group which Taylor had established in May to provide
closer coordination with the Vietnamese Director General of Rural Recon-
struction (pacification) but which until Lansdale had been chaired by the
Mission Coordinator. lodge even named him as the Mission's Senior Liaison
Officer to the Vietnamese Government in October, but this was a title only
with no directive power over other U.S. agencies.
Lansdale had hoped to have Washington control of his mission trans-
ferred from the State Department to the White House, but it remained under
William Bundy. He felt that the President and Lodge understood and sup-
ported his mission. It is indicative of the state of affairs in pacifica-
tion that before he left for Saigon Lansdale termed his appointment a "des-
peration play" to see if something else would work.
Lansdale's mission was not a success. He was useful for his political
contacts and sensitivity and his ability to gain the trust and confidence of
Vietnamese officials. But for him his stay in Vietnam was a frustrating
period. Basically, his solution of personal influence and inspriation on
key Vietnamese leaders was out of step with the behemoth that the war had be-
come. What probably would have been right for the 1950's was inappropriate
in 1965 and 1966. The Vietnamese quickly discovered that his power was
limited and turned to the large U.S. agencies with their vast staffs and ac-
cess to resources. Lansdale's personal preference for sensitive political
dealing ran afoul of the Embassy's political section, and his own inability
to manage was not compensated for elsewhere on his staff.100 His efforts to
99. Memorandum, MG William R. Peers to General Harold K. Johnson, Subj.:
Meeting with E. G. Lansdale, 17 August 1965, CONFIDENTIAL (Grp. 4)
100. Interview, Charles B. MacDonald with Westmoreland, 24 April and 8 May
1973. See also L. Maynard, op. cit., P. 35.
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to deal with Lodge on issues that cut across agency responsibilities were re-
sented and frequently frustrated by the agencies, for he had no independent
operating authority, no funds, and no Washington constituency, an extremely
important factor, to back him up.101 The Mission Liaison Group did meet
regularly and worked on producing interagency pacification plans. Its finest
accomplishment probably was the setting of the final design and unification
of the Rural Construction Cadre Program with the Vietnamese in November 1965.
In November Lansdale, who had recently been working closely with General
Thang, the Minister of Rural Construction, on the entire cadre program, told
Lodge that someone had to be put in charge of the U.S. cadre advisory effort
102
and liaison with the Vietnamese. CIA and USAID wanted to limit MACV's
participation in cadre matters to observation since CIA was paying much of
the bill for the cadre. They also felt that MACV would overstaff and over-
complicate the effort. Lansdale realized that if he stepped into an opera-
tional role all the agencies would regard him as a usurper, challenging their
resources. He made his desires and capabilities clear when he said: "I can
represent you on policy, but am not in any position to undertake directing
operations." AID, he noted, wanted to assume a more prominent role in paci-
fication as it was faced with a Congressional debate on its future. To the
Mission Council, Lansdale recommended that CIA or USAID be assigned executive
103
responsibility for U.S. liaison with the cadre program. Even the CIA,
USAID, and Lansdale could not agree on his proposals which had also included
101. C. Cooper, et al., Elements..., 22 cit., p. 286.
102. Memorandum, Lansdale to lodge, Subj. Rural Construction Cadre, 29
November 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
103. Memorandum, Lansdale to Mission Council, Subj.: Rural Construction
Cadre, c. 5 December 1965 CONFIDENTIAL.
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his office in a policy guidance role, and the matter was dropped mementarily.
MACV objected to being shut out on the cadre question as the Rural Construc-
tion cadre duplicated some of the Regional/Popular Force effort and drained
away precious manpower from the military.104 MACV also had the only fully-
established advisory structure down to the district level; they would have
to supply arms to the cadre; and the Rural Construction Minister was a mili-
tary man with other military responsibilities.
Therefore consternation was provoked when two weeks later lodge told
Lansdale that he and the representatives of USAID and CIA were to be the only
regular advisors to the Government of Vietnam on pacification and development,
105
with USAID and CIA as the operating support agencies. MACV was to be pre-
eminent in the military clearing phase but for the rest of pacification was
only to support CIA and USOM. General Westmoreland, who was in Honolulu, was
alerted by his watchful Chief of Staff, General William Rosson.106 As this
was in progress, Lansdale informed the Mission Council that since Lodge had
referred to him as the "principal coordinator and principal contact point
with the GVN in the fields of pacification and development," he must be kept
informed on pacification by all agencies involved.107 It is clear that he
did not visualize himself as a directing administrator but only as the senior
104. Memorandum, BG Depuy to Westmoreland, Subj.: Rural Construction Cadre,
c. 5 December 1965, CONFIDETIAL.
105. Memorandum, Lodge to Lansdale, Subj.: Roles of Different U.S. Agencies
in the Three Phases of Rural Construction, That Is, Military Clearing,
Pacification, and Development, 15 December 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
106. Message, MAC 6481, 162300Z December 1965, MG Rosson to Westmoreland,
Subj.: Memorandum on Roles of U.S. Agencies in Rural Construction,
CONIFIDENTIAL.
107. Memorandum, Lansdale to Mission Council, Subj.: Rural Construction,
16 December 1965, CONFIDEWIAL.
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policy and advice coordinator. General Westmoreland strongly objected to
Lodge about cutting MACV out of pacification citing the same reasons men-
tioned earlier and noting that such a move would merely split rather than
assist the U.S. pacification effort. 1 0 8
Lodge replied that MACV was in no way being excluded and that the "prin-
cipal purpose of his memorandum to Lansdale was only to cut down on the
number of contacts with the Ministry of Rural Construction. 1 09  After all, he
noted, MACV was in a similar position with the Ministry of Defense, and the
effort would remain integrated if 1ACV and the other agencies provided proper
support.
Nothing ever came of this attempt at unity. Lansdale did not exercise
any new authority; Lodge did not pursue his directive; and CIA and USAID, by
virtue of the resources committed, remained the principal agencies in the
cadre program, but MACV retained its say in the overall pacification effort
particularly in any aspect that involved security. Shortly afterwards, there
was a major interagency meeting at Warrenton, Virginia, the February Honolulu
Conference, and President's designation of Ambassador William Porter as the
single American in charge of pacification. Porter thus took over Lansdale's
role. These events eclipsed Lansdale and added new dimensions to the effort
to reorganize for pacification.
108. Message, HWA 343, 170415Z December 1965, Westworeland to lodge, Roles
of U.S. Agencies in Rural Construction, CONFIDENTIAL.
109. Message, Saigon 1579 to Hawaii, 171845z December 1965, Lodge to West-
moreland, CONFIDENTIAL
Chapter III T 2 9
THE FIRST REORGANIZATION
I wasn't at all reassured about what I heard yesterday.
I have been concerned every time I have been here in the
last two years. I don't think we have done a thing we
can point to that has been effective in five years. I
ask you to show me one area in this country...that we
have pacified.1
These harsh words of Robert McNamara exemplify the frustration that
American officials, particularly in Washington, felt with the pacification
program. After a brief period in which U.S. troops and military pressures
against the North diverted the focus of U.S. attention, the Administration
returned, slowly at first, to the problem of pacification. The war, they
were forced to realize, could not be solved alone by military measures with-
in the international constraints and fear of escalation operating at the
time. Also, there was a widespread perception that the influx of American
forces had reversed the steady decline in the South Vietnamese situation
thus providing an opportunity for pacification to move forward. In addition,
for both domestic and international reasons publicity and visibility were
needed to offset the military programs. The U.S. and Vietnamese Governments
began what Richard Holbrooke called the "Re-emphasis on Pacification."2
This re-emphasis was multifaceted and until the February 1966 Honolulu
Conference it was largely internal to the government. One cannot pick a
precise point in time when it began or devolve responsibility onto a single
1. Briefing for General Westmoreland, 28 November 1965. TOP SECRET, as
quoted in HQS. MACV, Command History 1965, TOP SECRET, p. 229. This
page is TOP SECRET.
2. This was the title he gave to his volume, IV.C.8., that he wrote for
the Pentagon Papers (or USVNR).
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actor or agency. The pressures for public visibility which culminated with
Honolulu clearly and understandably came from Washington, especially the
White House. Lurking at the back of the President's mind were the 1966 Con-
gressional elections and, more importantly, those in 1968 for President. With
some exceptions the same sources generated the internal re-emphasis, though
in Vietnam itself the atmosphere in the Mission, especially among the civil-
ians, was such that Washington's interest would fall on fertile soil.
Within Vietnam Ambassador Lodge was a key factor. While Taylor was not
against pacification, Lodge from the moment of his return pushed it heavily
both in the Mission and in his communications with Washington. If Lodge
was not prepared to interfere in the military side of the war, his advocacy
of pacification and support for the civilian side of the Mission encouraged
other supporters of pacification to press their cases. The presence of
Lansdale who had a long background in pacification was another signal. There
3is abundant evidence that Lodge deeply believed in this side of the war.
However, he saw himself as an advocate to the President not as an "overall
manager of the largest overseas civil/military effort in American History." 4
He did not devise a unified, balanced strategy. The Ambassador, despite his
personal and philosophic interest in pacification, did not extend this in-
terest to setting priorities for programs and directing the field agencies
under his command. His fine words, as we have seen with Lansdale in December
1965, were not followed up with action, and thus he failed to affect the
operating Mission.
The civilian agencies themselves contributed to the re-emphasis. Not
USVNR, IV.C.8., pp. 8-15.
4. II t p. iii.
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only were the various field cadre programs moving toward unification on the
Vietnamese side, but they provided also a centerpiece and a focus for the
civilians' efforts. Their resources committed to Vietnam were growing too
and this naturally provoked them, and their home offices, to push more ag-
gressively for the program toward which most of these resources were di--
rected.
Another factor was the commencement of the policy of leaving much of
the main-force war to the U.S. troops while giving ARVN the responsibility
for providing security to pacification. General Nguyen Cao Ky, then Prime
5
Minister, told Lodge as early as August 1965 that he favored this. Though
it was not formalized until the Manila Conference in October 1966, in
actuality, as U.S. forces arrived more and more ARVN units slipped into ter-
ritorial security roles. While this process left the U.S. main-force effort
more a separate entity, it did engage a growing proportion of the U.S. mili-
tary advisors in pacification. It increased, with some truth, the justifica-
tion for MACV's desire for a continuing and substantial role in U.S. pacifi-
cation support. Not only did the military have a large advisory chain to
nearly every province and district that far outnumbered the civilians', but
their advisory chain to the Vietnamese Army, perhaps reluctantly, became in-
creasingly enmeshed in pacification.
In Washington a renewed interest in pacification sprang up in many
places. The Army's Chief of Staff, General Harola K. Johnson, began a major
study effort called PROVN or Program for the Pacification and Long Term
Development of Vietnam (see below) in mid-1965. Little more than a month
5. USVNR, IV.C.9. (b)., p. 5.
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after Lodge's arrival the State Department sent an important cable to Lodge,
noting that there had been an informal high-level meeting on Vietnam and
that the time had come to consider putting more steam into the pacification
effort.6 While Westmoreland, and perhaps Lodge too, believed that this cable
was the product of the "ivory tower environment" of the VNCC, it was actually
personally drafted by William Bundy and cleared directly with McNamara and
McGeorge Bundy. Believing that the enemy had settled down for a long,
drawn-out war, Washington was asking how might the Americans and South Viet-
namese most effectively employ their forces. They wanted Lodge to develop a
specific plan for concentrating GVN forces on pacification while U.S. forces
would handle large enemy units. They also suggested that pacification be a
multi-faceted program, including such aspects as land reform, and be tried
systematically in key areas with firm military commitments to security.8
Lodge's reply showed that he had no intention of involving himself in mili-
tary questions; these were matters to be left to General Westmoreland. He
said also that he was not ready to provide a specific pacification plan at
that point, yet he did not suggest a future deadline or even that he might
begin work on one. Westmoreland had to reassure the Joint Chiefs Chairman
that he was "not accepting any concepts or ideas that" were against his
6. Message, State 753 to Saigon, 14 September 1965, TOP SECRET.
7. General Westmoreland's History Notes, 12-19 September 1965, CONFIDENTIAL,
p. 6 in General Westmoreland's History File (29 August-24 October 1965),
TOP SECRET. The characterization was Westmareland's.
8. The message also suggested that the United States re-evaluate the effect
and need of massive air strikes especially as regards their effects on
civilians and questioned whether planned increases of U.S. troops should
not be deferred. These naturally were bound to raise military opposi-
tion in Washington and Vietnam which of course they did.
9. Letter, Lodge to 'Westmoreland, 16bSeptember 1965, TOP SECRET, with at-
tached draft telegram in reply to State 753, TOP SECRET.
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"military judgment." 10 The general attitude in Lodge's and Westmoreland's
replies was that of resistance to Washington interference. Westmoreland
stated it quite plainly shortly afterwards:
This is a revert back to the situation of a
year ago when Washington attempted to call
all the shots, project all plans, and dic-
tate how the war would be fought. I regret
this development and will do everything I
can to discourage this tendency.1 1
Both he and General Wheeler were opposed to having the ARVN concentrate on
pacification, and it would be over a year before this would become official
policy and then only for one-half of ARVN.
From various sources the President was being encouraged to give more
emphasis to pacification. In early November, for example, he received a
trip report on Vietnam from the Editor and Publisher of Denver Post,
Mr. Palmer Hoyt -- a personal friend, who urged that more effort and pri-
ority be placed on the pacification program. Johnson was impressed by the
report and asked that it be circulated to his top officials.
Probably the strongest expressions to the President of dissatisfaction
with pacification came from McNamara:
...pacification is thoroughly stalled, with
no guarantee that security anywhere is perma-
nent and no indications that able and willing
10. Message, MAC 4642, 170215Z September 1965, Westmoreland to General
Wheeler and Admiral Sharp, TOP SECRET. See also Message, JCS 3428-65,
161914Z September 1965, Wheeler to Sharp and Westmoreland, TOP SECRET.
11. Westmoreland's History Notes, 12-19 September 1965, oj. cit., CONFI-
DENTIAL.
12. Memorandum, McGeorge Bundy to William Bundy, et al., 3 November 1965,
with attached trip report by Mr. Palmer Hoyt to President Johnson.
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leadership will emerge in the absence of that
permanent security.1 3
and he added pessimistically that the odds were about even that:
we will be faced in early 1967 with a military
standoff at a much higher level, with pacifi-
cation still stalled, and with any prospect of
military success still marred by the chance of
an active Chinese intervention.1 4
The result of this widespread renewal of interest in pacification and
the pessimistic assessments as to its current status was to reopen the ques-
tion of management on the U.S. side. During the following year and a half,
improved management was a key aspect of pacification especially as perceived
in Washington. Indeed, the Pentagon Papers volume on pacification focused
more on U.S. management of the program than on the program itself.
From late 1965 on, there is a clear progression, which in hindsight
appears more certain than it might have at the time to most observers, from
separate agency pacification advisory programs to a unified effort in CORDS.
The focus of this narrative also will perceptibly sharpen on one dimension
-- that of how to manage the pacification program. At this point the reader
must remember that the program itself, regardless of how loosely or broadly
the concept was defined or conceived, by now was but one of four simulta-
neous and often disconnected war programs, the other three being the Air
War, the U.S. ground force war, and the efforts of the regular South Viet-
namese Army. Unlike the late 1950's, it was not the whole war. For this
13. Draft Memorandum, McNamara to President, Subj,: Military and Political
Actions Recommended for South Vietnam, 4 December, 1965, TOP SECRET.
14. Memorandum, McNamara to President, 7 December 1965, as quoted in
USVNR, IV.C.6.(a)., p. 25.
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reason also the narrative largely excludes organizing for the entire war or
the major question of Ambassadorial primacy, issues that were extremely
important for pacification in 1965 and before. These issues rarely appear
in the documents from 1966 on.
This "clear progression" of events leading to CORDS conveniently cen-
ters around three major allied conferences -- Honolulu in February 1966,
Manila in October 1966, and Guam in March 1967. In conjunction with each
of these the U.S. pacification advice and support effort was reorganized.
The events surrounding these reorganizations will be covered in great
detail. Detail is essential to the bureaucratic politics model, and the
following will give some idea of its richness and complexity. Especially
interesting are the positions various bureaucracies and their spokesmen
took on proposed organizations and the marked similarity between predictable
bureaucratic reactions and each agency's perception of the solution that is
best for the program and the national interest.
The role of personalities was crucial. The events to be described
centered on, and were indeed moulded by, three key individuals -- the
President, Secretary McNamara, and Special Assistant Komer. Of these,
Komer was the most continually important, with McNamara coming to the fore
in certain key instances. The President, except in the obvious and ex-
tremely important fact that his Special Assistant acts directly for him,
appeared the least frequently. This is to be expected of Presidents, but
it does not weaken his final import. He created the climate and the pres-
sure for change, in the end deciding just how and when this change was to
be accomplished.
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It is also interesting to see a vast bureaucratic world, almost a
government Nibelheim, that existed beneath the President and his closest
advisors and agency chiefs. Often the two levels appear to be disconnected.
Change at this lower level was glacial; it is difficult to find a "clear
progression" there. This is not true at the President's level where the
change to CORDS was logical, obvious, and related to the President, or his
assistants acting directly for him.
Prior to the Honolulu Conference, a major interagency meeting on
Vietnam took place at Warrenton, Virginia, in January 1966. Not only did
this meeting foreshadow many of the later decisions on organization, but
one can also say that it represents the apex of the efforts of the bureau-
cracies in Washington and the field to deal with the problem of organization
on their level without Presidential direction. The agenda of this meeting
and its results indicate that disunity among the agencies on pacification
was still as strong as ever in early 1966.
In November 1965, the Vietnam Coordinating Committee, led by Ambassador
Leonard Unger, first raised the idea of a conference of working-level mem-
bers of the Saigon Mission and U.S. agencies in Washington concerned with
Vietnam. The conference proposal was preceded by a month of discussions
among the Committee on the future course of the U.S. effort in Vietnam.15
15. In particular see W.A.K. Lake, draft "Notes on Discussion Held at the
Vietnam Coordinating Committee Meeting October 20 on the Future Course
of the U.S. Non-Military Effort in Vietnam," 22 October 1965, SECRET,
and Memorandum, Robert H. Miller to Leonard Unger, Subj.: Future
Course of Non-Military Effort in Vietnam, 25 October 1965 SECRET.
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The major questions in the earliest discussions were the size of American
programs, their degree of influence with the Vietnamese, their lack of
coordination, and the need to set priorities among them.16 No common posi-
tion was reached, and nothing was said that clearly provides a link with the
future outcome of reorganization. Those concerned, both in Saigon and
Washington, were still groping for a solution.
The Committee's discussions were continued, and on November 4, 1965,
it sent a message to Saigon stating that it was essential to develop mil-
itary and non-military programs "in complete coordination." The Committee
also tried to move against the present trend of spreading programs by urging
a hard, realistic look at, and halt to programs that did not have a "posi-
tive and measurable" impact on the population, did not show GVN support,
and were beyond the GVN's capacity to absorb. It asked, in a deferential
tone, for recommendations from Saigon.
At the November 17th meeting of the Committee, Chester Cooper, still
on the White House staff, and Ambassador Unger proposed a meeting with
Mission members to review programs and set priorities.1 8 The Committee
members agreed that a general concept of pacification should be agreed
upon with the Mission and that following this there should be a meeting to
review programs and establish methods and machinery to keep them under
16. Ibid., "Notes on...," especially pp. 5-6.
17. Joint State/AID/Defense Message 1224 to Saigon, 042003Z November
1965, SECRET.
18. Memorandum, Unger to Members of the VNCC, Subj.: Action Summary for
November 17, 1965, SECRET, and the more detailed handwritten trans-
cript of the meeting attached to the copy of this paper in Center of
Military History files.
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review. The fact that there was no general concept of pacification even
at this late date is indicative of organizational malaise.
Ambassador Unger then called for a review of existing cadre programs
(twelve of which were listed!) and asked that non-combat programs and ac-
tions be arranged around a defined objective. He re-stressed the necessity
for priorities and the machinery to assign and follow through on them.19
These stirrings toward reorganization received further impetus from
outside the government when Henry Kissinger, then Professor of Government
at Harvard University, returned from an official trip to Vietnam and met
with the Committee on November 20th. He observed that the U.S. agencies
had non-aggression treaties and little positive integration.20 He saw the
Mission Council as the only group pulling things together with the agencies
"letting things go," and he remarked that programs were kept going with
unqualified or even no personnel rather than being dropped. The night
before he had met informally with a member of the Army's PROVN Study Group
and more bluntly stated that the structure of the U.S. effort in Vietnam
needed to be overhauled, that USAID management lines were hopelessly
tangled, and that while U.S. Army personnel might be more capable in the
job, it would not be in the best interests of the United States to have the
military carry the entire burden. 21
19. Leonard Unger, Outline, Subj.: Vietnam Coordinating Committee Actions
and Programs in Non-Combat Field, 19 November 1965, SECRET.
20. Handwritten transcript of VNCC Meeting, 20 November, 1965, attached to
Memorandum, Unger to Members of VNCC, subj.: Action Summary for
November 20, 1965, SECRET.
21. Memorandum, COL T. J. Hanifen for BG Bennett, Subj,: Debrief of
Dr. Kissinger (19 November 1965), 20 November 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
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Several days later, the Committee informed the Embassy that it viewed
the establishment of agreed standards against which all non-combat programs
should be evaluated as a major task that must be worked out by the Viet-
namese and U.S. Governments.22 These standards were to be the basis of the
Mission's assignment of priorities, allocation of human and material re-
sources, and attention. Significantly, they added that machinery needed to
be set up to implement this. Finally, the need for a meeting, to be held
in December, was formally broached to the Mission for the first time.
Ambassador Lodge responded enthusiastically within a day to the idea
of a meeting and stated that his representatives would be prepared to dis-
cuss all aspects of the U.S. effort.23 During the next two weeks prepara-
tions for the meeting progressed. A detailed concept paper on the applica-
tion of resources to the war effort was sent by Unger to Saigon for comment,
and shortly afterwards the Committee cabled a proposed agenda that dealt
almost exclusively with organizational concepts and priorities and how to
implement them.2 4
At this point General Westmoreland was thinking in terms of committees
and coordination. Before dispatching his representative, BG James L.
Collins, Jr., to the Warrenton Conference, he told him that he wished to
22. Message, State 1402 to Saigon, 221445Z November 1965, SECRET. See also
Message, State 1403 to Saigon, 221446Z November 1965, SECRET which
deals specifically with cadres and political action in the context of
preparing for the conference.
23. Message, Saigon 1849 to State, 230906Z November 1965, SECRET.
24. Letter, Unger to William Porter, 29 November 1965 with attached Memo-
randum, Subj.; Concept for Application of Resources to Vietnam Con-
flict, SECRET. Saigon's comments are not part of the available
record. See also Message, State 1512 to Saigon, 011236Z December 1965,
SECRET.
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see an interagency coordinating committee set up below the level of the
Mission Council but chaired by the Deputy Ambassador.25 This committee
would direct and execute pacification programs and activities but still be
subject to agency approval with reference to the Mission Council in the
event of unresolved disagreements. While he stated the need to integrate
entire effort, he advised little more than coordination, not wanting paci-
fication to be handled by a single Mission element and desiring that every
agency retain its separate access to the Ministry of Rural Construction.
These last two provisos are clearly tied into Lodge's earlier December
attempt to designate Lansdale as the chief American spokesman with the
Ministry of Rural Construction. They illustrate a consistent disinclina-
tion towards any directive unity for pacification in which the military
would not be the directors.
The Conference, which blossomed in its size and the scope of its dis-
cussions, was postponed and took place from 8-11 January 1966. It was sup-
plemented by additional meetings in Washington on a wide variety of non-
military subjects.26 Attending were members of the VNCC, the Saigon Mission,
25. Message, MAC 0117, 070050Z January 1966, Westmoreland to Collins, TOP
SECRET (Grp. 3).
26. See "Tentative Schedule of Meetings for Vietnam Conference January 7-
13," second draft, 6 January 1966, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE. This paper
lists the participants and the subjects of the preliminary and supple-
mentary meetings. I have not been able to locate any minutes or sum-
maries of these meetings, with the exception of the main conference
itself and the January 13th meetings on political developments which
is covered in a detailed memorandum from MG William P, Yarborough to
the Army's Chief of Staff, Subj.: Report of Meeting of the Warrenton
Group, 13 January 1966 at the Department of State, 17 January 1966,
CONFIDENTIAL.
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and other U.S. Government agencies in Washington.2 7
Chaired by Ambassadors Porter and Unger, the talks at Warrenton were
devoted almost entirely to pacification, broadly interpreted, touching on
such subjects as resource allocation, specific pacification programs and
priorities, and concepts of pacification and overall strategy.
A major area of concern treated extensively by the Committee in the
months preceding the Conference had been the development of a concept of
pacification. The results, however, were disappointing, so much so that
concept development is not even mentioned as a purpose of the Conference
in the final report, despite its having been the first item raised by
28
Ambassador Unger in his preliminary remarks. Proposed pacification con-
cepts were discussed in detail, but the concept paper included in the final
report merely restated enunciated GVN concepts with the useful but undevel-
oped additive that the Vietnamese Government should concentrate more on
political action and linkage between the people and their immediate author-
ities.29 Because of the possibility of interagency conflicts, the confer-
ence did not adopt a far stronger and more detailed concept paper by
27. The most important documentary sources on the actual conference are:
Report to the Principals and Ambassador Lodge from Ambassadors
William Porter and Leonard Unger, Subj.: Warrenton Meeting on
Vietnam, January 8-11, 1966, 13 January 1966, SECRET with extensive
annexes; "Minutes of All Warrenton Agenda Discussions, January 8-11,
1966," SECRET; and Draft "Agenda for Meeting at Warrenton Training
Center January 8-11," SECRET. A useful and detailed analysis is con-
tained in USVNR, IVC.8., pp. 20-27. A list of the participants at
the meetings at Warrenton is contained in Annex A to the conference
report.
28. Ibid., Report..., p. 1 and "Minutes...," January 8, 10:00-12:30 hrs.,
p. 1, both SECRET.
29. Ibid., Report..., Annex C. SECRET.
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Peer De Silva of the Central Intelligence Agency who, building on the
experience of the PAT program, advocated a flexible pacification response
that concentrated on security and improved government for people at the
local level. De Silva forcefully emphasized the need to stop enemy infil-
tration and eliminate their clandestine infrastructure, indicating that far
greater attention was imperative in these two areas.30
The conference also focused on priorities and resources and recommended
the adoption of Chester Cooper's suggestion that a resource allocation
expert with an appropriate staff be assigned to both Saigon and Washing-
31
ton.
Organization and coordination of all programs was the major unstated
purpose of the conference. It was stressed heavily in the agenda, and the
depth of comment and attention to these questions indicate a profound and
growing concern about the U.S. and GVN apparatus to deal with pacification.
Almost by nature as well as practicability the participants concentrated on
the U.S. side of this problem, but no agreement was reached on exactly how
to organize the Mission for pacification support.
Opening the discussions on U.S. coordination, Ambassador Porter
advanced the official Mission view that the present system was adequate
and that all was well. He saw field coordinaLion to be essentially a ques-
tion of "personality relationships" and said that "instances of failure
of coordination are relatively rare." 32 His views of the American
30. Peer De Silva, "A Concept of Pacification," 3 January 1966, CONFI-
DENTIAL.
31. Report..., op. cit., p. 5.
32. "Minutes...," op. cit., p. 3.
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Saigon-level structure differed considerably from those of subordinate
Mission members and officials in Washington:
The heads of agencies have developed a system of
coordination of pacification activities. The
Ambassador has complete control and no disagreements
have arisen concerning policy and priorities. When-
ever there is a need for a decision, one is always
obtained and this decision is accepted. The prin-
cipal officer of each agency fully understands U.S.
Government policy and the importance of the Vietna-
mese effort. The Mission should be given a chance
to operate.3 3
Ambassador Lodge, speaking thus through his deputy, clearly was reluctant
to make any change at all.
The various agency representatives presented solutions, most of which
were designed to increase coordination and some of which recognized the
need for centralized operational direction. A member of the Pentagon's
International Security Affairs office briefly proposed that the Central
Intelligence Agency take operational control of all agencies pacification
efforts, but this was immediately discounted by the CIA representatives who
said that their agency was not equipped to run such a large organization.34
This was consistent with the CIA's desire to back away from large overt
programs which were not in its institutional habitude. General Lansdale
retreated from a suggestion by CIA Saigon station chief Gorden Jorgenson
33. Ibid., January 9, 15:00-17:00 hrs., p. 4. The source does not
indicate that this statement is a quotation of Porter. However,
textual examination makes the attribution certain and this is
confirmed by BG James L. Collins, Jr., who was at the meeting.
Porter did hint briefly at organizational problems during a press
briefing a few days later -- See Dept. of State, Transcript of
Background Press and Radio News Briefing, Friday, January 14, 1966,
p. 2.
34. Ibid., p. 2.
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that his Senior Liaison Office be given greater authority and control over
pacification management.35 It is interesting that nowhere in the written
record is there a proposal to give control of pacification to General
Westmoreland.
All of the Saigon agency representatives wanted to keep their agency
command channels and links with the Ambassador. Each also wished to keep
their field programs separate. Advocates of tighter management were
Washington-based, such as Chester Cooper of the White House,with the excep-
tion of the State Department which proposed for Saigon little more than a
pacification coordinating committee. The Pentagon Papers observed with
some justification, however, that Washington was far more prepared to tell
the Mission to reorganize than they were to tackle improvements for their
own house.3 6
General William Peers, then the SACSA for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
advanced the most radical solution: all pacification activities would be
placed under "one central control and direction," just as psychological war-
fare was under JUSPAO. Later in the discussions he recommended that there
should be a second Deputy Ambassador who would have operational responsi-
bility and who would supervise and direct all agencies pacification activ-
ities. MACV pacification advisors were to be completely separated from
38
U.S. regular forces and advisors to the Vietnamese Army. Thus in one
35. Ibid., Morning Session, January 9, pp. 5-6.
36. USVNR, IV.C.8., pp. 26-27 has a useful summary of different agency
proposals.
37. "Minutes...," oI. cit., Morning Session, January 9, p. 6.
38. Ibid., January 9, 15:00-17:30 hrs., pp. 3-4, and Report, op. cit.,
Annex D Attachment "SACSA Proposals."
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instance, at least, an experienced general recommended a solution that his
military background and current position would not have led one to expect.
The various proposals, none exactly alike, indicate the depth of
feeling both in Washington and Saigon among most officials working on paci-
fication. A general consensus was reached that control and management had
to rest just below the level of the Ambassador, and that there must be one
senior official in Vietnam concerned with this subject alone and supported
by a staff. It was not agreed as to whether this person should be the pres-
ent Deputy Ambassador, assisted by a staff, or another official perhaps a
second Deputy Ambassador, and to what extent different agencies resources
and operations should be placed under a single director -- which was the
real issue.3 9
Tackling the U.S. advisory effort at a lower level, the conferees
decided that the Mission Council should consider designating U.S. team
chiefs to head the advisory undertakings in the four corps priority areas
-- a continuation of attempts in this direction that had been proposed and
tried in 1964 and 1965.40
Largely through the proddings of Chester Cooper, the officials at the
Conference took up Washington organization and concluded that the present
government machinery there was inadequate to handle Vietnam problems quickly
and decisively. They advanced, as a possible solution, the idea of setting
up the required "directing position" at a higher level, perhaps related to
the National Security Council. Allied to this, Porter and Unger- concluded
39. Report..., op. cit., p. 4 and Annex D, p. 1.
40. Ibid., Annex D, p. 1.
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that it would be desirable for the proposed pacification official in
Vietnam to have a "high-level point of liaison" in Washington. While
none of these solutions were precise, they do point the way to decisions
that would be taken after the Honolulu Conference.
The Warrenton Conference is not as noteworthy for what it accomplished
in terms of specific programs and completed actions as for the ideas that
were raised at it and the positions various participants and their parent
agencies took on them. It was a prelude. At the very least the meeting
was educational. It enabled officials from opposite poles to converse
unhampered by the restrictions of formal cables and telephones. It let
everyone stop and examine their work in a broader context. General Collins,
reporting back to General Westmoreland, saw this interchange of ideas and
assessments as perhaps the Conference's most important benefit.42 He im-
plied that Washington officials were the pupils, but if this was true, the
professors had but one eye open. The Conference foreshadows the organiza-
tional changes that were to follow in February and March. It also marks a
vague watershed in initiative. The Mission, soon to be forced by the
President's desire for publicity and tangible action onto a stage where the
actor's positions and attitudes were amplified, increasingly came to react
to proposals from above. During the following year the power and direction
in pacification shifted to Washington.
Warrenton as a prelude is most easily seen in the similarity between
the Conference recommendations and the designation of Ambassador Porter as
41. Ibid., pp. 4 and 6-7.
42. HQS. MACV, Command History 1966, TOP SECRET, p. 504. This page is
SECRET.
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the coordinator of U.S. pacification support a month later. The Conference
participants arrived at a vague compromise, perhaps more a consensus of the
necessary minimum, which excluded doing nothing yet eschewed a radical or
decisive solution -- one that their Washington superiors were equally un-
willing to press at this point.
On January 13th Porter and Unger met with McGeorge Bundy, McNamara,
and State Under Secretary George Ball, and they "tentatively agreed" that
the Mission's pacification official should be at the level of the Deputy
Ambassador, and that this person would "supervise" the work of the subordi-
nate agencies.43 At this point they were considering having two Deputy
Ambassadors.44 They decided that McGeorge Bundy would discuss these
changes with Ambassador Lodge during his forthcoming visit to Saigon. They
also pondered the question of Washington organization to deal with Vietnam
problems, but no definite decision was arrived at. The solution envisaged
was in terms of upgrading the functions of the Vietnam Coordinating Com-
mittee Chairman and making him not only a coordinator but a director,
giving him an interagency staff and access to the top officials in each
agency. The conspicuous lack of desire to upset their own bureaucratic
relationships in Washington is a worthwhile parallel to the same tendency
of the Mission in regard to its own affairs that has been remarked on
earlier.
43. Memorandum, Unger to Members of VNCC, 19 January 1966, SECRET, with
attachment, draft "Record of Decisions Concerning Warrenton Meeting
Recommendations," 19 January 1966, SECRET.
44. Ibid.
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Shortly after this the State Department developed a closely-held plan
to create a Director of Vietnam Operations within the Department.45 The
concept envisaged the Director as a manager of "all U.S, non-combat opera-
tions concerning Vietnam" with a Presidential mandate giving authority in
these operations subject only to Secretarial or Presidential reference.
While this office would be dominated by the State Department, the staff
would draw on officials from other interested agencies.
This proposal never came to fruition, though it was not entirely laid
to rest until the President's appointment of Komer in March (see below).
This plan is however remarkable in that it was stronger and more decisive
than any other advocated before or after by the State Department. Whether
it ever had a chance of adoption or operational success is an open question.
It would have been out of character for the State Department or its Secre-
tary. The Department, traditionally primus inter pares among government
agencies, was in no position to direct or supervise a field, action-oriented
program to which its contribution of resources and personnel was far out-
stripped by three other competing bureaucracies. But the idea of centrali-
zation in Washington did not die. The President and his advisors could not
adopt the State solution of one dominant bureaucracy or bring themselves to
shake up radically the U.S. Government's structure, such as creating an
independent supra-director for Vietnam. Yet over the next two months
Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, realizing the necessity for some
45. Memorandum, William Bundy to Rusk, 26 January 1966, SECRET, with
attachments: 1) Draft Cable to Rangoon and 2) Draft NSAM. I have
been unable to locate the Draft NSAM, so a description of its sub-
stance is based on Bundy's memorandum.
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sort of organizational strengthening, continued to advocate it with an
already-receptive President. The March solution embodied in NSAM 343 (see
below) was a direct result of their efforts.4 6
At the same time the need for change was pressed with the President
from another source. On January 19th, Mr. David Bell, the Administrator
of the Agency for International Development, submitted a thoughtful and
candid trip report to Johnson on his early January trip to Vietnam, a re-
port which incorporated some of the ideas raised at Warrenton. Adminis-
trator Bell, with an unusually broad view, saw pacification and not merely
traditional AID programs as the main concern in Vietnam, and he added a
special annex on the subject to a paper that already heavily emphasized it.
What he said is noteworthy for its realistic, harsh assessment of pacifica-
tion and its future. The President received some tough words, much the same
as those in Secretary McNamara's reports, that contrasted sharply with the
flowery phrases and promises soon to blossom from the Honolulu Conference:
It is a striking and melancholy fact that no
significant progress has been made in pacification
for the past several years despite a great deal of
effort...There is as yet, however, no basis for
optimism. The pacification task is inherently
very complex and difficult and will require years
to complete under the best conditions. The new
effort is still almost entirely on paper. 4 8
To a President necessarily occupied with the pressing political realities
at home, assessments of no progress and projections of a seemingly unlimited
46. Personal Interview with Ambassador Robert W. Komer, 6 November 1969.
47. Memorandum, Bell to President, Subj.: Non-Military Aspects of the
Effort in Vietnam -- January 1966, 19 January 1966, SECRET, with Annex
A, Subj.: The Problem of "Pacification" or "Rural Construction,"
SECRET. Two important Warrenton Conference members, Chester Cooper and
Rutherford Poats (AID), had accompanied him.
48. Ibid.
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future could not help but fuel his direct interest and action in
pacification.
Bell went on to state that the problem of highest priority was to
create a "tested and reliable system for 'pacifying' the countryside." He
also advocated a Mission staff to deal with resource allocation and endorsed
the pending propos-al to send high-level teams from the United States who
would be concerned with agriculture, health, and education.
For the purposes of this narrative his observations are most interest-
ing and significant for the force and directness with which he came down on
the side of strong management:
Neither the GVN nor the U.S. approach to the
pacification effort, in my opinion, is yet strong
enoug or well organized enough to get the job
done.
There were no strategy directives, he said, no integrated plans or schedules
to show how U.S. agencies would actually assist pacification. He recom-
mended that there be one single point of managerial responsibility for U.S.
pacification support. His solution, somewhat weaker than his pleas for
strong management, bears a definite resemblance to what actually happened a
month later: Ambassador Porter, supported by a small staff, should be made
responsible for the preparation of integrated plans and schedules and the
supervision of their execution. He noted that General Westmoreland and
the USAID Director were in agreement with this, with Lodge seeming "to
receive it favorably."
49. Ibid.
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In contrast to the growing pressures and high-level interest in a
reorganization of the Mission that existed in Washington and among the
Warrenton conferees, the reaction in Saigon, especially the U.S. Embassy,
to any change was distinguished by open reluctance. Shortly after his re-
turn to Saigon, Ambassador Porter downplayed the moves to reorganize. Ad-
dressing a meeting of the Mission Liaison Group, he stated only that the
"possibility" of a single manager was being discussed. The Mission, he
said, would continue its support of pacification with the current organiza-
tional structure, relying especially on the Mission Liaison Group.5 0
One of the Warrenton proposals on organization died quickly when sub-
mitted to the Mission Council -- the designation of team chiefs for the
U.S. advisory efforts in the four corps National Priority Areas. Ambassador
Lodge informed Washington that the Council had rejected any field structural
changes to accomplish this proposal except to adopt a suggestion by
Westmoreland that the USAID Provincial Representative become the team
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chief for the An Giang Priority Area in the IV Corps zone. This was a
small concession as of all the priority areas An Giang was singularly marked
by the absence of hard civil/military coordination problems and was distin-
guished by the most complete rural security to be found in any province in
Vietnam. Indicative of his attitude, Lodge reminded Washington that the
Council, in previous consideration of a similar concept, had decided to use
the words "team coordinator" rather than "team chief."
50. Memorandum, S. L. Karrick to Members of Mission Liaison Group, Subj.:
Report of Meeting 27 January 1966, CONFIDENTIAL.
51. Message, Saigon 2775 to State, 020519Z February 1966, Subj.: Wirrenton
Recommendations, SECRET.
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The Honolulu Conference of 7-9 February 1966 gave the American
"re-emphasis on pacification" a marked shove forward both within the gov-
erment and in the external visage presented by its spokesman, This con-
ference which said nothing specifically about U.S. organization was instead
a massive and highly-publicized build-up for the non-military war in Vietnam.
President Johnson, realizing that the conflict was not only military and
could not be won by those means alone, and beginning to feel the heat of
critics at home, such as the Fulbright Hearings, and abroad, personally
orchestrated a campaign to emphasize pacification. Putting such a spot-
light on pacification could not help but lead to an attempt to improve the
structure for dealing with it, especially in view of the chorus of com-
plaints of visitors to Vietnam and Washington officials about this struc-
ture.5 2 By publicly commiting himself to the program he not only got a
jump on his critics but a wave of Presidential pressure went down into the
bureaucracies. A new element had been injected.
Pacification and the non-military war dominated the Conference though
both were set within the context of military pressure to defeat the enemy
as a prerequisite. Significantly, however, the principal members of the
U.S. Government were beginning to stress the inadequacy of conventional
victory alone. As Lodge put it in his opening remarks:
52. Westmoreland's later views of Honolulu are interesting: "LBJ at
Honolulu brought out civilian officials to give high visibility to the
civilian side. It was the theme of the day. A lot of hogwash. It
deterred any real centralized control of our effort which was our
biggest problem" -- Interview with Mr. C. B. MacDonald, 2 April 1973.
This appears to have the wisdom of hindsight, for Westmoreland clearly
was only for central control if he had the control, and that was a
position he was not advocating at this point.
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We can beat up'North Vietnamese regiments in the high
plateau for the next twenty years and it will not end
the war -- unless we and the Vietnamese are able to
build simple but solid political institutions under
which proper police can function and a climate created
in which economic and social revolution, in freedom,
are possible.53
Honolulu brought pacification out of government cables and discussions and
gave it a place in the sun.
Secretary Rusk and the President carried the new emphasis further,
tying it into a three-faceted national strategy of military pressure, nation-
building or pacification, and negotiations. Rusk saw pacification as a means
of bringing pressure on the North Vietnamese to negotiate:
...anything that can cause them to realize that an
epidemic of confidence is building could hasten the5 4
time when Hanoi will decide to stop this agression.
The President made it clear that he wanted results:
Now, I want to have my little briefcase filled with
these three targets -- a better military program, a
better pacification program that includes everything,
and a better peace program.5 5
and in an unusually blunt statement, given that he was addressing not only
his own officials but the Vietnamese as well, he said:
...Preserve this communique, because it is one we
don't want to forget. It will be a kind of bible
that we are going to follow. When we come back here
90 days from now, or six months from now, we are
going to start out and make reference to the an-
nouncements that the President, the Chief of State
and the Prime Minister made in paragraph 1, and what
the leaders and advisors reviewed in paragraph 2...
53. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 36.
54. Ibid., p. 38.
55. Ibid.
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You men who are responsible for these departments,
you ministers, and the staffs associated with them
in both governments, bear in mind we are going to
give you an examination and the finals will be on
just what you have done..,.how have you built democ-
racy in the rural areas? How much of it have you
built, when and where? Give us dates, times, num-
bers... larger outputs, more efficient production to
improve credit, handicraft, light industry, rural
electrification -- are those just phrases, high-
sounding words, or have you coonskins on the wall...
Next is health and education, Mr. Gardner. We
don't want to talk about it; we want to do something
about it. "The President pledges he will dispatch a
team of experts." Well we'd better do something be-
sides dispatching. They should get out there. We
are going to train health personnel. How many? You
don't want to be like the fellow who was playing
poker and when he made a big bet they called him
and said "what have you got?" He said, "aces" and
they asked "how many" and he said "one aces"...
Next is refugees. That is just hot as a pis-
tol in my country. You don't want me to raise a
white flag and surrender so we have to do something
about that... 56
The fact that almost none of Johnson's specific wishes were carried
out within his deadlines does not indicate a lack of Presidential power
within the U.S. Government. First, some of his goals were naive and un-
realistic, born of his remoteness from and lack of understanding of the
problems. Second, the problems themselves, difficult as they were, had
also to be solved through an imperfect Vietnamese instrument, one that
might outwardly agree to but not willingly carry out the President's wishes.
The GVN was soon faced with a major political crisis, the revolt in I CTZ.
This overshadowed any sense of urgency that Johnson might have been able to
generate by his exhortations at Honolulu. However, the setting of targets
56. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
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at Honolulu exemplified the President's impatience with the status of
pacification. The nearest and most amenable-to-improvement target for
this impatience, given the difficulty of pacification itself, would be the
American organization to deal with it. Only visible success could have
stilled the pressure for reorganization.
Immediately in the shadow of the Honolulu Conference, President Johnson
made two important decisions. Deputy Ambassador Porter was assigned the
task of pulling together the Saigon Mission's pacification effort, and in
Washington Mr. Robert W. Komer, a Deputy Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, was made a Special Assistant and given a
strong mandate to supervise, from the White House, Washington support for
pacification.
Following the Conference, McGeorge Bundy headed a group of Washington
officials who continued on to Saigon. Bundy had permission from Johnson to
give Porter wide authority over all parts of the pacification program.
Concurrently, the President cabled Lodge:
I intend to see that our organization back here for
supporting this (pacification) is promptly tightened
and strengthened and I know that you will want to do
the same at your end. I was impressed with Ambassador
Porter.. .While I know that he is already doing so, I
suggest that your designation of him as being in total
charge, under your supervision, of all aspects of the
rural construction program would constitute a clear
and visible sign to the Vietnamese and to our own
people that the Honolulu Conference really marks a
new departure in this vital field of our effort there.
We will of course be glad to give prompt support with
whatever additional personnel or administrative re-
arrangement this might require within the Mission or
Embassy.5 7
57. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
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Porter's assignment was forced on a reluctant Henry Cabot Lodge, and
Lodge's reply hinted at the difficulties that Johnson would have with orga-
nizational changes as long as Lodge was Ambassador. After defensively as-
serting that heretofore he had considered that Mission direction of pacifi-
cation was working "pretty well" and that no public announcement was neces-
sary, he agreed to do the President's bidding. But he added:
I assume that if Porter's new allocation means that I
am so taken up with U.S. visitors that I am in effect
separated from "rural construction," then we would
take a new look at the whole thing.5 8
Lodge did go ahead and designate Porter as having "full charge, under my
direction, of all aspects" of U.S. support for pacification. Porter, on
paper at least, had a powerful mandate though Lodge excluded military as-
pects of pacification as opposed to the wider responsibilities advocated by
the President.
Porter was placed in an extremely difficult position. On one hand
Washington was pressuring him for results while on the other Lodge clearly
did not envisage Porter's role in the same way Washington did. Porter,
operating under the constraints of his boss, was unable to perform as
Washington officials, especially the President, had hoped. Holbrooke left
open the question of whether Porter did not pressure other agencies in
Saigon because he knew he would not be backed by Lodge, or because he per-
sonally did not conceive of his role as a true manager.59 However, the
1964 experience of David Nes, which shows strong similarities, indicates
58. Ibid., p. 56.
59. Ibid., p. 57.
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that Porter would have had great difficulty regardless of how he saw his
role. The path he chose to take was certainly made clear to the Mission
Council shortly after his appointment:
(Porter).. .pointed out that the basic idea is to
place total responsibility on one senior individual
to pull together all of the civil aspects of revolu-
tionary development. He sees this primarily as a
coordinating effort and does not intend to get into
the middle of individual agency activities and re-
sponsibilities. As he and his staff perceive areas
which require attention and action by a responsible
agency, he will call this to the attention of that
agency for the purpose of emphasis; he intends to
suggest rather than criticize... 60
It is worth re-reading the President's instructions to Lodge and his con-
ception of what Porter's role really should have been. The difference be-
tween reality and Presidential expectations was considerable. It is also
important to note that such an outcome was not foreordained. The personali-
ties of Lodge and Porter were critical. With Komer and Presidential support
backing him in Washington, an assertive Ambassador and his Deputy could have
done far more to unify the pacification effort.
If Porter's operation was not the success that officials in Washington
had hoped for, then neither was it a complete failure. His efforts were
the first step in a long process of getting the civilian agencies to work
together. In addition, while Porter had no authority over MACV, General
Westmoreland did designate his chief pacification planner, Colonel Joel
Hollis, to act as an advisor to Porter with an office in the Embassy.
Cooperation was such that Hollis' office often produced staff work that
60. Ibid., 57-58. This is from the Mission Council Minutes of 28 Feb-
ruary 1966.
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came out over Porter's signature.61 Hollis also was made MACV's single
point of staff contact with the Embassy on pacification -- an additional
improvement in coordination.
Porter had a small, though extremely able, staff, but its size, regard-
less of ability, just was not up to the task at hand. Ambassador William
Leonhart, Komer's deputy, returned to Washington in May "full of admiration
for Porter" but observed that while no one could do more with less, Porter
was stretched too thin with too many duties including virtually all the
usual Deputy Chief of Mission functions, most of which Lodge had promised
the President to relieve him of.62 (See Chart III-1)
The Pentagon Papers detailed instances of each agency's unwillingness
to change programs or divert resources in the directions Porter wished and
concluded with:
In this situation, Ambassador Porter tried several
times to get action, each time received enthusias-
tic, but generalized, words of agreement and support
from everyone, and finally turned his attention to
other matters; with the crush of business, there was
always a more immediate crisis.63
Some Washington observers, however, came away from Saigon almost
euphoric. William Bundy said in March that the Embassy was in the best
shape that he had ever seen it, and that Lodge was delegating major respon-
sibility to Porter for pacification.64 Henry Kissinger, after an informal
61. Personal Interview with Mr. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., 5 January 1975.
62. Memorandum, Leonhart to Komer, Subj.: Visit to Vietnam: May 17-29,
1966, 31 May 1966, SECRET.
63. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 61.
64. Memorandum, William Bundy to Under Secretary of State, et al., 14
March 1966, SECRET.
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Chart 111-1. U.S. MISSION 016ANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION, FEBRUARY --
10VEMBER 1966
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visit in August, noted that:
The organization of the Embassy has been vastly
improved since my last visit. The plethora of com-
peting agencies each operating their own program on
the basis of partly conflicting and largely unco-
ordinated criteria has been replaced by an increas-
ingly effective structure under the extremely able
leadership of Bill Porter.6 5
In view of what the situation really was, their observations are a telling
comment on how bad organization must have been prior to February. Their
views, however, were not the ones carrying weight in Washington at this
point. The real force on pacification in Washington was Robert Komer, and
he was impatient and dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction was not with Porter
personally but with the fact that not enough was being accomplished in paci-
fication itself.
Komer's appointment as Special Assistant to the President for the
"other war," the substance of which had been foreshadowed at Warrenton and
hinted at by the President in February, was due directly to the urgings of
Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy. 6 6 This innovation, consecrated in a
National Security Action Memorandum in late March, gave him authority to
direct, coordinate, and supervise in Washington U.S. non-military programs
for peaceful construction relating to Vietnam.67 Komer's office was prob-
ably the nearest that Washington ever came to providing some sort of cen-
tralized management direction to the war. But, the military, by far the
65. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 58.
66. R. W. Komer, The Organization and Management of the New Model
Pacification Program -- 1966-1969 (Santa Monica, California: RAND
Corporation, 1970), p. 26.
67. NSAM 343, 28 March 1966, as quoted in USVNR, IV.C.8., pp. 62-63.
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largest American element, were excluded,
His purview was wider than just pacification for he dealt also with
issues such as port congestion and economic stabilization. As evidence of
the imprecision in Washington on this subject, Komer, who was new to Vietnam,
admitted later that he was not certain just what the "other war" was:
By God, we had a mandate to run the "other war." We
didn't know what the "other war" was; nobody else did
either.6 8
Komer's instructions were most unusual if not unique for a Presidential
assistant. He was told to manage and supervise, not just coordinate. In-
terestingly enough, this was put in at the urging of McNamara.69 While man-
aging military pacification programs had been excluded, the President still
gave him considerable say in military business insofar as it affected the
"other war":
I have charged him and his deputy, Ambassador William
Leonhart, to assure that adequate plans are prepared
and coordinated covering all aspects of such programs
and that they are promptly and effectively carried out.
This responsibility will include the mobilization of
U.S. military resources in support of such programs.
He will also assure that the Rural Construction/Paci-
fication Program is property coordinated with the pro-
grams for combat force employment and military opera-
tions. 7 0
Even the Mission had to support him, though instructions from him had to be
issued through the Secretary of State. 7 1 Finally, the President made it
68. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
69. Ibid.
70. NSAM 343, op cit.
71. In practice Komer used all agencies communication channels and often
issued orders and instructions directly.
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clear that Komer's power had substance by stating that "he will have direct
access to me at all times."72 Komer stressed the importance of this open
Presidential backing:
I would...add that the influence we had was, of course,
largely a function of our direct relationship to the
President, and my position on the President's personal
household. Washington does move when the President,
the White House, speaks. (If I had been in the State
Department, I would have gotten)...nowhere... this is
no criticism of State...one bureaucracy cannot manage
several others.. .73
Operating under the White House umbrella, Komer became a powerful force
in non-military Vietnam matters in Washington. With a small but highly-
talented and unconventional staff, the "Blowtorch," as Lodge nicknamed him,
began to prod, often abrasively and with unusual pressure, officials and
agencies in Washington and Saigon. Porter in particular felt the heat.
Komer made seven trips to Vietnam in the thirteen months he was in this
position. While Komer succeeded and failed on a variety of specific opera-
tional issues (i.e., port congestion and increasing the number of Vietna-
mese pacification cadre teams), some of his major contributions were such
as to bear fruit with the passage of time, their significance not being
apparent at first -- laying the organizational groundwork for centralized
U.S. advice on pacification and developing the conceptual basis for the
program he was later to implement in Vietnam.
There is no question that Komer used his charter to the hilt, chal-
lenging even the military and urging giving priority to key pacification
72. NSAM 343, op. cit.
73. Personal interview with Ambassador Komer 6 November 1969.
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programs at the expense of the military effort.74 Noting that U.S. civil/
military relations were still inadequate, he told the President that:
Somehow the civil side appears reluctant to call on
military resources, which are frequently the best and
most readily available. I put everyone politely on
notice that I would have no such hesitations -- pro-
vided that the case was demonstrable -- and that this
was the express request of the Secretary of Defense,7 5
Another contribution, and an important one, was to keep pacification
squarely in the minds of senior officials, especially the President, and to
provide a voice for pacification in the highest circles when decisions on
the war were being made.
1966 also saw the publication of three major government studies, each
of which explicitly or implicitly recognized defects of U.S. organization
for pacification. The mere fact that they were made at all, and their sub-
jects, testified to those defects. None were adopted by more than one
agency, and in each case no follow-up machinery was created, The fate of
these studies is one indication as to why a second reorganization would
soon be underway.
The first was called PROVN or Program for the Pacification and Long-
Term Development of Vietnam. This study, developed by a select group of
officers on the Army staff under the aegis of General Johnson, was the re-
sult of research done in 1965 and appeared in March 1966. It was an exhaus-
tive, phased analysis of the whole problem of Vietnam and the American
74. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 65 which quotes from Memorandum, Komer to President,
Subj.: Komer Report on Saigon Trip, 19 April 1966, SECRET.
75. Ibid., p. 66.
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response there. Among many items, it noted that no two U.S. Government
agencies viewed the nation's Vietnam objectives in the same manner, and it
stressed that pacification should be designated as the major U.S./GVN
effort.76 PROVN made a series of detailed and explicit recommendations as
to U.S. organization: 1) a Washington executive agent to coordinate Vietnam
support activities in the United States; 2) that the US. Ambassador be the
single manager in-country with two co-equal deputies -- one for U.S. mili-
tary forces and the other for pacification; and 3) that there should be a
single U.S. representative or chief at each level in the field below these
deputies. PROVN never was adopted. It was an attempt at an ideal. Origi-
nally closely held within the Army it never received McNamara's support,
and MACV which had numerous objections, ended by recommending that PROVN
78
be reduced to a conceptual rather than action document. General Johnson
however continued to stress its importance to those who would listen, es-
pecially Komer. In the course of time, many of its recommendations were
adopted separately but not as part of the original whole.
The other two major studies were produced at the behest of Ambassador
Porter. The first, called the "Mission Priorities Study," was set up in
76. Ibid., pp. 74-79.
77. Colonel Donald S. Marshall, a key PROVN author, attributes this to an
inadequate briefing given the Secretary -- Personal Interview, 23
January 1975.
78. Message, MACV 18244 to CINCPAC, 271243Z May 1966, CONFIDENTIAL. This
message and its authors who were junior staff officers actually were
more favorable to PROVN than were General Westmoreland and his senior
staff. The message was apparently intentionally phrased to be as
favorable as possible without attracting Westmoreland's rejection.
Regardless, no one in Washington or Saigon formally adopted PROVN. --
Personal interview with Charles M. Cooke, Jr., 13 August 1975 and
Mr. Gerald Britten, 18 August 1975.
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response to Komer's urgings in April that the Mission attempt to establish
a set of interagency priorities. While directed by a USAID official, this
study group was of interagency composition. Unfortunately, its list of pri-
orities was often vague, confusing, and included just about every aspect of
the U.S. effort in Vietnam.79 Its recommendations were used by AID for its
programs, but it had little impact anywere else.80 The second was known as
"Roles and Missions" which was begun in July under an Army colonel working
81
for Porter. Again of interagency composition, this group attempted to
set out the roles and missions of each military and civilian force in
Vietnam. Yet when it was completed, each agency tended to object to the
parts which ipinged on their institutional interests such as MACV's re-
fusal to agree to give Vietnamese pacification forces priority in manpower
over regular units or USAID's objection to the idea of a National Constabu-
lary that would have endangered its own police programs or both CIA's and
MACV's unwillingness to have a single Mission Director of Intelligence.8 2
Yet of 81 recommendations, 66 were acceptable to all Mission agencies.
Rather than concentrate on the recommendations that all could agree on and
79. USVNR, IV.C.8., pp. 79-83,
80. The complete "Mission Priorities Study" has disappeared despite five
years of inquiries by this author and others. The only part extant is
the "Priority Directive." A file of papers, minus the complete study,
has been assembled on it at the Army's Center of Military History.
Holbrooke's summary (Ibid.) is probably the best, though it should be
supplemented by the lengthy and detailed letter of 4 May 1970 to this
author from Mr. Robert Klein who directed the study. Klein feels that
study probably never was adopted because its conclusions were out of
step with what Washington, both Komer and the military, wanted at that
time.
81. USVNR, IV.C.8., pp. 83-88. The colonel was George Jacobson.
82. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
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seek to resolve the others. Porter allowed the study to wither with each
agency adopting and pursuing only those parts of it that it wished to.83
83. Colonel Robert M. Montague, Jr., Komer's assistant, says that Porter
never even sent it to Lodge; knowing that Lodge would not push it, he
saw no reason to send it up. - Personal Interview with the author,
6 November 1969.
Chapter IV 6 7
THE SECOND REORGANIZATION
Special Assistant Komer and his staff set in motion the events leading
to the second reorganization when, in August 1966, they produced and circu-
lated a most significant anticipatory pacification paper titled "Giving a
New Thrust to Pacification." 1 It represents a codification of Mr. Komer's
thoughts on pacification and its management after several months on the job.
No other document so accurately reflected the future course of the U.S.
pacification program both in its discussion of the program itself and its
management. His discussions of the program are vital to comprehending his
proposals for its management.
Mr. Komer began, as did virtually every high-level Washington official
during these years, with a statement on the lagging status of pacification
despite the fact that it was "an indispensable ingredient of any high-
confidence strategy." He divided the problem into three main components:
local security, breaking the Viet Cong hold over the people, and programs
to win active popular support -- all of which reflected a stated emphasis
on targeting the Viet Cong as the weaker and more vulnerable component of
the enemy. Both the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments, in part due to a
changed military situation brought on by main-force victories, were seen as
1. Robert W. Komer, Draft 3 of "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification:
Analysis, Concept, and Management," 7 August 1966 with attached
Letter, Komer to John T. McNaughton, 10 August 1966. This paper
was drafted first by LTC Robert M. Montague, Jr. and Mr. Richard
Holbrooke with detailed guidance and extensive additions by
Mr. Komer.
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"psychologically ripe for greater emphasis on pacification." He stressed
a personally recurrent theme, the need for pacification assets, and the
possibility that proper management and orientation of these assets might
improve the otherwise mediocre situation in the countryside.
To answer the question of how to step up pacification, Komer responded
with a statement that can be taken as the cornerstone of the US. pacifica-
tion program as it evolved under his aegis after 1966:
As pacification is a multi-faceted civil/military
problem, it demands a multi-faceted civil/military
response. No single program properly managed and
supported would give us a breakthrough in this field.
The path to both quick impact and accelerated prog-
ress is through better management, and coordination
of the host of contributory programs -- most of them
already in existence.2
His priorities reflected these views: more adequate continuous security
for pacification areas to include improving local defense forces and di-
verting to pacification security regular Vietnamese Army troops not "gain-
fully employed" against enemy main forces; breaking the Viet Cong hold over
the people; positive revolutionary development programs to win active popu-
lar support; the establishment of functional priorities for field pacifica-
tion operations with work first in locales where the most progress was
feasible; concentrating additional human and material resources on pacifi-
cation; setting of more performance goals with adequate criteria to measure
progress and a system to monitor it; expansion of security of key roads;
systematizing the flow of refugees; and getting better control over the
rice supply.
2. Ibid.
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Implicit throughout this paper was a concept of mass, a concept that
clearly bears Komer's imprint. The road to success or at least visible
results was seen to be through a massive application and better management
of GVN human and U.S. material resources. This, he believed, was the only
solution when confronted with a large omnipresent war and a system, charac-
terized by mediocrity, for fighting it. He also felt that pacification had
to be pressed on a country-wide basis. Merely having corps priority areas
or specialized local pacification cadre programs did not engage the Vietna-
mese pacification manpower and assets that existed in every province. He
wanted pacification to have an impact throughout the country rather than in
a few smaller areas.
Underlying this interest in mass was the realization by both the
President and Komer that time was important. Quality was not shunned; they
merely recognized it as impossible to achieve in an acceptable period of
time. The war had been growing steadily, and while they knew that complete
success in pacification probably was impossible, some turn-around had to
appear. They had to make it clear that their side was winning.
Komer would continue to stress mass over the next two years. In
February 1967 he stated it as clearly as ever:
While earlier pacification schemes were often well
conceived, they lacked adequate resources for execu-
tion. This time the assets available are massive --
much of the ARVN, over 300,000 RF/PF, over 400 RD
Cadre teams, several thousand police, a growing
intelligence effort, and increasing civil aid pro-
grams. By sheer weight alone, this mass application
cannot help but produce significant results in 1967.3
3. Memorandum, Komer to President, Subj.: Change for the Better --
Latest Impressions from Vietnam, 28 February 1967, SECRET.
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Mass was not necessarily his preferred solution, but he realized that the
Vietnamese and the Americans were fighting the war by this principle, and
he accepted it because he could not change it. For all of these reasons
pacification assets preoccupied Komer during his involvement in the program,
and this struggle for them was a most important motivating force behind his
desire to give pacification responsibility to the U.S. and Vietnamese mili-
tary, since only they possessed and controlled the necessary resources.
The heart of the paper lay in its discussion of management which was
seen not only as a key to success but also as a way to faster results. For
the management of the U.S. side of pacification Komer proposed three alter-
natives. The first would have given Ambassador Porter full operational con-
trol over all U.S. pacification activities and merged field operations'
staffs and advisors at all levels into coordinated teams under one chief
with a direct chain of command from the Ambassador to the district.
The second alternative was, in essence, that adopted later in the, year
with the creation of the Office of Civil Operations under Ambassador Porter
and the Revolutionary Development Support Directorate in MACV. This would
have retained the present separate civil and military command channels but
strengthened the management structure of MACV and the Mission by having a
senior deputy for pacification in MACV and a unified field operations' staff
under Porter controlling the pacification personnel of all U.S. civilian
agencies at all levels.
The final alternative was to assign civil and military pacification re-
sponsibility to General Westmoreland. Discussion of the three alternatives
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was biased deliberately in favor of this solution. The MACV staff would
have been restructured to form an integrated civil/military staff under a
civilian deputy to the commander with a single-manager pacification advisory
team at each lower echelon. Komer recommended the Deputy Ambassador for
this position.
"Giving a New Thrust to Pacification" had little immediate impact.
Komer passed it to McNamara and his Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs, John McNaughton. He sent the paper also to the President,
but there is no evidence of any reaction.5 Ambassador Leonhart carried it
out to Saigon but received a uniformly negative reaction from Ambassadors
Lodge and Porter.6 General Westmoreland, occupied with the main-force war,
was unenthusiastic about any change, though he told Leonhart in effect:
"I'm not asking for it, but if I'm told to manage pacification, I'll do
it." Two and a half weeks later, perhaps with the knowledge of the pro-
posals and counterproposals then floating in Washington (see below), West-
moreland saw his assumption of responsibility in a positive light:
I'm not asking for the responsibility, but I believe
that my headquarters could take it in stride and per-
haps carry out this important function more economic-
ally and efficiently than the present complex arrange-
ment.8
4. Personal Interview with Colonel Robert M. Montague, Jr., 6 November
1969.
5. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
6. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 72 and Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer,
6 November 1969.
7. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
8. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 6 October 1966, TOP
SECRET.
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However, Westmoreland's planning staff (J-5) studied Komer's paper
and, with almost bureaucratic inevitability, came to the opposite conclu-
sions that there were no new approaches to pacification in the paper that
had not already been recognized by the US. Mission, that none of the three
alternative organizational concepts would achieve the desired results, and
that the present U.S. organizational structure was adequate.9 But when
this planning staff was tasked with preparing an organization plan for the
possible assumption of overall pacification responsibility by General
Westmoreland, it came up with a two-stage variant on Mr. Komer's third
alternative, The first stage would have seen a civilian chain of command
to the districts. The second stage, to be implemented if the first was
unsuccessful, would be to unify the entire field pacification effort under
military officers at each level, but leave the MACV headquarters staff
still split into civil and military pacification officers -- a concept that
Westmoreland basically agreed to, though he did visualize a slightly tighter
MACV staff relationship between the civilian and military components.10
The above was strictly a planning exercise. There was no "conspiracy"
by MACV to take over pacification. The weakness of the planning staff's
alternatives indicate that even MACV at this point was merely reacting to
Washington moves. General Westmoreland himself believed that military man-
agement was inevitable and that the logic of such a solution would eventually
9. Briefing, MACV J-5 for COMUSMACV and Chief of Staff, 19 September
1966, SECRET (Grp. 4).
10. Memorandum for Record, CDR D, 0. Maxwell (MACJ53), 29 September 1966,
SECRET (Grp. 4) contains some short comments made by General Westmore-
land at the planning staff briefing on the study.
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sell itself on its own merits. He wisely realized that the slightest hint
of advocacy in this direction on his part would provoke the strongest ad-
verse reactions from the civilian agencies both in Saigon and Washington.1 1
It is a telling point against the Mission's civilian elements that they
made no counterplans and initiatives, letting the Washington proposal drop
with a flat "no" as if nothing more would come of it.
Events in Washington were one step ahead of even General Westmoreland's
contingency planning. In early September, after Leonhart's return to
Washington, Komer began an active campaign to have pacification responsi-
bility given to the military:
Since military resources were 90 percent and the
civilian were 10 percent, it was obvious that it
ought to be put under the military. Moreover,
Westy had the clout with RVNAF and the GVN. Next,
the men in Washington who were really pushing hard-
est on Vietnam were Robert McNamara and his people,
like McNaughton. If you wanted pacification to
work, you wanted strong auspices behind it, and in
my view DOD was far stronger behind pacification
than State -- not that State didn't understand it
but the State people just weren't doing anything.
In terms of getting programs going DOD was infi-
nitely more dynamic and influential.1 2
Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton and Komer worked out the
tactic of having McNamara make the official proposal for military assumption
of pacification responsibility, the form of which was worked out by
McNaughton's office.1 3 The details were not exactly what Mr, Komer's
11. Personal Interview with General Westmoreland, 8 April 1975,
12. Robert W. Komer,. The Organization and Management of the New Model
Pacification Program -- 1966-1969 (Santa Monica, California: The
RAND Corporation, 1970), p. 38,
13. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
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office wanted, but this was not a disadvantage as the Secretary's proposal
then took the first blast of fire from the civilian agencies,14
The "McNamara" proposal was an incomplete one -- a strong concept yet
unfinished in its details, perhaps deliberately so. All pacification activ-
ities and personnel were to be placed under a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacifica-
tion who would be in charge of pacification staffs in Saigon and the field. 1 5
(See Chart IV-1) Left unanswered were whether the Deputy would be a civil-
ian or a military officer and which activities came under pacification. This
may have been deliberate so as to have an intended fallback "carrot" of a
civilian manager.
Secretary McNamara never formally sent his memorandum to the President,
though its ideas were discussed with him, and he indicated agreement.16 It
then was staffed out to the State Department, AID, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, CIA, USIA and Komer with predictable reactions. Only Komer and the
Joint Chiefs concurred.
The State Department disagreed and cited the political nature of paci-
fication, the military's failure in Hop Tac, the public and internal need to
emphasize civilianization, and the desirability of soliciting the Mission's
views from Saigon. In a revealing comment on the whole Porter effort,
Leonard Unger stated that the "problem (of management).. .would be better
solved by putting Ambassador Porter in a position to carry out his full
14. Personal Interview with Col. Robert M. Montague, Jr., 6 November 1969.
15. Draft Memorandum, McNamara to President, 22 September 1966, SECRET.
16. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
Chart IV-1.
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MCNAMARA PROPOSAL FOR UNIFIED PACIFICATION OfGANIZATION,
22 SEPTEMBER 1966
responsibilities as originally envisaged.
Rutherford Poats, AID's Assistant Administrator for the Far East,
proposed a strengthening of Porter's position.18 His comment that "Porter
should be given the job originally conceived for him" is another indication
that reality had not lived up to expectations. Poats envisaged a pacifica-
tion command structure with Porter directing separate agency staffs in
Saigon and U.S. councils chaired, in the main, by military officers at the
regional and province levels, The result would have been a Deputy Ambassa-
dor with a small staff, four powerful deputies, and a hierarchy of mini-
Mission Councils at lower administrative levels -- a solution that put a
high premium on coordination and did not provide truly integrated management.
Both the CIA and USIA opposed McNamara's proposed reorganization.19 To
one CIA official this change raised the basic pacification questions of
security versus popular involvement, of a military war versus a popular
struggle -- should pacification aim at inspiring the local populace rather
than relying on an imposed pacification by military power with civilian sup-
20
port. Another CIA official turned the full force of his arguments on
17. Memorandum, William Bundy to Under Secretary of State, Subj.: Respon-
sibility for Pacification/Revolutionary Development Program in Vietnam
(McNamara Draft Proposal), 27 September 1966, SECRET, (My emphasis).
This memorandum was drafted by Unger, but there is no evidence that it
was actually signed or sent forward by Bundy. The same views were
cited by Alexis Johnson in discussions with Komer -- See USVNR, IV.C.8.,
pp. 92-93. See also Memorandum, Alexis Johnson to Rusk, Subj.: Secre-
tary McNamara's Proposal for Placing Pacification Program in South
Vietnam under COMUSMACV: Action Memorandum, 1 October 1966, SECRET.
18. Memorandum, R. M. Poats, Subj.: Notes on McNamara's Draft Proposal,
26 September 1966, SECRET.
19. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 93.
20. CIA Memorandum, no title, no date (certainly late September or first
week in October) in Center of Military History files.
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Komer's concurrence (see below) rather than McNamara's original plan.21
The proferred organizational solution of a joint pacification staff under
the Ambassador was, however, scarcely more feasible in view of the U.S.
Mission's leadership and agency strengths and relationships. He stressed
unified direction rather than unified management, a direction which would
be obtained by giving control to a central authority above the level of the
component agencies. He envisaged a sufficiently large joint staff to enable
the U.S. Mission chief to supervise and direct the subordinate contributing
agencies.
Komer made the advocate's formal reply to McNamara on September 29th.22
Stressing once again the primacy of local security and the need for re-
sources, he said that the military were at that point much better set up to
manage the large effort required. Coordination was no longer enough. While
Komer did not indicate whether the Deputy in MACV should be civilian or mil-
itary, he did feel that the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador must retain
their primacy in overall pacification supervision. The new MACV Deputy, he
observed, should control only field activities and Saigon field operations'
staffs that would contribute directly to winning the village war, excluding
overall economic policy, anti-inflationary programs, CIA efforts other than
police and pacification cadre, and certain national USAID programs such as
21. CIA Memorandum, author unknown (deliberately blocked out), Subj.:
Comments on Mr. Komer's Views on Pacification Management, 3 October
1966, SECRET. Textual analysis makes it certain that this was a CIA
paper. The most barbed comments were reserved for the military,
particularly MACV, whose previous attempts to train and motivate the
RF/PF and ARVN and their leadership were addressed with undisguised
scorn.
22. Memorandum, Komer to McNamara, 29 September 1966, SECRET.
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medicine and education. Logistic support for pacification ought to remain
with the parent agencies along with personnel, pay, administrative, and
logistic support responsibilities. Komer concluded with the basic rationale
for his recommendations:
To be perfectly candid, I regard your proposal as
basically a means of bringing the military fully into
the pacification process rather than of putting civ-
ilians under the military.23
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the plan with marked enthusiasm
though they made minor changes in the text of the proposed memorandum, one
of which was intended to make absolutely certain that there would be no
interference in the employment of regular U.S. combat units,24 They recog-
nized that the new organization would mean increased support to pacification
by U.S. combat and support forces.
Ambassador Porter meanwhile had arrived in the United States from
Vietnam, and he expressed strong opposition to McNamara's proposal. He sug-
gested caution, warning of a possible "serious reaction" from Ambassador
25
Lodge if a quick decision was made in Washington on this issue. Porter
soon cabled Lodge, warning him of the proposal and recommending that a
23. Ibid. Closely tied to this basic rationale was the realization that
since governmental power in Vietnam resided in the military which was
more attuned and responsive to advice from their American institutional
counterparts, U.S. advice on pacification was apt to be more successful
if presented from the U.S. military headquarters -- Memorandum, Ambas-
sador Komer to the author, 15 August 1975.
24. Memorandum, JCSM-626-66, General Earle Wheeler to McNamara, Subj.:
Reorganization of Pacification Responsibilities in South Vietnam,
29 September 1966, SECRET.
25. Memorandum, Unger to Rusk, Subj.: Ambassador Porter's Views on Secre-
tary McNamara's Proposal to Place the Vietnam Pacification/RD Program
Under COMUSMACV, 2 October 1966, SECRET.
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Mission study group evaluate reorganization schemes before any final
decision. 26
Shortly thereafter both AID and State Department officials wrote draft
memoranda on this subject, neither of which were adopted or sent forward but
which do represent a consolidation of their thinking. AID Administrator
William Gaud proposed having a second Deputy Ambassador whose only function
27
would be direction of the U.S. pacification program. He would have an
interagency staff and would chair a Mission Revolutionary Development
Council made up of agency deputy directors who would serve under Porter in
their pacification capacities. Similar structures would be set up at sub-
ordinate advisory levels.
The State Department's solution was much the same -- a strengthened
Deputy Ambassador directing pacification at all levels but leaving the
execution to the U.S. agencies.28 MACV's corps, province, and district
advisors would be commanded by the Deputy Ambassador's military director
who also would coordinate with a Deputy COMUSMACV for pacification.
In the face of civilian opposition the President decided to defer a
decision until the right psychological moment. Instead, he would allow the
26. Message, State 61251 to Saigon, 061933Z October 1966, SECRET (Grp. 3).
Lodge's reply leaves the reader with the impression that this was the
first detailed information he had on the proposal -- See Message,
Saigon 7935 to State, 070424Z October 1966, SECRET.
27. Draft Memorandum, Gaud to McNamara, Subj.: Unified U.S. Pacification/
Revolutionary Development Organization, 5 October 1966, SECRET.
28. Draft Memorandum, Acting Secretary of State to President, Subj.: U.S.
Organization for Revolutionary Development/Pacification Program,
7 October 1966, SECRET. Drafted by Ambassador Unger.
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civilians a short time to put their own house in order, a period of grace
which he would use as a method to defuse the opposition.29 But, the mental
commitment to unified management of pacification under the military by the
President, McNamara, and Komer existed from September on.3 0
The Embassy's civilians continued to misread the way the wind was
blowing in Washington. On October 8th, Porter told Lodge that the pressure
for a swift decision on reorganization had now given way to "careful consid-
eration."3 1 He also said that he felt that perhaps attention had been di-
verted somewhat in the direction of Vietnamese Army capabilities and perfor-
mance especially for pacification.
Little did Porter know how wrong he was to be. On October 10th, Sec-
retary McNamara, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, General Wheeler, and
Mr. Komer arrived in Saigon for a short visit, a prelude to the forthcoming
Manila Conference. Because Porter was still in the United States on per-
sonal business, the Mission's pacification briefing for these visitors was
left to his deputy, Ambassador Henry Koren, who had arrived only recently.
Poorly prepared and weakly presented, his briefing did little to enhance
the appearance of civilian pacification leadership.32 Komer called the
experience a "fiasco" and feels it confirmed for certain McNamara's appre-
ciation that pacification should be placed under the military.3 3
29. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
30. Ibid.
31. Message, State 62666 to Saigon, 081901Z October 1966, SECRET.
32. Personal Interview with MG William A. Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
33. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
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The unfortunate Koren, soon to be sent to I Corps, assessed the meeting
somewhat differently but had no doubts as to where McNamara's sentiments on
organization and pacification now lay. He reported that the Secretary
"expressed himself as utterly dissatisfied with progress on pacification"
and that he felt the U.S. pacification organization was "incompetent" to
deal with the problem. Interestingly enough, Koren also noted that McNamara
said that he felt more to blame for the failure than anyone else. Lodge did
privately make the point to McNamara that the main reason for the lack of
pacification progress was that the necessary security was not being provided
by the military. Lodge at this point thought the McNamara proposal was dead,
but Koren was less optimistic, sensing that they had not heard the last of
it.
General Westmoreland, summarizing his talks with McNamara during this
visit, indicated the drift of events, yet he revealed also, once more, the
caution and carefulness with which he approached the possibility of his
assuming responsibility for pacification:
McNamara feels it is inevitable that I be given
executive responsibility for American support of
the Revolutionary Development program. He is con-
vinced that the State Department officials do not
have the executive and managerial abilities to
handle a program of such magnitude and complexity.
I told McNamara I was not volunteering for the job
but I would undertake it if the President wished
me to do so, and I felt we could make progress.
He stated that he thought there would be an in-
terim solution -- that they were giving the civ-
ilian agencies another try. He stated that if
this does not work after approximately three
34. Letter, Koren to Unger, 15 October 1966, CONFIDENTIAL.
months, I could expect to take over.3 5
Upon their return to Washington, McNamara and Katzenbach presented
their findings to the President separately. Katzenbach, while admitting
the failure of the political and social aspects of the pacification program,
hit squarely and with justification at the lack of sustained security as the
major stumbling block and singled out both the U.S. and Vietnamese military
for criticism.36 He proposed however only a strengthening of the existing
separate military and civilian pacification support channels with overall
command to remain under Porter. A second deputy would be assigned to Lodge
in order to relieve Porter of the added burdens of non-pacification duties.
Porter would have operational control of civilians working on pacification
though administrative control would rest with their parent agencies.
Katzenbach did however recommend that a high-ranking general be assigned
as Porter's principal deputy, one who could assist in administration and
coordination and who also would provide increased military stature for
pacification.37 It is indicative of the drift of events that he added the
proviso that should his civilian solution fail, this same general would be
an ideal choice to take command of a single, unified structure under
General Westmoreland.
McNamara, undergoing a difficult personal reappraisal of the war, was
highly pessimistic:
35. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 17 October 1966, TOP
SECRET.
36. Memorandum, Katzenbach to President, Subj.: Administration of Revolu-
tionary Development, 15 October 1966 as quoted in USVNR, IV.C.8., pp.
94-99.
37. See below, pp. 189-190.
183
I see no reasonable way to bring the war to an end
soon... we find ourselves -- from the point of view
of the important war (for the complicity of the
people) -- no better, and if anything worse off.
This important war must be fought and won by the
Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from
the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that,
as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have
not found the formula, the catalyst for training
and inspiring them into effective action.3 8
The solution, as he saw it, lay in:
girding, openly, for a longer war and in taking
actions immediately which will in 12 to 18 months
give clear evidence that the continuing costs and
risks to the American people are acceptably lim-
ited, that the formula for success has been found,
and that the end of the war is merely a matter of
time.3 9
The Secretary made five recommendations concerning this strategy but
that which he saw as the most important, and the most difficult to implement,
was a successful pacification program. Komer recalled that the Secretary
was particularly unhappy with the failure of Lodge, Porter, and Westmoreland
to do anything in pacification despite heavy emphasis from Washington.4 0 If
McNamara did not mention personalities by name, his general dismay and un-
happiness were clearly apparent:
Pacification is a bad disappointment.. .(and).. .has
if anything gone backward... full security exists
nowhere.4 1
He attacked directly or by implication the lack of sustained local security,
38. Memorandum, McNamara to President, Subj.: Actions Recommended for
Vietnam, 14 October 1966 as quoted in USVNR, IV.C.6.(a)., p. 82.
The phrase in parentheses is in the original.
39. Ibid., p. 88.
40. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 28 June 1971.
41. Memorandum, McNamara to President, 14 October 1966, oR. cit.
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the lack of attention shown it by the U.S. and Vietnamese military commands,
the apathy and corruption of Vietnamese officials, the weakness of the Viet-
namese Army in dedication, direction, and discipline, and "bad management"
on both the U.S. and Vietnamese sides.
Secretary McNamara went on to advocate, but with only lukewarm enthu-
siasm, that the military and civilian pacification structures be left sepa-
rate and that each side should be strengthened, with all civilian pacifica-
tion activities placed under Ambassador Porter. But he warned:
...we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails
after a fair trial, the only alternative in my view
is to place the entire pacification program -- civ-
ilian and military -- under General Westmoreland.4 2
Presented with these reports, the President acted. On October 15th he
called together Vice President Humphrey, Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Cyrus Vance, and General Wheeler. The President made clear
his dissatisfaction with the present direction and execution of the pacifi-
cation program.43 He told the group that he was, however, unwilling at that
point, to override the strong civilian objections, particularly from Dean
Rusk and Henry Cabot Lodge, to a transfer to military control. In order to
set the stage for future changes, he was emphatic in his desire for rapid
action, indicating a period of ninety days in which the civilians had to
produce acceptable results4 4 and implying that responsibility might be
42. Ibid.
43. Message, JCS 6339-66, 172139Z October 1966, Wheeler to Admiral Sharp
and Westmoreland, TOP SECRET.
44. Ibid. Wheeler says that Johnson directed Vance to draft for him a
memorandum to establish this deadline. The author has never seen or
heard elsewhere of such a memorandum, but the sentiments behind such a
memorandum were disseminated if not an actual written document. The
warning later was definitely put in writing in State 78865 (See below).
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transferred if the status of pacification were to remain unsatisfactory.
This small meeting was followed immediately by a National Security Council
meeting at which the necessity for "speedy strengthening of the civilian
,45
side of the program was made amply clear to all concerned," The President
gave the civilians one final opportunity to create their own organization
for pacification, though he never expected it to work.4 6
Thus was born what became the Office of Civil Operations. That it
existed at all was due to strong civilian opposition to placing pacification
responsibility under the military. In a sense what was set up was merely a
logical halfway step between multiple and single managerial responsibility.
While on the surface this interim solution seems to be a common bureaucratic
compromise, in actuality the President regarded it only as a temporary move
to deflate civilian objections to a plan which he was already mentally com-
mitted. As Komer saw it in retrospect: ,
I said they can't do it in six months, but the
President said: "That doesn't bother me." He
deliberately gave them a very short deadline...
McNamara told him it wouldn't work. I told him...
it wouldn't work. So he stacked the deck.4 8
45. Ibid. Wheeler's comment in this quotation may appear misleading as
the President really meant the entire program, military as well as
civilian. Wheeler also noted that this pressure would increase with
every day and was doubtful that a civilian organization could succeed
or even be put together at all. With this in mind, he recommended to
Westmoreland that there should be a high-ranking MACV staff member
concerned solely with pacification. MG Frederick Weyand and LTG Bruce
Palmer were put forth as possible candidates. He wanted MACV to have
both a man and a functional organization ready that could start with
as little delay as possible.
46. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
186
Shortly after the National Security Council meeting, President Johnson
began his Asian tour, to be capped by a seven-nation conference at Manila
where he met with Lodge and Westmoreland. Komer returned to Saigon for a
week and warned Porter that there would definitely be a reorganization. He
even left two key members of his staff to help Porter plan for it. 4 9
With the President's approval, on November 4th, Rusk, McNamara and
Komer instructed Lodge to reorganize the Mission for pacification, and they
even told him how.50 They made it clear that this was the final chance for
civilian management, going so far as to say that the proposed solution was a
"trial organization." Porter, relieved of all other duties, was to command
a unified civilian pacification structure which would be strengthened by
the assignment of a two- or three-star military officer to assist in admin-
istration and liaison with MACV. Lodge was to have a second Deputy Ambas-
sador. They concluded with one more warning:
We are most anxious, as we know you are, to make
progress in RD. So this new organizational arrange-
ment would be on trial for 90-120 days, at the end
of which we would take stock of progress and recon-
sider whet r to assign all responsibility for RD to
COMUSMACV.
49. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 108. The staff members were LTC Robert M. Montague,
Jr. and Mr. Richard Holbrooke.
50. Message, State 78865 to Saigon, 4 November 1966, probably SECRET. The
author was unable to obtain a text of this cable, However, the Pentagon
Papers volume on pacification (USVNR, IV.C.8., pp. 106-108) has a com-
plete text of the advance version sent to the President in Wellington,
New Zealand (Message, State 68390 to Wellington, 20 October 1966) which
Holbrooke states was unchanged in the final instructions. The President
probably decided to wait until after he had consulted with Lodge and
Westmoreland at Manila before sending the final instructions,
51. Ibid.
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Lodge replied two days later and agreed that some reorganization was
necessary, but he blamed poor military security for the lack of substantial
progress in pacification.52 He agreed to consolidate the civilian lines of
command within the Mission under Porter, but he left no doubt that he was
against having a second Deputy Ambassador. This was a position that Lodge
steadfastly adhered to. Against the judgments of almost every other ob-
server of this period, Lodge said: "Ambassador Porter does not now absorb
substantial other responsibilities which distract his attention from revolu-
tionary development."5 3
Again, McNamara, Rusk, and Komer urged Lodge to get moving on the
reorganization, and finally on November 15th, Secretary Rusk tersely told
Lodge that the President "wished to emphasize that this represents final
and considered decisions and.. .expressed hope that the indicated measures
could be put into effect just as rapidly as possible." 5 4
This finally brought a response from Lodge, and two days later he and
Porter told Washington what the new organization actually would look like.
5 5
He made some changes in the original Washington concept. Acceding to General
Westmoreland's wishes, he decided that there would be no MACV Deputy for
Revolutionary Development; instead, Westmoreland would have a Special Assis-
tant for Pacification. Porter, now with even greater pacification responsi-
bilities, was not going to be relieved by another Deputy Ambassador. Lodge
52. Message, Saigon 10204 to President, 6 November 1966 as quoted in USVNR,
IV.C.8., pp. 108-111.
53. Ibid.
54. Message, State 85196 to Saigon, 15 November 1966 as quoted in USVNR,
IV.C.8., p. 112.
55. Message, Saigon 11124 to State, 17 November 1966 as quoted in USVNR,
IV.C.8., pp. 112-113.
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believed that other Mission offices could take over much of the business of
running the Mission from Porter. He did not want Porter's position vis-a-
vis the American community and the Vietnamese to be downgraded. Lodge and
Porter proposed establishing a civilian Office of Operations, under a direc-
tor (not to be Porter), which would consist of the personnel and activities
of USAID's Field Operations, Public Safety (Police), and Refugee offices,
JUSPAO's Field Services (less North Vietnam), and CIA's Cadre Operations
Division.56 Civilians at the corps and province levels also would have a
single director, thus reducing to two the channels of U.S. advice bearing
on Vietnamese corps commanders and province chiefs.
In the meantime, and with sharply contrasting speed, General Westmore-
land strengthened his headquarter's organization for pacification support.
On November 7th he created the Revolutionary Development Support Directorate
(RDSD) and named his former Secretary of the Joint Staff, Brigadier General
William A. Knowlton, as director.57 General Knowlton recalled that West-
moreland thought of his appointment and the Directorate as conditional solu-
tions.58 The Directorate would be an organizational stepping-stone to pre-
pare for complete assumption of responsibility by the military, and that if
this happened, Major General Frederick Weyand, invariably a clear favorite
56. Message, Saigon 11125 to State, 17 November 1966 as quoted in USVNR,
IV.C.8., pp. 114-115.
57. Message, MACJOO 49907, 180045Z November 1966, CONFIDENTIAL (Grp. 4).
Though this Directorate was part of the MACV operations staff
(J-3), Knowlton was given direct access to Westmoreland on policy
matters.
58. Personal Interview with General William Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
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of both civilians and military for proposed military pacification positions,
would replace General Knowlton.
Following consultations with Lodge and Porter, Westmoreland nominated
Major General Paul Smith to serve as principal deputy and executive officer
to Ambassador Porter.5 9 Smith replaced Brigadier General Willis Critten-
berger, who had been appointed to Porter's staff to serve as a deputy and a
military liaison channel with MACV in August. Crittenberger's appointment,
reluctantly agreed to by Westmoreland and Porter at Komer's insistence, had
not been a success. Porter gave him little to do and this, combined with
passivity on Crittenberger's part, produced few tangible results.60 The
idea of upgrading military representation with Ambassador Porter's office
was consistently a civilian one, Komer having broached it in September and
Katzenbach strongly recommending it to the President in October.61 Lodge
received formal instructions to this effect on November 4th, but this was
followed by a disagreement between Porter and Westmoreland over the terms of
reference for General Smith's job.62 Washington, particularly Komer's of-
fice, was unwilling to support Porter's desire for his deputy to have direct
and effective access to the Vietnamese military and a supervisory role as
regards civil/military planning. Komer's unwillingness to back Porter on
this issue is an indication of how transitory he thought the halfway
59. Message, MAC 7242, 201240Z December 1966, CONFIDENTIAL.
60. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969 and Personal
Interview with General William Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
61. Message, 282146Z September 1966, Admiral Sharp to Westmoreland, SECRET
(Grp. 4) and Memorandum, Katzenbach to President, 15 October 1966,
'Op. cit.
62. Message, State 78865 to Saigon, op. cit.
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solution of OCO would be.63 The question dragged on into January, but
Porter gave up and accepted a diminished role for his deputy. The issue
disappeared as General Smith was in the job but a short time, and the posi-
tion was not filled upon his departure.
Ambassador Lodge announced the reorganization to the Mission Council on
November 21st and thus brought to a close over three months of complicated
government decision-making on how the U.S, Mission should be organized for
pacification support.64 In retrospect the decision appears, if not inevi-
table, at least to have a directing force behind it. This is even more true
of the overall trend towards complete responsibility being given to the
military. To produce the requisite results to stave off the November and
March/May reorganizations would have stretched the capabilities of even the
most ideal organization and dynamic personnel. The Saigon Mission, particu-
larly its civilian element, never had a chance. The problems were too dif-
ficult and the directing officials unequal to the task.
Once the idea of military single management of pacification was raised
by Mr. Komer with Secretary McNamara and President Johnson, they never dis-
carded it. The halfway solution of the Office of Civil Operations, never
expected to work, was seen not as a promising alternative but as a tool to
wring acceptance from protesting bureaucracies and ambassadors and to smooth
the way to eventual single management. The slowness with which the new
63. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 3 November 1971.
64. Mission Council Action Memorandum No. 140, Subj.: Minutes of the
Mission Council Meeting of 21 November 1966, 24 November 1966,
SECRET.
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Office of Civil Operations was formed and the foot-dragging by Ambassador
Lodge were but the final nails in the lid of the coffin of independent
civilian direction ,of pacification.
Chapter V 192
THE THIRD REORGANIZATION:
THE OFFICE OF CIVIL OPERATIONS AND THE FORMATION OF CORDS
The Office of Civil Operations, the second attempt in 1966 by the
President to solve the question of pacification organization, must be judged
at least a partial success. It had no discernable impact on the actual
course of the war against the Viet Cong during its short lifetime; its
accomplishments were organizational and American, not revolutionary and
Vietnamese. Nevertheless, it was an important halfway step, organization-
ally important to the formation of CORDS.
The structure and detailed concepts of operation of the Office of Civil
Operations or OCO were developed largely by members of Mr. Komer's White
House staff on temporary duty in Saigon with Ambassador Porter. However,
contrary to Washington's intent that Porter directly run the new organiza-
tion, OCO was made a subsidiary corporation under the Deputy Ambassador with
1
a director reporting to him.
Since the February 1966 reorganization there had been recurring criti-
cism that Porter had been unable to do his job effectively due to his in-
volvement as Deputy Chief of Mission in managing the Embassy -- a condition
1. Three early documents on OCO organization are important: Draft
Memorandum, Porter to USAID, OSA, JUSPAO, Subj.: Office of Opera-
tions -- Terms of Reference, 21 November 1966, SECRET -- this is the
earliest document extant on OCO's organization while it was still
called the Office of Operations; Message, Saigon 12200 to State,
020140Z December 1966, Subj.: U.S. Mission's Office of Civil Opera-
tions -- Terms of Reference, SECRET; and Memorandum, Leonard Maynard
to JUSPAO, OSA, USAID, et al., Subj.: OCO Functional Statements and
Organization Charts, 22 December 1966.
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aggravated by Ambassador Lodge's open unwillingness to run the Embassy and
the Mission except in broad policy spheres. When the time came to reorga-
nize in October and November, President Johnson and his closest advisors
were virtually unanimous2 that Lodge should have a second Deputy Ambassador
for Embassy administration and functions who would enable Porter to devote
his full time and energies to pacification and the new civilian organization
which, they felt, ought to be headed by Porter.3 Lodge, reluctant to orga-
nize at all, refused to have a second deputy; "I do not wantanother
Deputy Ambassador.. .There simply is no job for another Deputy Ambassador..."4
Shortly thereafter, Lodge departed for nearly a month's vacation leaving
Porter, who initially also was against having a second Deputy Ambassador,
steadily mired in non-pacification activities -- an inexcusable lapse in
view of Washington pressures for concrete action and the herculean job of
setting up a large new organization. The President probably tolerated this
resistance from Saigon for two reasons: he had already made up his mind
about the eventual organization and also had decided on a change in Ambas-
sadors.
Porter's office in OCO was seldom occupied. Matters were not helped
by the new OCO Director's departure for a month's home leave in late Decem-
ber. In February Komer told the President of this unfortunate situation
and stressed the need for a "full-time DCM as third in command," and he
2. Rusk, McNamara, Komer, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach among
others.
3. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 107.
4. Ibid., p. 115.
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noted that Porter had come around to this view also. At this point the
question was academic in view of the changes already in motion except that
possibly the need for three strong and highly-ranked civilians was impressed
on Lyndon Johnson's mind as he pondered the precise form the new organiza-
tion was to take.
OCO's chief was given directing authority over all civilian Saigon
staffs concerned with pacification and all US. civilian efforts in the
field except those pertaining to clandestine CIA operations.6 Furthermore,
he was to coordinate non-pacification civilian programs among the U.S.
agencies in Saigon. While the Director was able to attend Mission Council
meetings, he was not made a full member. This appears to have been an un-
fortunate stipulation in view of OCO's task of pulling together the inde-
pendent efforts of several powerful agencies.
The Saigon staff of OCO was an obvious precursor of the future CORDS
staff organization within MACV. (See Chart V-1.) There were six "func-
tional" divisions -- Refugees, Psychological Operations, New Life Develop-
ment, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Chieu Hoi, and Public Safety --
brought en bloc from their parent civilian agencies. Above them were the
Executive Secretariat, the Management Division,7 and the Plans and
5. Memorandum, Komer to President, Subj.: Change for the Better -- Latest
Impressions from Vietnam, 28 February 1967, SECRET.
6. Briefing, BG William A. Knowlton for General Earle Wheeler, Subj.: U.S.
Mission Agency Organization for Support of Revolutionary Development,
c. 6-14 January 1969, CONFIDENTIAL,
7. Its functions were internal management of the organization itself. A
more accurate title "Management Support" was given its successor in
CORDS.
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Chart V-l. THE OFFICE OF CIVIL OPERATIONS AND THE U.S. MISSION,
DECEMBER 1966 -- APRIL 1967
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Evaluation Division. This latter division was by far the most important OCO
staff section and had as its primary responsibility the development of the
pacification policy, concepts, strategy, plans, and programs, along with
evaluating and reporting on all pacification activities,
At subordinate levels -- region (corps), province, and even eventually
some districts, civilian operations were placed under one man who was re-
sponsible in the end to the Director of OCO. The staffs in the four regions
were similar to that in Saigon except for the addition of a Military Program
and Liaison Division. Because at this point the Vietnamese Army division
was still in their pacification chain of command, OCO assigned a Division
Tactical Area Coordinator to each Vietnamese division. The province repre-
sentative had as a rule at least six functional subordinates that paralleled
the larger staffs covering the same program areas at region and Saigon.
Ambassador Porter chose L. Wade Lathram, the USAID Deputy Mission
Director in Saigon, to be the Director of OCO, a choice narrowed consider-
ably by the need to find a senior civilian already serving in Vietnam in
order to make the transition as swift as possible. Whether Lathram was the
right man for the task has been debated. General William Knowlton, later to
be his deputy on the CORDS staff, felt that he was "an ideal choice" for
this job based on prior military staff experience and work with AID's per-
sonnel office.8 Holbrooke judged Lathram to be "the wrong man at the wrong
time, a methodical and slow worker with strong respect for the very inter-
agency system that he was supposed to supercede." Lathram was competent,
8. Personal Interview with MG William A. Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
9. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 122.
197
and probably did better than most others of similar rank and experience
could have done. The situation, however, called for unusual and dynamic
action.
The organization of OCO itself, no mean effort, was substantially a
success. By combining the existing organizations OCO far outstripped any
of its civilian antecedents in Vietnam in terms of size. Nearly one thou-
sand civilians were employed, and OCO oversaw program funds totalling almost
10
$128 million and 4 billion Vietnamese piastres.
Personnel choice and acquisition occupied much of OCO's time. They
were necessary tasks and ones that were to help smooth CORDS formation,
though the difficulties and contributions involved were not fully recognized
by an impatient Washington. By early December, Porter and Lathram had de-
cided on three of the four Corps (Region) Directors: Ambassador Koren
(State) for I Corps, John Vann (AID) for III Corps, and Vince Heymann (CIA)
for IV Corps. Vann, at this point employed by USAID and one of the most
controversial Americans in Vietnam, was a bold choice in view of his past
disagreements with the U.S. Army and the CIA. The II Corps position, orig-
inally offered to General Lansdale but rejected by him, 1 was later filled
by Mr. Robert Matteson (AID) in February 1967. The choice of civilian rep-
resentatives in the provinces took much longer despite the fact that all of
those chosen came from the provinces where they were already serving. Not
until mid-January 1967, near the end of the original 90-day trial period,
10. Airgram, Saigon A-543 to State, Subj.: OCO Progress Report, 22 March
1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
11. Letter, Porter to William Bundy, 3 January 1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
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were the representatives designated for each province.1 2
OCO, like many other offices in Vietnam, never had its full complement
of personnel. By late February there were 485 vacancies out of 1468 posi-
tions.13 The problem was not merely restricted to routine jobs. In March
the Embassy requested Washington's "urgent attention" to critical current
and impending vacancies in important managerial positions. 14 The difficulty
of civilian recruitment for Vietnam was a continuing problem, neither new to
OCO nor ending with its demise. Replacement of qualified field personnel
meant substantial lead times for recruiting and training.15 In the case of
their U.S. military counterparts in pacification, the problem involved more
a decision on resource allocation than a shortage of personnel.
In terms of personnel and funding OCO was predominantly an AID organi-
zation. USAID in FY 1967 was to provide 54% of the U.S. dollar support,
78% of the personnel, and 82% of the commodities.16 In addition, AID in
Washington provided and financed the administrative support for OCO. 
1 7 The
Central Intelligence Agency was the second largest contributor, providing
12. Message, Saigon 15479 to State, 130130Z January 1967.
13. Chart, developed by AID/Washington, Subj.: OCO Personnel as of 23
February 1967, CONFIDENTIAL, By mid-May this percentage had actually
increased -- Message, State 196733 to Saigon.
14. Message, Saigon 21790 to State, 310800Z March 1967, Subj.: Critical
Vacancies -- Managerial, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.
15. State 196733, op. cit., noted that requirements for most new positions
were not identified to Washington until the personnel were already
required in Vietnam.
16. Saigon A-543, op. cit. CONFIDENTIAL.
17. Memorandum, William Hall for Komer, Subj.: OCO Financing and Support,
6 February 1967, and Memorandum, Komer to Hall, Subj.: OCO Financing
and Support, 6 February 1967.
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44% of the U.S. dollar assistance though far lesser percentages of U.S.
personnel, commodities, and Vietnamese piastre support.18
OCO's relationship with other U.S. Government agencies was a mixed
success. At least senior civilians in Saigon working on pacification were
located together and seeing each other on a daily basis which was a boon to
coordination and cooperation. Yet while OCO directed personnel and, most
importantly, wrote their efficiency reports (but with comments by the parent
agency), these same people were supported, paid, and housed by their parent
agencies. The separate agencies retained funding and accountability for
pacification programs despite their direction by OCO. While this undoubt-
edly made the transition to OCO simpler, separate funding did impede the
flexibility of OCO in re-programming funds and resources to deal with unex-
pected, critical problems. The Director could not, for example, transfer
funds from the RD Cadre Program to psychological warfare.1 9
Interagency relationships, though an improvement in every instance
over what had occurred previously, were often strained. Holbrooke asserts
that OCO was "sniped and attacked almost from the outset by the bureaucra-
cies" and cited the Saigon Directors of JUSPAO and CIA as being particularly
possessive of personnel and programs with the result that their field repre-
sentatives at times ignored the guidance of their nominal OCO directors.
2 0
The terms of the Memorandum of Understanding between OCO and the CIA showed
just how carefully the latter guarded its personnel and assets by giving the
18. Saigon A-543, op. cit. CONFIDENTIAL.
19. Ibid . CONFIDENTIAL.
20. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 125.
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RD Cadre Division Chief, a CIA official, and the CIA Station Chief wide
authority and veto power over the planning, programming, funding, and em-
ployment of the RD Cadre Program.21
OCO was a strong step forward as regards the civilians' relationships
with MACV and the GVN. The civilians now spoke as one, though not always
as indicated above, which strengthened their position at all administrative
levels with their American military and GVN counterparts. Now Vietnamese
officials received basically just two channels of advice. Coordination with
MACV, especially in pacification planning, was made easier. Furthermore,
key civilians received managerial experience and stature that stood them in
good stead when OCO and MACV's Revolutionary Development Support Directorate
(RDSD) merged.
It is a comment on OCO's accomplishments that its leaders saw them in
terms of American criteria, organization, and coordination.22 They praised
reporting systems and evaluating staffs, not what these were designed to
report on. Personnel selection, office consolidation, U.S. cooperation, and
advisor training programs were highlighted. GVN follow-up to pacified areas
and RD hamlet security, two of the most important building blocks of effec-
tive pacification, were emphasized as continuing problem areas.
It would be a mistake to criticize OCO for not accomplishing more,
especially in the way of concrete field results in the struggle against the
Viet Cong. The time allotted OCO was far too short, and even had the office
21. Memorandum of Understanding, L. Wade Lathram and John L. Hart, 10
February 1967, SECRET.
22. Saigon A-543, op. cit., CONFIDENTIAL.
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worked to perfection, results in the field were dependent on many related
organizations and problems at hand ill-disposed to quick improvement.
OCO is best viewed as a step, if not essential then at least convenient
and useful, towards single management of U.S. pacification advice and sup-
port. The successful transition from civil to military responsibility was
made far easier by the experience and organization that OCO provided.
Despite the formation of OCO the possibility of military assumption of
responsibility for the pacification advisory effort always lurked in the
background. As has been explained earlier, OCO would have had to produce
results little short of the miraculous if the trend, fueled by the President
and other officials in Washington, towards a military takeover was to be
halted.
General Westmoreland appears to have realized the way the wind was
blowing, though he was most discreet about it. In mid-December with the
ink on OCO's charter scarcely dry Ambassador Leonhart had a long discussion
with Westmoreland who, while denying any promotion of increased MACV paci-
fication responsibility, indicated that he had no intention of being unpre-
pared should it come his way.2 3 The General did make a revealing remark
when he said that he did not believe that fragmented or even dual authority
was best and that Washington might be ill-judged by history for not devising
more clear-cut organizational authority and responsibility.
23. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 1 January 1967, TOP
SECRET.
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Leonhart returned to Washington and voiced much the same feeling to
the President. After noting that the civilians and the military still
could not agree on operational priorities for the war effort and allocation
of resources, he said:
But I remain doubtful that we can get pacification
moving quickly or effectively enough with the pres-
ent organization or that we will have the requisite
planning, retraining, and leverage applied to ARVN
until MACV is tasked with a single responsibility
for the pacification program.24
Copies of this report went to State, Defense, CIA and AID, but Leonhart's
words seem to have raised little protest with the exception of a VNCC member
who wrote to Ambassador Unger that he was "deeply troubled by the continuing
and apparently growing pressure" to give pacification responsibility to
MACV. 25-
On January 9th General Westmoreland reviewed a special MACV planning
study on U.S. Mission reorganization in the event that pacification was
turned over to the military,26 and soon after met with General Taylor and
noted that Taylor was in favor of a Mission reorganization by which the
military would have greater control.2 7
February was a shadowy month. OCO proceeded along its way, solidifying
into a working organization. Mr. Komer visited Vietnam from 13-23 February
24. Memorandum, Leonhart to President, Subj.: Visit to Vietnam -- December
1966 Report and Recommendations, 30 December 1966, SECRET.
25. Memorandum, Robert Miller to Unger, Subj.: Possible Military Takeover
of U.S. RD/P Effort, 11 January 1967, SECRET.
26. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 16 January 1967, TOP
SECRET, p. 7.
27. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 29 January 1967, TOP
SECRET, p. 9.
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and was full of praise for OCO, calling it "a major step forward" and
pointedly stated that it deserved "full Washington backing by all agencies
involved," but he also made a strong plea for better management and cited
three requisites: "a vigorous top U.S. team in Saigon," "better civil/
military coordination," and "a more effective and coordinated GVN effort." 2 8
The first of these was in line with both the President's and Lodge's own
wishes that he be replaced by a new Ambassador.2 9
He made these recommendations at the same time as the President was
considering a radically different American command structure for Vietnam
that would have given General Westmoreland far greater powers and responsi-
bilities than were proposed by Secretary McNamara and Mr. Komer in the sum-
mer and fall of 1966. On January 31st, General Wheeler told Westmoreland
that consideration was being given to reorganizing the Mission.30 Secre-
tary McNamara was thinking at this point of a "MacArthur-type operation,"
and both he and General Wheeler envisaged Westmoreland having control of
the civil and military efforts and devoting the bulk of his attention to
the former.31 McNamara does not appear however to have conceived Westmore-
land's role as pro-consular in regard to the Vietnamese. The proposed
reorganization applied only to the American house. Westmoreland would have
become "Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces, Vietnam." General Westmoreland saw
28. Memorandum, Komer to President, Subj.: Change for the Better --
Latest Impressions from Vietnam, 28 February 1967, SECRET.
29. Personal Interview with Official X, 6 April 1975,
30. Message, JCS 0831-67, 302355Z January 1967, Wheeler to Westmoreland,
SECRET.
31. Message, JCS 1190-67, 140023Z February 1967, Wheeler to Westmoreland,
CONFIDENTIAL.
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himself as having three deputies -- operations (General Creighton Abrams),
political affairs, and economics and national planning.32 What the Ambas-
sador's job would be or even whether there would be an Ambassador under this
concept is not clear. McNamara discussed this plan with the President who
indicated his interest and shortly thereafter asked General Taylor for his
opinions. Taylor later told Wheeler that such a reorganization would be
salutary from almost every point of view.33
During the second half of February the concept was altered substanti-
ally, a development probably related to the forthcoming change of Ambassa-
dors. Lodge, through Mr. Komer and probably by other channels, had made
known to the President his desire to leave Vietnam, and the President and
the State Department at this point were unsure of a successor. Now West-
moreland was under consideration as Ambassador Lodge's replacement with
Secretary McNamara seeing him in one of two roles: as a civilian Ambassador
or as Ambassador/Commander, U.S. Forces, Vietnam.34 General Wheeler opted
strongly for the second solution for the sake of Westmoreland's military
career, his military image, and his own belief that a military man could
better coordinate the Mission -- an implicit admission of MACV's indepen-
dence under the present arrangements and Ambassador Taylor's failure to
alter this. McNamara questioned whether the second solution would not
result in inadequate command emphasis on the Ambassador's non-military
responsibilities, but General Wheeler returned to the concept of a
33. JCS 1190-67, op. cit., CONFIDENTIAL.
34. Message, CJCS 1527-67, 280022Z February 1967, Wheeler to Westmoreland,
CONFIDENTIAL.
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"MacArthur-type" operation with Westmoreland giving his main effort to the
civilian side of the job which he felt was in the most need of improvement.3 5
At this point Westmoreland was thinking only of a field civil/military staff
merger with coordination of the Saigon agencies resting in his hands.
In late February McNamara discussed these plans with President Johnson,
and several days later both met with Secretary Rusk. At this meeting Rusk,
while stressing that he had no personal reason against Westmoreland becoming
Ambassador, did express concern about the U.S. effort being completely mili-
tarized when it appeared that the forthcoming Vietnamese elections would
almost certainly result in a military President.36 This was the principal
reason for killing the proposal. The chances of General Westmoreland's
becoming Ambassador certainly were hindered by McNamara's recommendation,
based on the wishes of General Wheeler and General Westmoreland, to the
President that his field commander not be made a civilian Ambassador. 3 7
This attempt by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to alter substantially the American command arrangements in
South Vietnam failed because of Secretary Rusk's opposition and General
Westmoreland's reluctance to serve as a civilian. It does however lay bare
the strong desire of Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, coaxing a more
cautious Westmoreland, to consolidate the U.S. effort in Vietnam, particularly
35. Ibid. CONFIDENTIAL. "MacArthur-type" operation was in reference to
the Korean War where General MacArthur was senior to the Ambassador
who served as his Political Advisor.
36. Message, JCS 1573-67, 011733Z March 1967, Wheeler to Westmoreland,
SECRET; Message, JCS 1637, 031501Z March 1967, Wheeler to Westmoreland,
SECRET; and Message, JCS 1815-67, 101711Z March 1967, Wheeler to
Westmoreland, SECRET.
37. Ibid., JCS 1637, SECRET.
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the pacification program. Having told Westmoreland that the proposal was
dead, Wheeler said:
I regret this outcome because, while I consider we
can eventually mount a successful pacification/PD
program despite two channels of control and activ-
ity, I am convinced that a united effort under the
control of one man would speed the process and en-
hance its effectiveness, both in the near-term and
long-term.39
Thinking among all three was more developed on pacification organization,
and it does not appear that a great deal of attention was given to the far
more sensitive and difficult problem of the rest of the Mission, despite the
overall centralization that these plans implied.
Knowledge of these plans within the government was strictly limited.
They may have been just some of several alternatives considered by President
Johnson. Concurrently, he had mentioned to Komer that he might send him to
Vietnam to head the pacification program.40 The decision pattern is further
complicated by the fact that it was Secretary McNamara who first recommended
to the President in February that Komer be made the head of the field paci-
fication effort.4 1  Since both proposals came during the same period from
the Secretary of Defense and since his concepts on how to handle the rest of
the Mission (to say nothing of the howls and storms that would have arisen
38. Westmoreland in retrospect said that he was reluctant to take over the
Ambassadorship as its political aspects should have been handled by an
official experienced in them. -- Interview, Mr. Charles B. MacDonald
with Westmoreland, 2 April 1973.
39. JCS 1815-67, o_. cit., SECRET,
40. R. W. Komer, The Organization and Management of the New Model Pacifica-
tion Program -- 1966-1969 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation,
1970), p. 52.
41. Ibid., p. 53.
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from U.S. Government agencies and Congress in Washington) had the radical
proposals been adopted were largely undeveloped, it is probable that McNamara
made his stronger proposals in the knowledge that they would be found unac-
ceptable and the fall-back solution of Mr. Komer's taking over would be
adopted, the very solution he wanted in the first place!
Having discarded a controversial solution, the President began to settle
in on one that was less so in comparison. Pacification would be made General
Westmoreland's responsibility, but he would be given a civilian deputy to
manage it. The second half of this solution, a civilian deputy, went largely
unmentioned between Mr, Komer's August 1966 pacification paper42 and the
March conference at Guam. Though by the fall of 1966 the President had de-
cided to turn pacification responsibility over to the military, there is no
evidence that until February 1967 he was considering giving Westmoreland a
civilian deputy. He was certain on the general direction but by no means so
on its details.
Knowledge of the idea of a civilian deputy was limited to a small hand-
ful of high officials and almost certainly to none who might have opposed
it. General Westmoreland arrived at the Guam Conference only suspecting
that he might have a civilian deputy.4 3
As a prelude to the Guam Conference, President Johnson announced on
March 15th that Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker would replace Lodge;
42. See Chapter 5, p. 5.
43. JCS 1815-67, op. cit., SECRET; General Westmoreland's Historical
Briefing, 25 March 1967, TOP SECRET; Personal Interview with MG
William A. Knowlton, 26 January 1970; and Personal Interview with
General Westmoreland, 18 April 1975.
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that Ambassador to Pakistan Eugene M. Locke would be the new Deputy
Ambassador; and that Mr. Komer would head the pacification advisory program
in Vietnam. Komer, away on vacation at the time, was somewhat chagrined at
Locke's appointment which made him the third-ranking civilian rather than
the second.44 Komer had expected to be the Deputy Ambassador at the same
time as being Deputy for Pacification to General Westmoreland.45 Unwitting-
ly, Locke was moving into a non-job, for the new Ambassador was a manager
and did administer, and with pacification given to a separate person, and
soon to a different agency, the position of Deputy Ambassador had lost much
of its raison de'etre. Thus scarcely a week after he had decided against a
complete military takeover, Lyndon Johnson had announced the partial solu-
tion, though the exact details remained to be worked out and the placing of
pacification under General Westmoreland was not publicly announced until
May.
The March Conference at Guam had been brewing for several weeks, but
while outwardly it could be seen as one more in the series of joint confer-
ences with the Vietnamese on the war's progress that began with Honolulu,
it was more important as a gathering of American officials to discuss the
state of the war, to introduce the new team for Saigon, and to begin to
46
work out the organizational details of the U.S. Mission.
There were extensive discussions at Guam among U.S. officials over the
Mission's organization with the principal proposal under consideration
44. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 14 February 1972.
45. Memorandum, Leonhart to Walt Rostow, 15 March 1967, SECRET.
46. One-half of the Conference was devoted to "U.S.-only" talks.
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being that eventually adopted (see below). At the time Westmoreland noted
a trace of Presidential hesitation: "... they were later put to the President
who seemed to accept them in principle but stated he would refrain from mak-
ing a decision until a later date. This indecision would last into May.
Westmoreland went to the Conference expecting to have his pacification
staff officer, General Knowlton, be the new chief of a MACV staff section
pulling together both the MACV Revolutionary Development Support Directorate
and the Office of Civil Operations, but because of "extensive pressure" he
had to accede to having Wade Lathram, the OCO Director, as the head of it. 4 8
Knowlton who had already a good working relationship with Lathram agreed
readily and the matter was settled.
Mr. Komer and his assistant Colonel Montague accompanied General
Westmoreland back to Saigon and spent several days there working out the
details of the reorganization and meeting with him on the 23rd and 24th of
March to hammer out future relationships and terms of reference.
General Westmoreland, describing with understatement the final meeting
on the 24th, notes that they "came to a meeting of the minds." 4 9 General
Knowlton and General William Rosson, MACV's Chief of Staff, saw Komer's
proposed organization charts as a move by him to command U.S. battalions
that supported pacification. This, according to General Knowlton, was a
47. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 25 March 1967, TOP
SECRET.
48. Personal Interview with MG William A. Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
49. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 25 March 1967, TOP
SECRET.
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50
major point of contention in these discussions. General Rosson's
overly-alarmed presentation may have had something to do with Westmoreland's
agitation. Rosson accused Komer of taking operational control and tactical
direction of U.S. battalions away from Westmoreland, an allegation that is
not supported by the available documents. In the charts in question the only
possible indication of this was that US. regional and provincial pacifica-
tion chiefs should control US. units "if (these units were) attached for
pacification missions."51 Perhaps General Rosson had more reason to be
alarmed over a key paragraph in the draft NSAM which said:
The Deputy will supervise the employment of all U.S.
resources -- civil and military, and the conduct of
all U.S. programs directly contributing to pacifica-
tion (Revolutionary Development),52
Komer stated that this paragraph never was intended to include U.S. bat-
talions but only U.S. advisory assets, and there is no other documentation
extant that would support in any way the allegations presented by the two
generals.53 This paragraph was however removed from the draft NSAM after
the meeting on the 24th. The whole incident shows one more example of just
how sensitive the U.S. military were in Vietnam to any hints of civilian
involvement in troop command and tactical operations.
More significant however is what General Westmoreland and his future
deputy did agree on -- a series of guideline concepts that set the pattern
50. Personal Interview with MG William A. Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
51. Draft charts, Subj.: Organizational Schematics, March 1967. These
were written by Komer and Montague and copy 2 is noted; "Used for
Westmoreland Meeting."
52. Draft National Security Action Memorandum, Subj.: Responsibility for
U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development), c. 24 March
1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
53. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 14 February 1972.
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for the subsequent U.S. pacification support structure in Vietnam.54 The
American role would continue to be one of advice and support; the task of
pacification would remain essentially Vietnamese. The U,S. pacification
advisory effort would have a single manager at each level from Saigon to
district with one chain of command, one official voice when dealing with
the Vietnamese, and integrated civil/military planning, programming, opera-
tions, evaluation logistics, and communication. Every effort would be made
to effect a-smooth transition by melding the existing civil and military
structures. The entire Office of Civil Operations would be transferred en
bloc to the new organization. Significantly, they agreed that Mr. Komer was
to manage and supervise and should have full liaison with the GVN agencies
concerned with pacification. He and the civilians beneath him were not to
be political advisors or mere coordinators. He would operate in a manner
similar to a component commander; his pacification organization would re-
semble a subsidiary corporation. As a corollary principle to civil/military
unity, positions were to be filled by the best man available, regardless of
whether he was civilian or military. The phasing of the reorganization was
to be careful and cautious; certain functional programs, mostly those brought
from OCO, were to use a "program manager" concept; and civilian agency
staffs and budgets were to be continued to be used at least until FY 1969.
54. This paragraph is based entirely upon Draft Concept Paper by Mr. Komer
and Colonel Montague, Subj.: Organizational Concepts Governing Inte-
gration of Civil/Military Responsibility for Pacification (RD) Under
COMUSMACV, 23 March 1967, SECRET. This is a most important basic
document on CORDS organization. The xerox copy used by the author
has General Westmoreland's handwritten revisions and a notation by
Mr. Komer saying: "Westy's copy, as revised by him 24 March '67."
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The transition in Mission organizational relationships originally was
planned as a two-stage operation, but the final structure in June more
closely resembled the original first stage. This stage had the advantage
that with the civil and military staff sections still relatively intact and
identifiable it would be possible to make a smooth switch back to a civilian
advisory effort should negotiations with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
force a U.S. military reduction and withdrawal.
In March Komer envisaged for himself a greater policy role in the re-
source allocation, training, and other activities of all Vietnamese forces
affecting pacification. This basic point was not obtained by Komer probably
in deference to General Abrams, the new Deputy COMUSMACV, who was to have
ARVN as his primary responsibility. Komer asked for and received a direct
channel of technical supervision to the regional pacification advisors and
their provincial subordinates, though his command line ran through the U.S.
military field force (corps) commanders.
Westmoreland and Komer also worked on a draft NSAM prepared by Komer.
The General's changes were small in number, with the exception of the re-
moval of the controversial paragraph quoted earlier, and served mostly to
formalize without question his own primacy and responsibility in pacifica-
tion as opposed to that of his new deputy. The changes put some restric-
tions on what would have been an unusually free-wheeling subordinate, even
by Mr. Komer's standards.5 5
55. The author has examined five different versions of NSAM 362 from
March drafts to the final. Textual changes and marginalia enable
one to determine often who made the changes and when.
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On the 24th Komer left Saigon for Washington where events appeared to
be moving toward a swift decision and announcement. Three days later Komer
sent the draft NSAM to the President noting that Secretaries Rusk, McNamara,
and Vance, General Wheeler, and Ambassador Bunker were in agreement with
it.56 Secretary Rusk and Komer however insisted that Ambassador Leonhart,
who was to take over Komer's White House office, receive the full mandate
previously held by Komer, a twist that was only grudgingly accepted by the
President.57 Komer made it clear to the President that he expected to be
General Abrams' equal, except when General Westmoreland was absent, and that
he must have "free access to Bunker (who insists on it)."58 At McNamara's
urging he ruled out his also managing civilian non-pacification functions,
such as anti-inflation and port congestion, in order to fully focus his
energies. Finally, in view of press speculation, Komer urged the President
to move quickly and permit an announcement as soon as it could be coordinated
with the Saigon Mission.
The President delayed, and the decision remained unannounced until May
because of a combination of several factors. Ambassador Bunker for personal
reasons was not ready to go to Saigon, and President Johnson wished him to
56. Memorandum, Komer to President, Subj.: Shift of Pacification Respon-
sibility, 27 March 1967, SECRET, with attached draft NSAM, Subj.:
Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Develop-
ment), CONFIDENTIAL.
57. Memorandum, Walt Rostow to Rusk and McNamara, Subj.: U.S. Role in
Vietnam Pacification, 27 March 1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
58. Comparisons of the various drafts of the NSAM indicate that McNamara
made only one substantial change -- he removed a phrase that required
Komer to report through COMSMACV to the Ambassador. In practice
Komer always retained this access.
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announce the change once he was at his new post. In addition, official
Washington was deeply engrossed in a major U.S. force-level decision.
Finally, the President himself was still not certain about Komer and
Leonhart's roles. He was leaning towards having Komer divide his time
between Saigon and Washington,60 On April 20th Komer urged the President
to decide, at least in time for Komer to be in Saigon by May 1st.61 As
evidence of President Johnson's uncertainty and wish to keep options open,
Komer at this late date was still presenting three alternative organiza-
tional schemes: the solution worked out during and following the Guam
Conference, Komer as director of a larger OCO, and the two-hatted approach
of his handling both the Saigon and White House pacification jobs. The
idea of Komer heading a larger OCO was thrown in only as a contrast to the
other two and to push the President into a decision. It was one that would
have been far more acceptable to the civilian agencies. There is however
no evidence that this solution was under serious consideration by the Presi-
dent. Komer did not even feel it necessary to comment further on it, but he
did strongly recommend against the two-hats idea and left no doubt that he
preferred the Guam solution.
The President still had not signed the NSAM when Komer arrived with
General Abrams in Saigon on May 1st. Not until nine days later, with events
in Saigon already in full swing, did President Johnson relent and promulgate
NSAM 362. General Westmoreland was charged with US. civil/military support
59. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 128.
60. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 14 December 1971.
61. Memorandum, Komer to President, 20 April 1967, UNCLASSIFIED.
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of pacification in Vietnam and Mr. Komer was made his Deputy with the
personal rank of Ambassador. The President gave Ambassador Bunker full
jurisdiction over any inter-agency issues in Vietnam arising from this
change. He retained Ambassador Leonhart as Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent. At the end, Johnson admonished:
I count on all concerned -- in Washington and in
Vietnam -- to pull together in the national inter-
est to make this arrangement work.6 2
It is interesting that, unlike his treatment of OCO, he imposed no deadlines.
Mr. Komer's arrival in Vietnam and the issuing of NSAM 362 marks a most
important turning point in the U.S. pacification advisory effort. Washington
had held the initiative for over a year; the Mission carried out the pacifi-
cation program, but the force, the policy energy, emanated from Washington.
By mid-1967 as Komer puts it, "the problem was one of field execution, not
Washington organization... the real problems were not in Washington any longer
but in Vietnam...we could not manage the 'other war' from 11,000 miles
away." 6 3 With his arrival in Saigon and the creation of the new, unified
management structure, the torch was passed back to the Mission, and Wash-
ington became an on-looker, monitoring but not initiating programs in paci-
fication.
President Johnson's decision to place pacification under the military
and create CORDS was a significant act of policy. Few organizational
62. National Security Action Memorandum No. 362, Subj.: Responsibility
for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development), 9 May
1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
63. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
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changes have had such an important and discernable impact during the
Vietnam War. Its effects would be felt for the rest of the war, not merely
among U.S. bureaucracies but with the Vietnamese and in the actual course
of the war. Looking back over his action, one must ask, in summation, why
he did it.64 First -- pacification cut across every agency's line so much
that normal government coordination was inadequate. Military and civilian
tasks were inextricably interwoven. Second -- the scale of the problem
escaped the bounds of the civilian agencies resources, especially personnel,
and managerial competence. In general, they did not have the ability, per-
haps even the desire, or the experience to deal with such a vast program.
Their organizational background did not prepare them for it. But finally,
lest this narrative appear to place the civilians continually in a bad
light, both the President and Komer realized that for more than any other
reason pacification was failing because of inadequate military security.
They understood the civilians' contention on this point, but proceeding
from it they also knew that the only way to force the military to take
pacification more seriously was to engage its chain of command in direct
responsibility, a point which Komer skillfully played up with General
Westmoreland. Beyond the obvious quest for military resources, they also
sought by this decision to give military operations a political meaning,
supporting directly rather than indirectly a more politicized strategy. The
64. Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972),
p. 459. These three reasons .are based on those enumerated by Rostow in
the above.
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military did not respond and alter overnight, nor was this intended, The
end result however was to force a significant, if not permanent, change in
its institutional repertoire. No other U.S. organization in Vietnam, civil-
ian or otherwise, was altered to the degree that the military were by this
decision.
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Chapter VI
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION: SETTING UP CORDS
The decision which had been in the offing for nearly a year finally was
made. The President, in order to defuse opposition, gave the civilians one
final opportunity but structured it so that his preference for a unified
civil/military effort would be adopted eventually. If this was bargaining,
then he stacked the deck.
It is important also to observe what happened after the President made
his decision. Was it implemented in the fashion he desired? I will contend
that it was, but that success was due as much to a fortuitous combination of
personalities as any other factor. The same decision carried out by a dif-
ferent chief with a different commander and a different Ambassador probably
would not have produced the same results regardless of Presidential emphasis,
regardless of the organizational arrangements. The key, therefore, to suc-
cessful implementation was as much the officials he chose to implement it as
the decision itself or his own interest. This, of course, does not imply a
weak President, for the power to appoint whom he chooses to fill key positions
is a vital, and perhaps under-emphasized, aspect of the Presidency.
In contrast to most of the organizational decisions that the President
made during the war, he rarely reappears as an actor in the story. He did not
have to continually back Komer up. He did not have to switch officials again
after six months or a year. He did not have to remind his Administration.
This is not to say that carrying out his decision was a smooth event. There
was resistance from both the civilians and the military; yet there was com-
promise also. But, problems were handled below the President's level.
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Indeed, the change was so successful in this regard that President Johnson
effectively downgraded Komer's old White House office. The need for it, so
apparent in 1966, simply did not exist with the same urgency as before.
If the decision was implemented successfully, it was not accomplished
easily or overnight. By no means was the final outcome as foreordained as it
appears in retrospect. Creating CORDS and having it do the job that the
President intended was a major accomplishment. There were formidable bureau-
cratic and organizational problems. It is to this story that I now turn.
I dislike the term "The Other War." To me this is
all one war. Everything we do is an aspect of the
total effort to achieve our objectives here. 1
With these words to his first Mission Council meeting, Ambassador Bunker
set the tone of his administration. The American effort never became one war,
and the architects of the new reorganization deliberately left out interagency
problems that were not related directly to the pacification program, but Am-
bassador Bunker drew the United States effort in Vietnam more closely together
than at any time since the mid-1950's. Pacification advice and support was by
far the most apparent manifestation of this.
As has been seen earlier the new Ambassador was a latecomer to these
developments. The train was set in motion long before the public announcement
which presented the change as his decision. However, he did not hesitate or
delay but strongly supported the reorganization.
1. Mission Council Action Memorandum No. 191, Subj.: Opening Remarks by
Ambassador Bunker at Mission Council Meeting, May 1, 1967, Saigon, 8
May 1967.
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If the Ambassador had needed any prodding, he certainly got it when
Komer arrived the next day. The new pacification chief took a wider and
more dynamic view of his concerns than his title would indicate, and he was
not about to let the massive military staff submerge him. He immediately
recommended that Bunker leave no doubt that civilians were running the Mis-
sion despite the placing of pacification under General Westmoreland. To put
a swift imprint on the Mission, Komer urged that the Ambassador focus on
three crucial problem areas by demanding prompt "action programs" for the
transition to an elected GVN, for the "revamping" of the Vietnamese Armed
Forces, and for improving the pacification program.2 After consulting with
Westmoreland, he also recommended that the Ambassador create from the Mission
Council a smaller "Executive Committee" to discuss the most sensitive issues.3
This was put into effect; the Committee's membership consisted of Ambassador
Bunker, Deputy Ambassador Locke, General Westmoreland, and Ambassador Komer.
Behind Komer were Colonel Montague and John Vann urging him to strengthen
his position by concentrating and insisting on key issues such as command of
pacification personnel, authority to organize pacification staffs from Saigon
to the provinces, and a channel to Ambassador Bunker. While Komer's activity
2. Memorandum, Komer to Bunker, Subj.: Completing the Transition, 5 May
1967, SECRET (Grp. 4).
3. Ibid., and Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 30 March 1972.
Komer suggested the Executive Committee as he felt that the Mission
Council was too unwieldy and notes that Bunker used it almost from the
beginning. After the regular Council meetings the four principals,
occasionally joined by others, would adjourn to the Ambassador's office
or to lunch to discuss the more sensitive issues. General Westmoreland
noted that the meetings were ad hoc and not institutionalized - Personal
Interview with General Westmoreland, 18 April 1975.
4. Memorandum, (Montague) to Komer, Subj.: Tactics, 6 May 1967.
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was typical of the man, both he and his staff were genuinely apprehensive
that if the civilians in pacification did not assert themselves, they would
gradually be pushed under in the military command and lose their power to
press pacification against competing priorities and interests. And, as
Colonel Montague put it: "your leverage goes down day by-day after you are
no longer Special Assistant to the President."5
So the new Deputy for Pacification landed in Saigon on the run, and he
never stopped. To help create the most powerful pacification support organi-
zation possible, he also set out to bring such new areas as support for the
paramilitary forces and the anti-Viet Cong infrastructure efforts, under his
purview. He wrote the pacification section in Ambassador Bunker's weekly
message to the President; he went to MACV commanders' conferences; he would
make comments to Bunker and Westmoreland on issues such as proposed troop
operations or GVN political development that scarcely were within his bureau-
cratic purview; he would make private proposals to the Ambassador for programs
to be levied on MACV and other Mission agencies. Above all, he was deter-
mined not to be lost in a huge military machine; he would act like a four-
6
star general and insist on being treated as such.
Soon after his arrival, Komer sent Bunker draft cables to Washington
explaining the concept of reorganization and the proposed method of announce-
7
ment along with a schedule of steps to implement the process,. Making but
5. Ibid.
6. Even to the point of having the MACV Chief of Staff design for him
special four-star license plates!
7. Memorandum, Komer to Bunker, 6 May 1967, SECRET, with Tab A -- Subj.:
Two Cables to Washington in Response to NODIS Septel 184979, and Tab B
-- Subj.: A Schedule of Steps Required to Complete the Exercise.
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minor changes, Bunker sent them on to Washington which approved and returned
them with little alternation on the 10th of May.8
On May 8th, Komer again reminded the Ambassador of his proposed action
program in pacification, indicating that while he would be working on it
anyway, the Ambassador might want to assert a personal interest by formally
requesting such a program. And in a statement that is indicative both of the
man and his method of operation, he added:
Let me add privately that such an action program is
far more urgent and important business than a pro-
longed Steering Committee exercise on how we might
effect marginal logistic economies and perhaps save
some men and money. Results are the ultimate economy. 9
The Steering Committee exercise referred to here was an idea first suggested
by Komer and greeted with great enthusiasm by Bunker and Westmoreland. They
envisaged taking a close look at reducing the degree of duplication and over-
lap among MACV and civilian agencies dealing with pacification. Mr. Komer
quickly lost interest once it became clear that the real savings were going
to be small and it was not going to be worth the extra time spent. He let
the idea die quietly.1 0
Meanwhile, on May 9th President Johnson signed NSAM 362, and the State
Department passed on the final text to Saigon.
From the outset the Ambassador kept the impending reorganization as much
of a secret as possible to forestall press speculation and possible criticism.
8. Message, Saigon 25028 to State, 081220Z May 1967, SECRET and Message,
Saigon 25029 to State, 081225Z May 1967, SECRET. The State Department's
reply, transmitting the approved texts is: Message, State 190928 to
Saigon, 091020Z May 1967, SECRET.
9. Memorandum, Komer to Bunker, 8 May 1967, SECRET (Grp. 4).
10. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 12 May 1972.
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11
Rumors and hints of change flowed freely however in OCO and MACV. Another
worry, but one that happily proved unfounded, was that the news of a military
takeover would jolt civilian morale and result in resignations. Komer sensed
both civilian morale and press speculation as potentially serious problems to
be tackled by leaning over backward to emphasize civilian leadership and the
powerful roles that civilians now would play, As one of his assistants noted:
If, however, the civilians refuse to exercise the
authority they are now being given, if they refuse
to accept the control necessary -- in fact, only
if they themselves relinquish their powers will the
military in fact take over.1 2
Civilian authority was exercised, and events belied the reasons for this
apprehensiveness.
The Mission's leaders also gave careful attention to countering possible
press and public criticism of the reorganization as a militarization of the
U.S. effort. They stressed Komer's role as a manager and the fact that the
new staff structure would have a civilian head with OCO absorbing MACV's paci-
fication directorate. Westmoreland even constructed the acronym "CORDS" so as
to give the greatest prominence to the word "civil."1 3
On May llth the Ambassador met with the press in Saigon and announced
the reorganization, stressing heavily the desirability of single management
and his interest in pacification. He made it clear that he too would be
involved:
11. Memorandum, Mr. Mac Deford to Komer, Subj.: A Well-Kept Secret, 9 May
1967, SECRET (Grp. 4). One source of his noted that knowledge of the
change was "all over Region III."
12. Memorandum, Deford to Komer, Subj.: Suggestions for Regional Director's
Meeting, 9 May 1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
13. Personal Interview with MG William A. Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
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I intend to keep fully informed personally about all
developments in this field, and to hold frequent
meetings with General Westmoreland and Ambassador
Komer for the purpose of formulating policy.14
At the MACV Commanders' Conference at Cam Ranh Bay on May 13, Ambassador
Bunker and General Westmoreland dwelt extensively on the new organization,
each stressing that pacification was now a single program, part of a larger
combined civil/military effort with one manager -- the Ambassador. General
Westmoreland candidly stated that a "major goal will be to avoid personal
conflicts or friction" and highlighted the importance of civilians in the
new structure. 1 5 Ambassador Komer talked of the use of mass, of no single
solution but many programs unified in a "comprehensive package approach."
For the first time, one of these conferences was devoted almost entirely to
pacification.
For the next ten days the focus of organization shifted to the discus-
sions of the Steering Group on Organization for Revolutionary Development
Support. With Komer as Chairman, this group set about the mechanics of re-
16
organizing U.S. pacification support activities under Westmoreland. Against
the recommendations of a previous MACV planning study, Komer insisted that the
Steering Group approach the integration as a three-step process, going slow
on areas that would raise more complicated interagency problems, such as
14. Statement by Ambassador Bunker at Press Conference, Saigon, 11 May 1967
(my emphasis). This statement was drafted by Komer and approved by
Westmoreland.
15. Memorandum for Record, BG John R. Chaisson, Subj.: MACV Commanders'
Conference, 13 May 1967, 21 May 1967, TOP SECRET (Grp. 3).
16. Directive, MACV Chief of Staff, Subj.: Terms of Reference for Organi-
zation Steering Group, undated but probably 12 May 1967. Its members
with Komer, MG Paul Smith, Mr, Frank Van Damm, and BG Daniel Raymond.
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psychological warfare operations and intelligence, or those where absorption
into MACV would adversely affect civilian morale or be inconsistent with the
Ambassador's May llth announcement.1 7
The first step was to create a unified organization consolidating civil-
ian and military pacification activities under General Westmoreland with a
single chain of command down to the district advisory level. This was to be
accomplished in thirty days. The second and third steps involved the func-
tional integration of such civil and military activities as transportation,
communications, logistics, intelligence, medical support, public safety, and
psychological operations. No completion dates for these two steps were speci-
fied, and many of their aspects were never achieved. It would appear that
Komer stated these long-range objectives because he had to but without great
enthusiasm or firm expectation that they might be achieved.
Komer and his assistants insisted that the MACCORDS staff (the merged
OCO and RD.SD) be an operating agency with command authority against the rec-
ommendations of the military members of the Steering Group.18 A second key
issue was whether the Deputy to COMUSMACV could deal directly with the
MACCORDS staff on pacification matters that did not involve the interests of
other MACV staff sections. This was never spelled out specifically but the
17. Memorandum, Komer to MACV Chief of Staff, Subj.: Terms of Reference for
Steering Group on Organization for RD Support, 12 May 1967, SECRET
(Grp. 4).
18. Memorandum, Organization Sub-Committee to Chairman of the Organization
Steering Group, Subj.: Integration of MACV/RDSD and the Office of
Civil Operations, 16 May 1967, OFFICIAL USE ONLY. See also LTC
Montague's marginal notes of the Subcommittee's "Operating Assumptions"
Memorandum, 16 May 1967, and Memorandum, Montague to Komer, Subj.:
Organizational Issues, 17 May 1967,
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final directive gave Komer such wide authority over pacification that he
could easily interpret his pacification command authority as he saw fit (see
below). In practice he dealt directly with all lower echelons involved in
pacification. Not only did he go around the MACV Chief of Staff and work
directly with the Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS, Wade Lathram, but he
and his assistants often went straight to Mr. Lathram's individual staff sec-
tions and members, The facade of working through the Chief of Staff was
usually preserved, but was more often than not one of formality rather than
substance.
Perhaps the biggest stumbling block during the reorganization process
was how to organize pacification at the regional or corps level. This had a
number of aspects: should the CORDS regional staff be an operating agency;
should the regional Deputy for CORDS directly control the province teams;
would the ARVN division advisory teams be in the pacification chain of com-
mand; what would be the role of the corps Deputy Senior Advisor (military);
and who would control the advisors assigned to ARVN units on pacification
support missions? This last issue was more important than it might appear
at first glance as nearly half of the Vietnamese Army battalions were supposed
to be supporting pacification.
On March 23rd Ambassador Komer sent General Westmoreland his proposed
organizational arrangements.19 These arrangements were in the nature of a
19. Memorandum, Komer to Westmoreland, Subj.: Integration of OCO/RDS
Activities within MACV, 23 May 1967, UNCLASSIFIED, with attached staff
study: Memorandum, Komer to Westmoreland, Subj.: Integration of OCO/
RDS Activities within MACV, n.d., CONFIDENTIAL, with five enclosures.
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compromise by order, imposed on the members of the Steering Group, especially
on those aspects already mentioned in connection with regional organization.
Komer and his assistants generally sought as much independence and power as
they thought was necessary or calculated he would be able to obtain. The
entire exercise of the Steering Group had far less importance than the avail-
able documents would indicate.20 It put a stamp of compromise harmony on
concepts and ideas about the organization that Komer brought with him to
Vietnam. Where the Steering Group's recommendations did not agree with these
concepts, they were changed. Komer had steered his ideas on the new organi-
zation through the first of several bureaucratic shoals.
This is not to say that the new pacification chief had everything as he
wished. At General Westmoreland's insistence he was made Deputy to COMUSMACV
not Deputy COMUSMACV, and hence was deputy for just one function. Unlike
General Abrams, he operated across the broad range of MACV staff sections
for pacification only. Westmoreland wanted to be certain that there would be
no chance of a civilian in command of US. forces should, for some reason,
both General Abrams and he be absent.21 Formally at least he had to operate
through the U.S. military Corps Senior Advisors on many issues.
Komer's presentation to Westmoreland masked the sharp divergences of
opinion among members of the Steering Group. He allowed that "the plan is by
no means perfect, but represents an optimum balancing of pros and cons" and
that it was "the best interim scheme."2 2 To deal with the not fully-settled
20. Personal Interviews with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969 and 5 June,
1972.
21. Ibid.
22. Komer memorandum, 23 May 1967, o2. cit.
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problems of regional/corps organization, he recommended that the proposed
directive be issued subject to objections by the U.S. Corps Senior Advisors
and MACV staff sections -- thus throwing the burden of changing an established
directive onto the potential opposition. Three days later General Westmore-
land, who was determined to give CORDS every chance to succeed, called Komer
in to discuss the proposed implementing directives, made only minor changes
publcaton.23in them, and approved their publication, He discussed them with Ambassador
Bunker who gave his concurrence, and on the 28th of May the MACV Chief of
Staff published CORDS' implementing directive.2 4
Ambassador Komer had wide power to manage the U.S. pacification program:
Specifically, he is charged by COMUSMACV with
supervising the formulation and execution of all
plans, policies and programs, military and civil-
ian, which support the GVN's Revolutionary Devel-
opment program and related programs.25
The absence of limitations and specifics in this directive as to Komer's role
meant that the role of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revo-
lutionary Development Support (DEPCORDS) came to depend to a great extent on
personalities.
The directive greatly expanded the pacification support role handled by
one organization from those tasks previously handled by OCO and RDSD. In
particular, Komer obtained the tasks of advising the Vietnamese Government on
23. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 31 May 1967, TOP SECRET.
24. HQS. MACV, Directive 10-12, Subj.: Organizations and Functions for
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, 28 May 1967,
and HQS. MACV, Change 4 to Organizations and Functions Manual, 28 May
1967. Change 4 details the functions of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for
CORDS, the Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS, and the MACCORDS divisions.
25. Ibid.
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two key aspects of pacification -- local security and destroying the Viet
Cong's political/military infrastructure (see below).
To have civilians fully operating in a military chain of command probably
was unique in U.S. Government history. (See Chart VI-1.) Certainly it never
occurred before on this scale. Ambassador Komer was the first Ambassador in
U.S. history who not only served directly under a military commander but also
had command responsibility for military personnel and resources. CORDS was an
organization with military and civilians intermixed, each writing the effi-
ciency report of the other. Finally, at each administrative level, pacifica-
tion advice and support were under one man.
Komer himself had a small personal staff that served as an informal brain
trust and eyes and ears for the pacification chief along with being a short-
cut channel of communication for more junior members of the larger CORDS
organization. This staff was headed by his hand-picked deputy, an Army major
general, George I. Forsythe, who helped to smooth military feathers ruffled
by the unconventional actions of Komer and his assistants. As Forsythe later
put it:
... the whole arrangement was like a grain of sand in
an oyster. Like the oyster, the bureaucracy set out
to encase the irritant. But Komer was not about to
become a pearl.2 6
CORDS principal Saigon staff, called "MACCORDS," operated under the MACV
Chief of Staff as a regular MACV staff section alongside J-2 (intelligence),
J-3 (operations), and others. Its chief, Wade Lathram, now became the Assis-
tant Chief of Staff for CORDS. His staff's responsibilities included all
26. Interview, Mr. Charles B. MacDonald with Forsythe, 16 June 1973.
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Chart VI-l. U.S. MISSION AND MACV HEADQUARTERS STAFF RELATIONSHIPS AFTER
THE FORMATION OF CORDS, JUNE 1967
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aspects of pacification planning, support, and advice to U.S. and GVN
officials. By the Directive, MACCORDS also had MACV staff responsibility
for economic warfare and U.S. forces civil action. Most important, Mr. Lathram
supervised "the execution of plans and programs for U.S. civil/military support
of" pacification.27 MACCORDS was an operating agency not only a staff sec-
tion. Komer had won a major victory.
The staff under Wade Lathram was initially similar to that in OCO; in-
deed the new CORDS organization was designed specifically to make the transi-
tion as effortless as possible with most of the personnel doing the same jobs
they had done before but with a different supervisory structure. (See Chart
VI--2.) Six functional divisions, such as Chieu Hoi and Refugees, were trans-
ferred in their entirety from OCO (and hence from AID and CIA) with some mili-
tary added. Management support remained largely civilian. The most extensive
intermingling of military and civilians occurred in the command sections and
in the Research and Analysis, Plans and Programs, and Reports and Evaluations
Divisions.
Without discussing each program in detail, it is worth noting the breadth
of programs that CORDS now embraced and who formerly had been responsible for
them: New Life Development (AID), Cheiu Hoi (AID), RD Cadre (CIA), Montagnard
Cadre (CIA), census grievance (CIA), Regional and Popular Forces (MACV), refu-
gees (AID), field psychological operations (JUSPAO), Public Safety (AID),
U.S. forces civic action and civil affairs (MACV), RD reports and evaluations
(all agencies), and RD field inspection (all agencies).2 8 CORDS also assumed
27. MACV Directive 10-12, op. cit., (my emphasis).
28. Change 4 to Organizations and Functions Manual, op. cit.
Chart VI-2.
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coordinating responsibility for pacification-related AID programs such as
rural electrification, hamlet schools, rural health, village/hamlet adminis-
trative training, agricultural affairs, and public works. As time went on
CORDS expanded its purview even further. With few exceptions, all U.S. pro-
grams outside of Saigon excluding regular U.S. and GVN military forces and
clandestine CIA operations came under CORDS operational control.
One important exception was land reform which USAID insisted on retain-
ing within its purview. Though this originally was one of Komer' s eight high-
priority action programs, he was "out-maneuvered" by USAID and gave up trying
to bring it under CORDS. 2 9 Busy with many other bureaucratic battles at the
same time, he was not able to win this one. CORDS did however retain an
interest in the program, and later it became an important aspect of the Viet-
namese Government's pacification effort in -the early 1970's.
In most aspects the CORDS organization in each region (or corps) mir-
rored that at MACV headquarters. (See Chart VI-3.) The regional Deputy for
CORDS (DEPCORDS) was a full-fledged deputy to the U.S. Corps Senior Advisor,
who was also the U.S. corps commander. Once more one sees the same words:
"supervising the formulation and execution of all military and civilian
plans, policies and programs..."30 Komer and his assistants, against the
misgivings of General Westmoreland, felt strongly that the regional Deputy
for CORDS should be in an operational not staff position and definitely should
29. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 22 April 1975.
30. MACV Directive 10-12, op. cit.
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Chart VI-3. CORPS/REGION ORANIZATION AFTER THE FORMATION OF CORDS,
JUNE 1967
-KXXXXXXXXXXXX- Coordination - Military and CORDS Matters
-H 5 -0-9 0- Operational Control when unit assigned an RD
Direct Support Mission
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not be subordinate to the U.S. corps commander's Chief of Staff.31 Komer
took as a model the Corps Deputy Senior Advisor who was in charge of the
entire advisory program to the Vietnamese Armed Forces in the corps and who
functioned as a "component commander" reporting directly to the Corps Senior
Advisor. A key to CORDS ability to function was this autonomy that he ob-
tained for its field efforts -- largely on the advice of John Vann, the
DEPCORDS in III Corps. The model solution proposed in Directive 10-12 left
the Chief of Staff with only one area of concern -- the separate corps gen-
eral staff. A variant, allowed for the III Corps area, installed the Chief
of Staff immediately beneath the U.S. corps commander and his two deputies.
The U.S. war effort at the corps level and below now was divided into
three distinct components: the U.S. forces, the advisory effort to the Viet-
namese Army under the Deputy Senior Advisor, and the pacification support
program under the Deputy for CORDS. The Deputy for CORDS was served by the
Assistant Deputy for CORDS, or in the case of III Corps the Assistant Chief
of Staff for CORDS, who headed a civil/military staff that paralleled closely
the MACCORDS structure at Saigon.
Since the Vietnamese Army was so heavily involved in pacification sup-
port, the corps Deputy for CORDS supervised the Deputy Senior Advisor for
all aspects of Vietnamese military support of pacification. To reinforce
this, the U.S. Province Senior Advisor was to have operational control of
all U.S. advisors to Vietnamese units attached to the Vietnamese Province
31. Memorandum, Komer to Westmoreland, 26 May 1967, SECRET (Grp. 4). This
was a key element both of CORDS success and of the ability of the civil-
ians to preserve their power and exploit the access to military re-
sources and personnel that the new organization provided.
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Chief for support of pacification.
The province advisory teams, unified under a single chief called the
Province Senior Advisor, were responsible directly to the regional Deputy for
CORDS. Thus Westmoreland and Komer settled a major point of contention with
a lengthy bureaucratic history -- should the advisory teams to the Vietnamese
Army divisions be in the pacification chain of command? Removal of these
teams from the chain of command ran counter to a steadily growing trend, sup-
ported by MACV, to have the ARVN division commanders control all province-
level activities.32 Both PROVN and the "Roles and Missions" studies of 1966
flatly recommended removing the*ARVN division from the pacification chain of
command,33 since the division headquarters would not give pacification and
province affairs the attention they deserved. The division was in many re-
spects a superfluous link; most GVN civilian ministries, including the Minis-
try of Revolutionary Development, and U.S, civilian agencies did not have
representatives at this level. Proponents of a stronger GVN provincial gov-
ernment also supported a change. Finally, as a matter of organizational
principle, Komer did not want his key province pacification advisors under
the direct control of military superiors whose advisory role was oriented
towards large-unit combat.
In the May discussions on this point General Abrams, the MACV staff, all
U.S. corps commanders, and General Knowlton, Lathram's deputy, recommended
32. Memorandum, Richard Holbrooke to Ambassador Leonhart, Subj.; Reorgani-
zation of the United States Mission: An Appraisal So Far, 6 June 1967,
CONFIDENTIAL.
33. Ibid., and USVNR, IV.C.8., pp. 132-133.
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against removing the division advisors from the U.S. pacification advisory
structure. Knowlton felt that with the assignment of ARVN battalions to
pacification, the division commanders now were taking a more active interest
in pacification and that the American example of removing advisors from the
chain would not necessarily make ARVN follow suit. 3 4 General Westmoreland,
to the surprise of some skeptical civilians, decided in Komer's favor on this
issue, and henceforth the division advisory teams were involved only in rou-
tine administrative and logistical support for the military members of the
province teams. Westmoreland continued his support on this point, despite
his personal doubts, later in 1967 when he supported Komer's effort to per-
suade the Vietnamese to make the same changes on their side and remove the
ARVN division Commander's control over province chiefs. The Vietnamese moved
slowly but did as Komer wished in 1968. At this point it is worth remember-
ing the rejection of these changes when they were proposed by PROVN and "Roles
and Missions" in 1966. This is one of many examples where CORDS managers were
able to reach back into past reports and studies that never had been acted
upon, pull out some of their recommendations, and get them implemented.
The pacification support structures at province and district were easily
determined and generated little argument. (See Chart VI-4.) The province
and district teams now had a single team chief. The regional Deputy for
CORDS, with the concurrence in each case of Ambassador Komer and General
Westmoreland, chose the Province Senior Advisors who were split roughly in
half between military and civilians. The civilians in this position would
34. Personal Interview with MG William A. Knowlton, 26 January 1970.
Chart VI-4.
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have a military deputy and vice-versa. The Province Senior Advisor chose
the District Senior Advisor, but with the approval of the regional Deputy
for CORDS. Most of the District Senior Advisors were drawn from the ranks
of the MACV sub-sector advisors. This was for reasons of security plus the
fact that there were no civilians stationed in many districts. In the most
secure districts civilians headed the CORDS advisory teams.
At this juncture Komer and Westmoreland put off two difficult deci-
sions. 3 5 They left the IV Corps organization as it was to await specially-
tailored instructions as this area had both the largest civilian advisory
structure and the smallest U.S. military elements. They also decided that
for the moment there would be no changes in administrative/logistic support
for CORDS. Each agency would make the same contributions in funds and per-
sonnel, with the same support arrangements, as they had prior to May.
At the beginning of June, Ambassador Komer traveled to each of the four
corps headquarters to lay out the new organization to the U.S. commanders and
their staffs. In general there was little resistance to the provisions of
the new CORDS directive, but he did feel it necessary to stress heavily that
the regional Deputy for CORDS supervised all U.S. support to pacification,
to include the Deputy Senior Advisor in activities affecting pacification.36
At each corps he left a list of recommended Province Senior Advisors.
In mid-June the three U.S. corps commanders submitted detailed plans
35. MACV Directive 10-12, op. cit,
36. Memorandum, Komer to Westmoreland, Subj.: DEPCORDS Trip to I-FFORCEV,
5 June 1967, SECRET (Grp. 4),
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for pacification organization in their respective areas.3 7 Each commander
made some modifications to the principles stated in the CORDS directive, the
most serious coming from General Stanley Larsen, the II Corps commander, who
recommended, in essence, a dual chain of command for the Province Senior
Advisor (for military matters it would run through the division advisory
teams and the corps Deputy Setior Advisor) and a rating scheme for province
advisors that directly involved the Deputy Senior Advisor.3 8 With these ex-
ceptions, which soon were rejected, they all adhered remarkably to the spirit,
and in the case of the U.S. Marine commander in I Corps the letter, of the
directive.
On June 25th, Komer asked Westmoreland to approve four changes in the
directive that would: let the corps Chief of Staff coordinate the efforts
of the pacification and military staffs, set up the basic organization for
all the corps, create an Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS in the U.S.
Army's headquarters to replace the section that had handled civil affairs
and civic action, and designate the former OCO Deputy Regional Director as
Assistant Deputy for CORDS, rather than Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS,
37. Memorandum, LTG Stanley R. Larsen to Komer, Subj.: CORDS Organiza-
tion for I FFORDEV, 13 June 1967, with attached Memorandum Larsen
to Westmoreland, Subj.: Integration of OCO/RDS Activities Within
II Corps Tactical Zone, 12 June 1967, with 2 enclosures; Letter,
Commanding General of III Marine Amphibious Force to Westmoreland,
Subj.: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
Organization and Functions, submission of, 17 June 1967, with 2
enclosures; and Letter, MG Frederick C. Weyand to Westmoreland,
Subj.: Reorganization for Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support (CORDS) within III Corps Tactical Zone, 15 June
1967, with 9 enclosures.
38. Ibid., Larsen memorandum to Komer.
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to emphasize his operational as well as his staff responsibilities. 3 9 He
asked also for permission to disapprove some of the Senior Advisors' pro-
posals as "inconsistent" with the CORDS directive. General Westmoreland
concurred, and Komer sent out the implementing instructions to the Senior
Advisors the next day.4 0 Thus the corps organization for pacification was
standardized. As with the decision on the anti-Viet Cong infrastructure
effort (see below) and the MACV staff arrangements for CORDS, General West-
moreland backed his new deputy at a critical juncture with a critical ele-
ment in the chain of command. The principles of the CORDS directive were
not to be watered down, and thus he sent a signal, albeit one that would need
reinforcing later, to all subordinate echelons.
Despite this however, the MACV commander kept a wary eye on his new
subordinate. After the IV Corps visit in early June, Komer had told West-
moreland that his "next major step will be to review and approve the organi-
zations in each of the" corps. 41 Westmoreland replied tersely: "I will
approve (corps) organizational arrangements."42
39. Memorandum, Komer to Westmoreland, Subj.: Organization for CORDS in
CTZs, 25 June 1967. This memorandum originally had three tabs on corps
recommended organizations, changes to the CORDS directive, and changes
to the corps proposals -- none of which can be located. Most of the
substance of the tabs can be gleaned from the memorandum and from the
messages sent the next day by Komer to the four Corps Senior Advisors.
40. Message, COMUSMACV 21013 to CG, III MAF, 261242Z June 1967, Subj.:
CORDS Organization for I CTZ; Message, COMUSMACV 21014 to CG, II
FFORCEV, 261243Z June 1967, Subj.: CORDS Organization for III CTZ;
Message, COMUSMACV 21015 to CG, I FFORCEV, 261244Z June 1967, Subj.:
CORDS Organization for I FFORCEV; and Message, COMUSMACV 21016 to
Senior Advisor, IV CTZ, 261245Z June 1967, Subm.: CORDS Organization
for IV Corps.
41. Memorandum, Komer to Westmoreland, Subj.: DEPCORDS Visit to IV Corps,
7 June 1967, SECRET (Grp. 4).
42. Ibid. See the COMUSMACV routing slip of 8 June 1967 to Komer that is
attached to this memorandum. The slip is UNCLASSIFIED.
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Though Westmoreland let Komer devise the corps arrangements for
pacification and supported him over the Corp Senior Advisors, several months
were needed to establish firmly the working relationships. Komer wished to
control all pacification matters, referring only the most important to General
Westmoreland and wanted to accustom the Corps Senior Advisors to working di-
rectly with him rather than Westmoreland.4 3 He felt it was important to set
an example on this point for the entire organization.
As of mid-August, there were still problems:
My ability to contribute..,is as yet hampered by the
fact that my role and relationship vis-a-vis subordi-
nate and coordinate echelons is not adequately de-
fined. Nor am I sure as yet that I have your own
full trust and confidence, which I have had from all
my previous superiors but which I recognize takes
time.44
Again the issue was that at times General Westmoreland, the MACV staff, or
the Corps Senior Advisors were bypassing the pacification chief. Komer
wanted Westmoreland to tell the Senior Advisors, the U.S, Army Vietnam staff,
the MACV staff, and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff to come to him first
on "all pacification business," relying on him to refer major issues to his
commander.4 5 In retrospect Komer took a mellowed view of this issue:
Westmoreland was not used to having an active deputy.
The corps commanders or staff would come to him and
discuss several issues, one of which would be paci-
fication oriented. Then Westmoreland would give 46
guidance and I would not hear about it until later.
43. Note, Komer to Westmoreland, 24 June 1967.
44. Letter, Komer to Westmoreland, 11 August 1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
45. Ibid.
46. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 30 March 1972.
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In time this difficulty was ironed out by the combination of Komer's
assertiveness and Westmoreland's growing trust. Actually, Komer began to
exercise responsibilities that belonged to the Corps Senior Advisors. CORDS
developed a semi-independent chain of command. The Senior Advisors were oc-
cupied with the large-unit war and delegated most pacification business to
their own Deputy for CORDS. Most of CORDS operational affairs went through
the unwritten Komer (or MACCORDS) -- corps DEPCORDS -- province team channel,
though certain issues such as money and manpower (especially if they con-
cerned personnel or materials not already under CORDS control) had to be
dealt with through the Corps Senior Advisors.
Basically the corps commanders left us alone. In
practice the pacification business was run autono-
mously. This had a great deal to do with the suc-
cess of the organization.4 7
The CORDS organization for IV Corps is best treated as a separate case.
This region had far fewer U.S. troops, and the only major U.S. ground force
stationed in the Delta, parts of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division, were under
the operational control of the American III Corps commander, On the other
hand, the Delta area had not only the largest advisory effort but also the
largest civilian advisory effort. It was the one corps where Komer and
Westmoreland gave serious consideration to naming a civilian as the Senior
Advisor and not merely the Deputy for CORDS.
In May Komer proposed Mr. Barry Zorthian, then the head of JUSPAO, as
47. Ibid.
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Senior Advisor, and Westmoreland agreed wholeheartedly.4 8 To the surprise of
both Zorthian turned down the job, and the idea of a civilian Senior Advisor
fell through because it was difficult to find another civilian with the req-
uisite experience, rank, and acceptability to the military. John Vann, the
III Corps DEPCORDS who could have handled the job, was ruled out for the lat-
ter reason though much later in the war he did serve as the first and only
civilian Corps Senior Advisor under MACV, but then in II Corps.4 9
The organization in IV Corps was different from the other corps in that
here the corps command channels devolved in only two broad lines: the ARVN
and the pacification advisory efforts. The Senior Advisor was given an extra
month to revise his organization, and the resulting structure and principles
adhered to the general guidance as laid down in the CORDS directive.50 (See
Chart VI-5.)
Thus Komer and Westmoreland established the organization of CORDS which
remained unchanged, except for minor alterations, during the next five years.
The remainder of this chapter continues the tale of managerial and orga-
nizational development but mixes it with some discussion of the field programs
48. Memorandum, Colonel Montague to Komer, Subj.: Early Decisions/Actions,
13 May 1967, and Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 15 June 1972.
There is almost no documentary evidence on this proposal. Komer says it
was all handled verbally.
49. In July Komer, who wanted to emphasize IV Corps because of its pacifica-
tion importance, even suggested General Bruce Palmer to be the senior
American there, but Westmoreland kept Palmer on as his overall Army
commander. -- Memorandum, Komer to Westmoreland, 9 July 1967, SECRET
(Grp. 4).
50. Message, COMUSMACV 21016 to Senior Advisor, IV Corps, 261245Z June 1967,
Subj.: CORDS Organization for IV Corps, CONFIDENTIAL, (Grp. 4).
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Chart VI-5. U.S. ADVISORY OF&ANIZATION IN IV CORPS AFTER THE FORMATION OF
CORDS, JULY 1967
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themselves and CORDS effect on the Vietnamese Government. Implementation of
the President's decision was not merely the mechanics of setting up the new
organization and publishing directives. What followed Westmoreland's direc-
tive was as important to implementing the decision of President Johnson as
establishing the organization itself. If CORDS had not become a successful
bureaucracy, its survival would have been doubtful. Even the most ingenious
organization charts could not have saved CORDS if it had not been aggressive
and innovative or if it had not demonstrated its own competence and ability
to get results from the Vietnamese it advised and supported -- this latter
point being the fundamental motivation for the President's action.
As it is not the intention of this dissertation, I wish to avoid a
lengthy defense of CORDS, its programs, or their effect on the Vietnamese
and the war despite any personal impressions that I might entertain. But,
one cannot escape a crucial factor in implementation which was the perception
(a word that cannot be stressed too heavily in this instance), by those
within the.government who could pass judgment on the new organization, of
its success and that of its programs. This perception of success was vital.
Unlike the case of OCO, the President sat back and let CORDS develop.
CORDS was in place as a functioning element in far less than the ninety days
allotted OCO, but affecting the Vietnamese and the war's progress itself were
more difficult problems and results in these areas came slowly over the next
several years.
As mentioned earlier, Washington influence on pacification dropped off
perceptibly after CORDS was established. For one, the President did not
allow Ambassador Leonhart the same influence that his predecessor had en-
joyed, and after the 1968 TET offensive Johnson's interest in pacification
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waned. In addition, Komer fell victim to what one might call the "man-in-
the-field" syndrome:
... I didn't want them telling me how to run something
which over a year I thought I had learned how to run.5 1
He adopted what he called the "Westmoreland" view: "we're the field com-
manders; give us the resources; we'll do the job. 52 Regardless of whether
he did know better than Washington, it is interesting that he showed much
the same resentment towards Washington agencies and officials that Taylor,
Lodge, and Westmoreland had shown before him. The phenomenon appears and
reappears throughout this narrative and its preparatory researches; indeed,
it seems to be universal -- field managers intensely dislike Washington in-
volvement in their business.
Komer did however take pains to keep his Washington fences mended, and
to make sure that those in Washington who counted understood what he had
done. Not only did he personally brief Secretary McNamara during his July
visit on the new CORDS organization and its plans, but he rode back to Wash-
ington with him to make sure that his viewpoint would be heard, especially
against some of the civilian agencies that had resisted the formation of
CORDS. He also made sure to see the President.
An important source of Komer's strength was the implicit recognition
that he was the President's man. He could, for example, on his return trips
to Washington see the President immediately -- a fact that conferred great
bureaucratic power. Though Komer never used this source of strength himself,
51. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 7 November 1969.
52. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
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his previous position and perceived closeness to the President still existed
as a definite reality. This was however a mixed blessing, for the permanent
power position of CORDS depended more on its field relationships than on far-
away Presidential ties. Unless the survival of the new organization or its
policies was at stake, too much Presidential help would have been a hindrance.
This was one more facet of the decline or at least eclipse of Washington in-
fluence. Komer, though not wishing to dispense completely with his White
House aura, moved to become an integral part of the Mission and Westmoreland's
headquarters. Not only was this a boon to his own working relationships with
General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker, but it helped CORDS itself sur-
vive the later changes in leadership, especially the exit of Lyndon Johnson.
One major problem that needed resolution was CORDS relations with the
Agency for International Development. The new pacification organization
scarcely was established before AID attempted to whittle it down and retrieve
some of its own programs. Though AID's monetary contributions were far
smaller than those of the Department of Defense, the Agency did not want to
fund programs not under its own control. Citing a confusion in AID's role
in Vietnam, William Gaud, the Administrator, proposed to Under Secretary of
State Nicholas Katzenbach that the CORDS program be more narrowly defined
with AID removed from Congressional accountability for activities that had
been transferred to MACV.53 Police advisory activities in particular should
return to AID's purview.
53. Memorandum, William Gaud to Katzenbach, Subj.: Responsibility and
Accountability for U.S. Support of Revolutionary Development/Pacifica-
tion for Vietnam, 22 June 1967, OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
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Here was a clear attempt by one agency, reacting in terms of its own
organizational imperatives, to subvert the President's decision. Komer sent
off a sharp response to Gaud observing that he was discouraged that AID should
raise questions of bureaucratic and Congressional difficulties.54 Pacifica-
tion could not, he said, be sliced to fit agency jurisdictional and budgetary
alignments in Washington, a division that had plagued past efforts. He also
noted that CORDS had merely taken over AID's OCO programs and no more, so
why should objections now be raised. Had Gaud been successful in this move,
the result would have been a military pacification program with civil/military
separation rampant again. McNamara, Bunker, and Komer firmly resisted this,
and AID was left with the same accountability and managerial responsibility
for pacification programs now under CORDS as it had had before Gaud's at-
tempt.55 In practice, CORDS and MACV had field (outside Saigon) responsi-
bility and accountability for pacification programs that formerly had been
under USAID in Saigon.5 6
AID never accepted relations with CORDS as settled. Funding and ac-
countability continued to concern its directors.57 Komer had problems try-
ing to get the Agency to correspond directly with CORDS on pacification
business and not go first through the Saigon USAID office.58 But in general
54. Letter, Komer to Gaud, 30 June 1967, SECRET.
55. This matter was handled entirely below the level of the President --
Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 April 1975.
56. Draft Memorandum, author unknown but an AID/Washington official, Subj.:
Division of Responsibility Between USAID and CORDS and Between AID and
DOD, 11 August 1967.
57. Memorandum, James P. Grant to Gaud, Subj.; Background for Your Meeting
with Ambassador Bunker on Thursday, November 16 at 9:30 a.m., 15 Novem-
ber 1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
58. Letter, Komer to James P. Grant, 11 December 1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
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the relations did work, and AID did support CORDS.
Pacification cut across separate agency and bureaucratic lines. If
General Abrams as a deputy covered a wider field of staff responsibilities
within MACV, Komer made up for it by ranging in and out of other agencies
business, even commenting on and involving himself in intelligence and AID
issues that were not strictly within the purview of pacification. General
Westmoreland, though always wanting it understood who was in command, al-
lowed his pacification deputy a remarkable freedom of action. The personal
flexibility of Westmoreland, combined with Komer's ability to capitalize on
it through the absence of an intervening command layer, permitted the Deputy
for CORDS to run an unusual, innovative program within what otherwise might
have been the overly strict confines of a military staff. Komer has acknowl-
edged Westmoreland's importance in this regard:
... the way (Westmoreland) handled the thing was one
of the basic reasons why CORDS worked. I think
Westmoreland deserves a great deal of the credit
for the decentralization.,delegation of pacification
management, and the support he gave after I got out
there, on every issue that did not involve taking
something away in the way of forces. 5 9
Reporting channels demonstrate the flexibility of CORDS operation. For
Komer the new job meant a readjustment from the heady days of complete access
to the President. On the day of Komer's arrival in Vietnam, General Westmore-
land told him firmly that he would not compromise on his reporting to anyone
else, which Komer fully agreed to. 6 0 Komer assured him that he was not serv-
ing two masters. 61 Ambassador Bunker in his opening press conference cited a
59. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
60. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, 33 May 1967, TOP SECRET.
61. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
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single reporting channel to him on pacification as one of the benefits of
the new organization.
In reality the situation was more intricate. Bunker indicated as much
when he went on at his press conference to say that he personally would stay
abreast of pacification developments and meet often with the MACV commander
and his pacification deputy.62 The placing of Komer on the Mission Council
and even more importantly on its "Executive Committee" assured that pacifica-
tion views to the rest of the Mission and in particular its chief would come
directly from the man operationally responsible and not be filtered through
a third person. This preserved a formal channel to Bunker.
Komer however sought more than formal channels. In March he had
stressed to the President that he should have "free access to Bunker (who
insists on it)., 63 The direct channel to Bunker was not set down by direc-
tive, but General Westmoreland and the Ambassador agreed to it. 6 4 In prac-
tice, especially as time went on and the General and his Deputy became more
used to each other, Komer's access to Bunker became a natural occurrence.
This channel not only kept an interested Ambassador intimately informed, it
also immeasurably eased the transaction of daily business by increasing
flexibility, and it gave Komer and the pacification program advantages when
dealing with other U.S. agencies in Saigon or Washington. He had two points
at which he could apply pressure on an issue.
62. Statement by Ambassador Bunker at Press Conference, Saigon, 11 May
1967.
63. Memorandum, Komer to President, Subj.: Shift of Pacification Responsi-
bility, 27 March 1967, SECRET.
64. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 30 March 1972.
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Communications with Washington were another matter. McNamara made it
clear that Komer was expected to work through normal channels, and Komer
himself knew that he would soon become unacceptable to the Ambassador and
General Westmoreland if he went over their heads and dealt directly with the
Secretary of Defense or the President.65 Yet, paradoxically, an important
source of his strength, especially in 1967 as he formed CORDS, was the gen-
eral feeling that he was "LyndQn's boy" and that he had a direct line to the
White House.
While the President wanted him to communicate directly, Komer became
increasingly reluctant to do so as he feared jeopardizing his close personal
relationships with Westmoreland and Bunker. During his first months in Viet-
nam, he did communicate with the President and Walt Rostow, but in nearly
every instance this was done with obvious reluctance and only in reply to
White House initiatives or at the Ambassador's behest. These communications,
moreover were in the main answers to queries for his personal views on various
non-pacification subjects. In all, what could have become a serious problem
was resolved by the new Deputy's forebearance and his chiefs' growing trust
and flexibility. After October this type of communication appears to have
dropped off completely. Meanwhile the power position of Komer and CORDS and
his relationship with General Westmoreland had stabilized with Komer fully
managing pacification. Following the 1968 TET Offensive, Washington interest
in pacification fell sharply, reducing even further any occasion for this
65. Message, OSD/SECRET 7253, 022144Z September 1967, SECRET.
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type of communication. 6 6 What happened is a good example of the adjustments
that must be made and have to be taken into account when the President sends
one of his assistants, a man accustomed to direct contact with the highest
level, to a field position where operational officials stand between him
and his former chief.
Technical and staff channels on strict pacification and personnel mat-
ters remained open to Washington agencies, Ambassador Leonhart's White House
pacification office, and field elements below Saigon with, for the most part,
none or only. the most routine perusal and clearing by the formal intervening
command echelons. On pacification matters Westmoreland and Bunker allowed
Komer and CORDS to use State Department, AID, and CIA communications chan-
nels.
One of CORDS great strengths was the close contact through formal and
informal reporting and communications mechanisms that parts of the CORDS
structure had with each other. This was a two-way flow, from the district
advisors to Mr. Komer and the reverse. Members of CORDS command frequently
visited the field, and key field officials, such as the Province Senior
Advisors, would talk with Mr. Komer or his closest assistants if they came
though Saigon.
CORDS headquarters also maintained an office of U.S. and Vietnamese
evaluators who made lengthy trips to the field. They acted as an extra-
bureaucratic intelligence source on the situation and the success or failure
of pacification programs in the countryside. They were encouraged to dig
66. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 30 March 1972.
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for and report freely on problem areas. While these reports, and indeed
this whole evaluation operation, frequently raised the hackles of subordi-
nate commanders and CORDS officials, Komer and his successor, William Colby,
protected and expanded this office.
On pacification matters Komer and the CORDS staff communicated directly
and indirectly with all levels of the Vietnamese Government including the
President, Vice President, and Prime Minister. Though this communication
occurred from CORDS inception, it increased dramatically following the 1968
TET Offensive when CORDS assisted in the nationwide recovery effort. These
contacts and working relationships that it developed with the Vietnamese
Government were a fundamental wellspring of CORDS strength as an organiza-
tion. Not only did this enhance CORDS' ability to get results from the
Vietnamese but it gave CORDS a strength and a usefulness within the Mission
that other elements did not possess. No other agency or office during the
entire American involvement possessed such regular, active, and working re-
lationships with the Vietnamese at all administrative levels from Saigon to
the district. What is more, this contact had a continuity that went beyond
any one personality, a welcome change from a problem that so often plagued
the U.S. advisory efforts in Vietnam.
I have dwelt at length on these aspects of communications as they are
indicative of what must be termed an unusual flexibility within a well-
established bureaucratic structure, Credit belongs not only with those in
pacification who pushed it but equally with those who permitted it, often
despite resistance and opposition in their own staffs.
One of CORDS' great strengths was that its leaders went out aggressively
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to bring under its purview programs of vital importance to pacification
which heretofore had been the province of other agencies and in at least two
cases had been languishing with token or low-priority attention. They de-
serve special emphasis here.
The first program was advising and supporting South Vietnamese local
troops, the Regional and Popular Forces. In the early 1960's advisory re-
sponsibility had been transferred from AID to MAAG, but since then it had
always taken a back seat to the more conventional and glamorous advisory work
with the ARVN regular forces, Because of ARVN reluctance and inability to
support pacification on a sustained and systematic basis, pacification clearly
needed its own security forces. Komer recognized that these local forces
represented an enormous and under-utilized source of manpower for security
of the rural population. He felt that it was better to take these assets,
already in existence and organized on a local, territorial basis, and improve
and expand them rather than to attempt a long, slow build-up of RD cadre and
police to accomplish the same end.
The MACV staff, perhaps because it wished to let someone else tackle a
difficult and flagging task, offered no resistance to moving the advisory
effort for these forces from MACV's operations office to CORDS. The transfer
was accomplished effortlessly. After this was done, CORDS set up a large
advisory and monitoring system for the local forces,
No single organizational maneuver of Komer's was more important to the
eventual course of pacification. Bureaucratically, this strengthened CORDS
as an organization, more than doubling its complement of advisors, but far
more important it gave CORDS leverage with the Vietnamese and resources to
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build up the indispensible security component of the Vietnamese Government's
pacification program. This security component soon became larger than the
regular army. By its very responsibilities this greatly increased CORDS
independence, legitimate areas of interest, and Vietnamese officials whom it
could influence. This move on the U.S. side also enabled CORDS to press for
a corresponding reemphasis and reorganization on the Vietnamese side which
was accomplished in late 1967 when General Thang, the Minister of Revolution-
ary Development, was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Joint
General Staff and put in charge of the Regional/Popular Forces and pacifica-
tion. Komer thus had a clear opposite in the Vietnamese military chain of
command, and the first step had been taken towards unifying the pacification
effort on the Vietnamese side. This provided a welcome contrast with an
unsuccessful attempt in 1966 by General Thang with the full support of Komer
and Porter to do the opposite -- take the Regional/Popular Forces out of the
Army's command and put them under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development.
The second advisory program was the Intelligence Coordination and Ex-
ploitation (ICEX) Program which later became the Vietnamese Government's
Phoenix, or Phung Hoang, Program. Komer devised it as an attempt to get the
Americans and the Vietnamese to focus on a vital, but hitherto neglected,
element of the Viet Cong -- its political/military command and administrative
cadre. Such a program had long been regarded as essential to the defeat of
the Viet Cong. As we have seen, pacification theorists from the days of the
French onward regarded this as crucial. All U.S. and GVN agencies agreed to
its importance, but existing efforts were diffuse, uncoordinated, and unequal
to the task. Even MACV agreed with the need to centralize the effort that
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was falling between the efforts of several U.S. and GVN agencies.
Komer felt that the CIA knew more about this problem than MACV, whose
main interest was order-of-battle intelligence, and wanted the new advisory
effort to be under CIA leadership but subject to his close, personal super-
vision as an integral part of CORDS. This meant the creation of a new
organization within MACV and one that would have a CIA man as its operating
chief and be competitive with MACV's own intelligence office in an area
(intelligence) in which throughout U.S. history civilians and the military
have often disagreed. To make matters even more difficult, the new office,
with its CIA leadership in key positions, would control an advisory program
whose members would be overwhelmingly military in numbers. It should come as
no surprise that the MACV intelligence office wanted to head this new effort
themselves and strenuously resisted Komer's proposal.
At a crucial meeting in July 1967 General Westmoreland overruled the
MACV staff in Komer's favor. Komer felt that this was what really put CORDS
"in business":
...we had a session in Westy's office, with myself and
all the generals.
They had all sorts of objections to Phoenix...The
Chief of Staff, representing the staff with all the
other generals nodding their heads wisely, said;
"The idea of attacking the infrastructure makes
sense, but this scheme you have which calls for a com-
bined, civil/military effort, bringing CIA expertise
onto the scene and having a civilian director under
you, and you're chairman of the board of the Phoenix
corporation, and all that sort of thing..."...all these
nice gimmicks that we had put in there, the staff just
thought that was terrible. You couldn't spare the
people; the military shouldn't participate, but at the
same time J-2 should run it. It should be run as a
regular military operation. But after they had gotten
through with these limp explanations, Westy turned to
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me and said: "Bob, what do you think about these
criticisms?" Well, I held forth for about ten
minutes, and if I may say so myself, I absolutely
destroyed them. First of all, they didn't know
anything about the problem, whereas I'd been work-
ing on it for eight or nine months, and they had
tried their best to throw some monkey wrenches
into the works.
I'll say this for Westmoreland, he turned to
the Chief of Staff, in the presence of all the
generals and said: "The Ambassador is right...I
think we ought to do it his way." And that was
it. They all filed out, and from that time on my
power position was solid...And I remember psycho-
logically marking that as the time when Westy made
it clear that when I had a good case, he was on my
side.67
Not only did CORDS gain a new program, new responsibilities, and new
areas of bureaucratic purview, but Westmoreland sent an unmistakable signal
to the rest of his command -- pacification had the commander's full support,
and it would be a force not easily controlled by the MACV staff. From the
point of view of bureaucratic innovation, the result was interesting too.
With organizational repertoires and interests stacked against it, few would
have given Komer's proposal the slightest chance of adoption. Yet Westmore-
land backed it against the recommendations of the rest of his staff, proving
not only his personal flexibility and adaptiveness but the importance of
personality against organizational determinism. Finally, the anti-infrastruc-
ture advisory program was a microcosm of the larger CORDS organization -- the
intermingling of military and civilian advisors with the military being more
numerous but the civilians holding important directing positions. One of
the most disunified American programs was welded into a genuine civil/military
67. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
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effort. As in the case of the division advisors and the local forces, the
U.S. reorganization was able to push a similar one on the Vietnamese side,
CORDS also at key points in the war managed and created programs that
increased its responsibilities and reputation, within the U.S. Government
at least, for competence. When the 1968 TET Offensive hit South Vietnam
with its hammer blows, Bunker and Westmoreland asked CORDS to take the lead
in a nationwide recovery effort that not only dealt with problems no other
U.S. agency was able to handle but in the process developed for the organiza-
tion an intimate working rapport with the Vietnamese Government. CORDS also
conceived, planned, and then stage-managed a major GVN pacification offensive
in late 1968 to take advantage of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese weakness
following upon their own 1968 attacks. This organizational aggressiveness
was a key factor in CORDS' ability to survive and prosper, particularly once
high-level Washington interest had waned. CORDS grew not only big and power-
ful but useful at the same time. Both these programs were among CORDS' most
successful, and they illustrate the delayed nature of the payoff from the
May reorganization. Though this payoff was not immediately apparent to many
in the first months of CORDS, when a national emergency struck or a strategic
opportunity presented itself, the United States was able to react with a
functioning, unified organization closely tied to and able to influence all
levels of the Vietnamese Government. In both of these also, the experiences
gained in the programs themselves cemented relations between CORDS and its
Vietnamese counterparts.
Throughout this dissertation I have stressed the dissatisfaction that
many observers and U.S. officials felt with the lack of unity of the U.S.
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effort for pacification. The situation was no better, if not worse, on the
Vietnamese side. By early 1967 the Vietnamese military, the Ministry of
Revolutionary Development, and numerous civilian ministries, such as those
dealing with health, education, and police, were all involved in pacifica-
tion. Each possessed chains of officials stretching down into the provinces,
and no one was giving a pacification focus or unity to their undertakings.
The situation was complicated by bureaucratic heritages and political prob-
lems that made the U.S. side seem simple by comparison. Countless American
officials were aware of these complications but could accomplish little ex-
cept in the case of the creation of the Ministry of Rural Construction
(later Revolutionary Development) in 1965 which pulled together the pacifica-
tion, but not the ministerial, cadre programs. An explicit rationale behind
the CORDS decision was that this move on the American side would encourage
the Vietnamese Government to bring unity to their own pacification program.
From the outset Komer set out to accomplish this, but it was a long, slow
road to travel. The aforementioned movement of General Thang, the Minister
of Revolutionary Development, to the Joint General Staff, was one step in
this direction. Conspicuously disunified sub-programs, such as the anti-
infrastructure efforts, were his targets also. But the real key to unity on
the Vietnamese side, he felt, was to engage the Vietnamese Government at its
highest levels directly in pacification, to lift the effort from the purview
of any group of ministries and create a national pacification council with
the President as its chief and run directly by the Prime Minister. Komer
began this effort, and William Colby kept pushing it until he was rewarded
with success in 1969 when President Thieu established the Central Pacification
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and Development Council.
A vital element in the viability of this change was the full-time
working staff that was set up to serve the Council. Under a Vietnamese
general68 this staff actually managed the pacification program, so much so
that the Americans began to fade into the background -- part of the original
intent of the U.S. advocacy for the Council. A wish that had been but words
in the months of a succession of American officials for many years finally
became reality.
CORDS was remarkable for the degree to which disparate U.S. Government
agencies were welded into a functioning civil/military organization. Komer
had stressed the need for this since 1966; pacification, he felt, was neither
civil nor military but civil/military.69 When CORDS was set up, terms such
as "non-military actions" or the "other war" left the official vocabulary.
The military did contribute much more of the manpower and resources, but most
of the key policy-making and directive positions were held by civilians.
This, combined with the aggressiveness of the civilian leadership, did much
to allay the fears of civilians that the May decision meant that they would
be swallowed up and smothered by the military. After several months of
working together the distinctions between military and civilians began to
break down. For the civilians CORDS was an invaluable managerial and opera-
tional experience of the type few of them had been exposed to before. Both
civilians and the military gained a better understanding of each other.
68. General Cao Hai Hon.
69. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 April 1975.
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Because CORDS was not a fully institutionalized bureaucratic structure
with career patterns, promotional loyalty, and lengthy terms of service, and
because most officials would return to their original agencies, the basic
personal orientations were still toward these agencies. The leaders of
CORDS did however go out of their way to see that service with CORDS was
treated by the agencies promotion boards with the same respect as that given
functions normally felt to be the essence of each contributing bureaucracy.
What is most.important is that in operations in Vietnam the members of this
new bureaucracy began to identify more with pacification than with the tradi-
tional roles of their parent agencies - this despite the fact most planned
to return to traditional jobs in these agencies.
Many civilians feared that with CORDS they had been captured by the
military. Just as strong a case can be made that the reverse happened. In
terms of sheer material resources pacification had direct access to such
items as military engineers for construction and road building, military
transport, and the far larger funding sources that the Department of Defense
possessed. One has but to observe funding trends to see what this meant for
pacification. Bearing in mind that much of the Defense Department contribu-
tion went for assistance and support to the Regional and Popular Forces
which accounts for most of the phenomenal disparity in contributions even
in FY 1967, the military share steadily increased. And yet the following
percentages by no means reflect the relative weights of military or civilian
policy influence:
DOD AID 63
FY 1967 81% 19%
FY 1968 87% 13%
FY 1969 93% 7%
FY 1970 94% 5% 70
Between FY 1968 and FY 1970 AID's contribution declined from $70 million to
$41 million while DOD's share jumped from $485 million to $729 million.7 1
By consolidating the effort in 1967, the President and Komer obtained for
pacification a vast increase in funds under one manager.
It is more difficult to assess to what extent the formation of CORDS
affected military policies, emphasis, and attention. In May President
Johnson was not just making an organizational change. He wanted action on
pacification and from the military as well as the civilians. From the fore-
going, the strength of CORDS within MACV should be obvious. Furthermore, by
having a powerful, institutionalized advocate, with outside ties, inside the
headquarters, pacification began to influence military operations and policy
in a way that it had never been able to do when it was the province of sepa-
rate and sometimes hostile agencies and when the military were not held di-
rectly responsible.
This is not to say that pacification supplanted military operations.
Numerous examples can be found long after 1968 to show that the military
often continued to do exactly what they knew best with no heed for the con-
sequences to pacification or the Vietnamese, But military actions did have
70. CORDS Fact Sheet Prepared for Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing in February 1970.
71. CORDS Briefing Paper, Subj.: Trends in Pacification Funding --
1968-1970,' 4 May 1970.
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to take pacification into account, and more often than not these actions
began to be shaped and influenced by pacification considerations. It is
instructive in this regard to look at the MACV planning guidance for senior
commanders. It underwent some rapid changes. The directive issued in May
1967, just prior to the formation of CORDS, heavily emphasized main-force,
offensive operations. 7 2 In it pacification was treated last in discussions
of the situation, and support for pacification was the seventh of seven ob-
jectives. By the end of October the same directive said that the key to the
overall concept is "sustained territorial security for pacification."
Pacification now was discussed second under "situation," and it became
"objectives" numbers numbers two and three, ahead even of "invade enemy base
areas" which had long been a favorite of the U.S. Army. The joint U.S./GVN
combined campaign plans reflect this same trend.
When a series of extraneous factors, the 1968 TET Offensive and the
gradual U.S. withdrawal for example, began to alter the war, CORDS was on
hand with a program to fit these changes. CORDS also was institutionally
adaptable enough to change in 1970 and 1971 to an emphasis on development
rather than security, an adaptation of the type which AID found impossible
to achieve during the entire war.
Looking back over the implementation of the President's decision, one
must stress that it was remarkably successful, far more so than any official
72. HQS. MACV, Planning Directive 5-67, Subj.: Planning Guidance for
Senior Commanders for the Period 1 May 67 - 31 October 67, 3 May 1967,
CONFIDENTIAL (Grp. 4).
73. HQS. MACV, Planning Directive 9-67, Subj.: Planning Guidance for
Senior Commanders for the Period 1 Nov 67 - 30 Apr 68, 29 October 1967,
CONFIDENTIAL (Grp. 4).
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in Washington, including the President, could have hoped in May 1967. The
fact that the President does not appear again in this tale of organization
is an indicator of how well his wishes were carried out. CORDS worked well
enough and built up enough momentum to last until the 1973 Cease Fire des-
pite shoals of bureaucratic vicissitudes, a growing lack of civilian agency
backing, and a complete change of the original personalities.
This change of personalities is perhaps the most interesting, for as
much credit belongs to the individuals as to the organization they created.
Komer's working relationship with Westmoreland became closer and more re-
laxed, but Westmoreland returned home to be Army Chief of Staff in May 1968.
General Abrams replaced him, and immediately a cold wind blew on his pacifi-
cation deputy:
I'm also afraid that our semi-public arguments about
pacification in the presence of our subordinates are
giving them the impression we're seriously at odds.
I can even sense a decline in staff responsiveness.
Nor are the Corps Commanders, DEPCORDS, or PSAs going
to be as responsive to me if the word gets around
that you think they ought to have a great deal more
leeway. One quite senior officer even told a senior
officer of mine recently to "remember what suit you
wear."74
This change affected particularly the free-wheeling operational style of
Komer and his organization, though not pacification itself which Abrams sup-
ported as fully as his predecessor. Washington's attention to pacification
waned severely after the shock of the 1968 TET Offensive, and this was a
subtle signal that Komer's power was not quite what it had been. When
74. Letter, Komer to Abrams, 28 July 1968.
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Clark Clifford visited Vietnam in July 1968, Komer found that he had little
interest in pacification.75 By the end of September his frustration had
grown to the point that he accepted the President's offer to become Ambassa-
dor to Turkey and left Vietnam a month later.
With President Johnson's departure from office shortly thereafter, CORDS
was on its own and had to live by its efforts alone. Komer had hand-picked
William Colby as his potential successor and brought him out to be trained
on the ground.76 From early 1968 Colby served as Assistant Chief of Staff
for CORDS, so the transition went smoothly. Colby was by nature a different
personality from Komer and stuck more closely within the boundaries of paci-
fication. If Abrams reduced the independence of CORDS, he did not stifle
it. In a sense, each man was right for his period -- Komer to establish the
system and Colby to keep it running in a changed situation. CORDS was as-
sisted by the fact that as U.S. forces withdrew pacification became a larger
and larger component of the total American effort. The new administration
kept it going because, along with Vietnamization, pacification provided the
alternative to U.S. troop involvement.
CORDS was a large-scale organization, a sharp departure from the smaller
efforts of the past. It was however in tune with what the war and the U.S.
response had become by 1967. Rather than to plead for tidbits of manpower,
resources, and attention from the military war, CORDS, in essence, became a
better bureaucracy, acquiring power by aggressive innovation and force of
personalities. It got resources and attention from the U.S. military by the
75. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 30 March 1972.
76. Personal Interview with Ambassador Komer, 6 November 1969.
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only way possible -- working from within as part of the structure. It was
not revolutionary, but it was flexible and innovative as new organizations
often are. CORDS was less bound by the constraints of the more established
agencies. It was not afraid to take on new responsibilities, and it was
adaptable. Most important, it was an organization with one purpose -- paci-
fication. It did not dilute its efforts by other major tasks. Lastly, in
the implementation of President Johnson's decision, one must stress again
the role of personalities. Without Komer and some of his key assistants
there is a good chance that CORDS would have failed. Ambassador Bunker's
influence was important too. He not only strongly supported and backed
CORDS and pacification, but he also did not interfere in the conduct of its
operations or its contacts with even the highest levels of the Vietnamese
Government. General Westmoreland, more organizationally flexible than his
successor, was vital. He accepted, at times tolerated, and almost always
supported this unusual, quasi-independent organization and gave it the neces-
sary freedom to operate.
Chapter VII 2468
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has focused on the President for two reasons. First,
he is a key protagonist in the bureaucratic politics paradigm and the main
source of contention over its validity. Second, in the events related in
this study, he was the agent of change, the sole actor able to force reso-
lution of the organizational and managerial impasse among the agencies of
the government below him.
What lessons can be drawn from the evolution of U.S. organization and
management of its pacification advice and support program? Four immediately
come to mind: the importance of active Presidential interest and involve-
ment, the key role of the individual in making and carrying out governmental
decisions, the rejection of bureaucratic/organizational determinism, and the
possibility of change in even the most complex and difficult bureaucratic
situations. The emphasis of these four conclusions is on how to make the
government work despite bureaucratic politics and organizational response.
Before discussing these in detail, it is worth emphasizing that when
this evolution is examined chronologically, two significant decision thresh-
olds appear -- 1961 and 1966. The former was a critical year. President
Kennedy made decisions on U.S. organization for Vietnam that set the pattern
for the rest of the war, although at the time Vietnam was not at the center
of the government's attention and few realized the significance of these
decisions. Rather than have a small task force tied directly to the White
House or a single director to unify U.S. operations, he retained the
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traditional agency system and set up a conventional military command. These
decisions were not accomplished with great dispatch or out of any open Presi-
dential preference, but they had profound and lasting implications for Ameri-
can war management. No one agency or individual in either Washington or
Vietnam was given overall authority. With the Ambassador's power circum-
scribed by bureaucratic resistance or personal inclination, each agency per-
severed in its own approach to the war, and, because of their size and ag-
gressiveness, the military preserved and increased their domination of opera-
tions and operational emphasis. The lack of organization and clear political
management helped to ensure that a political approach to conducting the war
would remain secondary.
The second key year was 1966. With the United States now massively
involved and Vietnam consuming more of the government's attention than any
other issue, President Johnson became actively interested in pacification
and set out to improve the U.S. and Vietnamese efforts. He established the
White House pacification office and began the steps that led directly to
CORDS and later to parallel GVN organization and management changes.
Despite their separation by time, the decisions of 1961 helped to con-
dition those made in 1966. In a sense, the President was a prisoner of the
system set up in 1961 in much the same way that one administration is locked
into the on-going weapons systems generated by its predecessors. The al-
ternatives presented to Johnson in 1966 were moulded by the existing
1. Graham Allison and Frederic Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control:
Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," Daedalus, Summer
1975, pp. 99-129.
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structure of quasi-independent agencies and their powers. The CORDS
decision recognized bureaucratic realities and the strengths and weaknesses
of the respective agencies and was tailored to fit them.
Between 1961 and 1966 many complaints about the inadequacy of U.S.
organization reached the President. Yet until he acted, until his prefer-
ence was established, little happened. Officials in the bureaucracies, even
some White House Special Assistants, sought solutions, but without the uni-
fying force of the President and without a special office close to him con-
tinually pursuing the issue, they remained fragmented. Finally, when Presi-
dent Johnson did decide to place pacification under the military, he had to
manipulate the resisting bureaucracies and reluctant subordinate officials.
He was, however, able to follow through on his preference and see to this
major managerial innovation that in one way or another went against the
organizational grain of every agency involved.
The "Introduction" asked why it took the U.S. Government so long to
produce a remedy for managing the U.S. role in the pacification program.
American leaders up to and including the President were aware of the pro-
gram's deficiencies, and nearly all of them gave at least lip service to
the importance of pacification in their public declarations. Yet, for six
years little happened and the program was allowed to drift between the orbits
of different agencies. A bureaucratic politics interpretation might answer
that the President was enmeshed in a web of bureaucracy, unable to force
compliance with his wishes, trading off inaction in this area for compliance
in another.
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The answer is both in the bureaucracies and the President. On the
bureaucratic level the participants were incapable of resolving the impasse
over organization between their agencies and incapable of arriving at and
then implementing a solution. At this level, the years were replete with
struggles and solutions that failed for pacification management. There was
little forceful or sustained input from the President, Each agency saw the
war and U.S. strategy in terms of its own organizational procedures. While
pacification involved every agency, none of them saw it as their central mis-
sion in Vietnam. Although most officials realized the need for more unity,
left to themselves, they could not transform intentions into outcomes. The
resulting disunity is a perfect illustration of Allison's "organization pro-
cess" model,2 and the record is replete with instances of organizations and
officials behaving exactly as Allison and Halperin predicted they would. 3
Furthermore, possible attempts at unity ran against a strong but unwritten
U.S. government principle that civilian and military agencies dislike tread-
ing into each other's business. With the President only involved peripher-
ally and his attention turned elsewhere, bureaucratic conflict and bargain-
ing were the dominant state of action. While successive U.S. Ambassadors
can be rightly faulted for not bringing more forceful leadership to bear or
achieving more unity, they, too, faced formidable problems since each agency
could appeal Mission decisions back to its Washington constituency. Even
2. See Introduction, p. 10.
3. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm
and Some Policy Implications," World Politics, Vol. 24 (Spring 1972),
pp. 40-80.
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Ambassador Taylor probably would have had to appeal for Presidential
assistance if he had really tried to centralize U.S. operations and strategy
or pacification management in Vietnam despite his strong letter of authority.
Thus at the agency level below the President the actors were unable to
reach a solution on organization. This should be no surprise. Though the
military/Defense Department were far stronger as organizations with far
greater resources, the civilians, whose strength in Vietnam grew proportion-
ately, were aided by their agencies' power in the U.S. Government and by the
fact that the top civilian leadership saw pacification as a predominantly
civilian program and did not want to cloak the entire U.S. effort in Vietnam
in military garb. The bureaucracies' strengths, though not equal, were bal-
anced enough so that, unless one of them succeeded in winning the President
to its side or unless the President intervened forcefully on his own, no
resolution was possible.
The President was the key actor, for he resolved this impasse. What
emerges is not the picture of roi fain&ant but rather a lack of Presidential
focus on the problem. Neither Johnson nor Kennedy perceived organization and
management as having the importance they have received in hindsight. This is
not to heap blame on either, for a President cannot and should not attend to
every detail in government. The failure was first of all the fault of those
who served the President. This said, why did the President not intervene
and resolve the problem?
President Kennedy in 1961 exhibited no clear thread of preference, al-
though he did not discourage the gradual swing of power to the military/
Defense position late in the year. He was presented with a variety of
2 7
alternatives but there is no indication that he preferred any one of them.
Organizational structure did not occupy his mind; he seems to have been far
more concerned with people and performance than with the precise forms orga-
nization should take. He may have recognized that problems existed but not
seen any better solution than to continue with an expanded agency system,
letting more and more power devolve into the hands of subordinates whom he
trusted such as Secretary McNamara. Secretary Rusk, to the distress of some
of his subordinates, also figured in by backing away from Vietnam and permitting
McNamara to assume gradually the leading role in Vietnam. Combined with Presi-
dent Kennedy's growing trust and confidence in the Secretary of Defense, Rusk's
attitude helped to determine why the managerial system grew as it did, and
this system, left without strong outside regulation, evolved exactly as could
be expected.
No one agency or actor would ever be permitted to be in complete command;
yet, because of personalities, size, aggressiveness, and willingness to act
(even if the action was wrong), the Defense Department and the military took
the leading role. As power became more entrenched in the largest bureaucracy,
it not only determined the overall U.S. strategy and resource allocation for
the war, but it also made the military the logical candidate and the pre-
eminent contender for pacification support responsibility as the issue came
to resolution in 1966 and 1967.
This lack of Presidential preference was extremely important. One can-
not make a case for the omnipotence or inevitability of the bureaucratic
4. Letter, Roswell Gilpatric to the author, 27 May 1975, and Personal
Interview with McGeorge Bundy, 17 July 1975.
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politics/organizational process models if the President did not express
himself with any force on the issue or pursue with any vigor the wishes he
occasionally expressed. Also, Kennedy's actions were understandable. Beset
with problems then far more important than Vietnam, it was not illogical that
he would overlook U.S. management and organization in Vietnam and leave the
details to his subordinates.
President Johnson continued this same lack of clear preference until
1966, although he occasionally toyed with ideas of U.S. military government
in Vietnam.5 While aware of the management problem in the U.S. Mission, he
does not seem to have focused on it until 1966. When he voiced a preference
or when he was presented with reports on U.S. disorganization by his closest
aides, he did not follow them up. Why did he not take a more active role?
One reason may be found in the gradualism inherent in the U.S. approach
to the Vietnam War. The size of the U.S. effort crept up slowly enough so
that the separate agency system was strained but not broken apart. Closely
tied to this was the abundance of resources available to each agency and the
government. Since all could have more, it was easy for the Administration
to put off decisions on organization and centralization that would have
meant stepping on bureaucratic toes. Before 1966, the costs of waste and
the advantages of major organizational change did not seem to warrant dis-
rupting the normal processes of government.
Allied to this indirectly were considerations of domestic politics.
In a war where the leaders were unsure of public support, reluctance to
5. Personal Interview with McGeorge Bundy, 17 July 1975.
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interfere severely in the bureaucracies and create a probable outcry from
their allies in Congress may have played a role. Furthermore, both adminis-
trations were most unwilling to paint the conflict as a full-scale war.
Major bureaucratic reorganization would have signaled visibly to Congress
.6
and the public more gravity than they cared to exhibit.
Psychologically, Johnson perhaps wanted to avoid facing the reality of
war. His style of governing may have been influential also. Apparently
obsessed with secrecy, Johnson seemed bent on keeping tight personal control
over the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.8 Thus, the only powerful office deal-
ing with Vietnam to supervise other agencies, Komer's Special Assistant of-
fice, was set up in the White House and run by an aide always directly and
closely responsible to Johnson himself.
Another reason for the lack of focus on pacification organization and
management was that pacification was perceived as the GVN's business rather
than as a job Americans could or should do. This government-wide outlook
delayed the coming of the moment when the U.S. Government and the President
would see pacification advice and support as worthy of the investment of
attention and resources that it required.
Finally, the time frame affected Presidential perception. Until 1965
Vietnam was not a major consumer of his and the government's attention.
6. Closely related to this view is Gelb's assertion that each President did
what he construed to be the minimum necessary action for passing on the
burden of Vietnam. See Leslie Gelb, "Vietnam: the System Worked",
Foreign Policy, No. 3 (Summer 1971), pp. 140-167.
7. This view is elaborated by Chester Cooper. See Chester Cooper, The Lost
Crusade (New York: Dodd, Head & Co., 1970), p. 413.
8. Ibid., pp. 412-417.
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Only after the United States' involvement reached a massive scale did
organizational and management problems begin to be addressed with real
urgency.
These reasons, however, all lead to the basic factor -- perception. To
see these events in terms of perception is in accord with John Steinbruner's
hypothesis of "uncommitted thinking." There was only a slow dawning in the
President's mind of the need for a true reorganization in addition to a change
of personalities. Since true Presidential pressure had to be exerted to free
pacification from its organizational and managerial morass, the perception of
the urgency of need, which would then lead to committed thinking, was the key
element in explaining the changes of 1966. From this perception flowed the
steps that lead to CORDS. Because Johnson does not appear to have perceived
the need in forceful enough terms, he did not want to upset the agencies or
interfere with his Ambassadors and how they ran the Mission. Both Lodge and
Taylor were politically strong, the former especially so because he was a
Republican serving in a Democratic war. The President felt that he needed
them there at that time and was reluctant to force them on an issue such as
organization. This is not an argument in favor of a bureaucratic politics
interpretation of events, for in 1966 and 1967 when he realized the need and
importance of reorganization, he was willing to override the civilian agen-
cies and even some within the military. He prodded Lodge openly and even-
tually had him leave Vietnam. This was done at a time when the President
9. John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 128-131.
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was daily faced with growing criticism and when his perceived political
needs should have been greater.
In covering the period of 1966-1968, this dissertation addressed a
different question. Once the President perceived the need for reorganization
and better management, how did he go about achieving it?
The real jolt of Presidential interest in pacification came with the
Honolulu Conference in February 1966 after the first flush of attention to
the military war diminished and criticism of the war effort began to mount
slowly at home. This interest naturally gravitated toward the U.S. advisory
organization since that was the one area amenable to early repair because
the United States did not have to work through the Vietnamese. Organization
was also a subject that Americans were most at home with.
The bureaucracies and officials below the President furthered this in-
terest by their own recognition pf the urgency of the problem of organiza-
tion. Nearly every key actor but Ambassador Lodge admitted that something
had to be done, and their estimates reached the President through several
sources,. Yet for all their interest, they were by no means agreed on a
solution.
President Johnson's appointment of Porter in February 1966 ran closely
in tune with the recommendations of the Warrenton Conference -- a bureau-
cratic consensus. Komer's White House assignment in March reflected the
forceful urging McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, both of whom realized that such
an office had to be located in the White House and that it had to have di-
rective and supervisory powers.
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The contrast between the results of these two changes is instructive.
Porter did not see organization and management as important issues but chose
to continue operating within the prevailing agency system, challenging neither
his immediate boss nor the bureaucracies he was supposed to oversee. Komer,
on the other hand, viewed institutional change as essential to the success
of pacification and that became the focus of his efforts. Close to the
President and attuned to his needs, the White House pacification office pro-
vided the force and impetus in U.S, advice and support over the next year.
It forcefully pushed government agencies in Washington and the Mission in
Saigon. The office codified three organizational alternatives for U.S.
pacification support in the field, presented them to the President, and
began the process of moving the subordinate agencies. One cannot overesti-
mate the importance of having an advocate sitting next to the President,
tied directly to him, and perceived by the Chief Executive as his personal
instrument. The presence of an aggressive agent for change turned a persis-
tent magnifying glass on the problem and gave the Chief Executive a specific
solution.
While Johnson decided on the overall form of reorganization in September
of 1966, he still moved carefully. Ambassadorial and civilian agency opposi-
tion ran high. Rather than directly implement the change, he manipulated
the resistance and defused any possible Congressional criticism by giving
the civilians another chance (OCO) while deliberately setting an impossible
deadline of three months in which to achieve results, When the final
10. Letter, Ambassador Komer to the author, 13 August 1975.
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decision came, opposition was muted and chastened.
That the implementation of the decision to give pacification to the
military worked so well was due to four factors. First were the personalities
of those who carried it out. If Bunker and Komer had behaved like their
predecessors, the new organization would either have ground to a halt or have
been submerged and lost in the enormous military headquarters' machine. That
would have violated the President's wish to make pacification a civil/military
effort and not one or the other. Yet, if.Westmoreland had been rigid and
inflexible, the civilians would have departed from the organization or been
forced often to throw issues up to the President. Instead, because of a
fortuitous combination of personalities, organizational problems never once
returned to the President's level. Although one can question the success of
the pacification program, it is hard to fault the implementation of Johnson's
decision from his point of view -- it was carried out exactly as he wished
and it left him free to turn to other concerns.
The second factor affecting implementation was the open injection of
Presidential interest. By choosing one of his Special Assistants and placing
the Washington pacification office in the White House instead of the State
Department, Johnson made his own involvement clear. The active, aggressive
role he permitted Komer to play is another indication of his interest. If
he had not desired this, the "Blowtorch" would have been quickly extinguished.
This interest contrasts greatly with that he had for the SIG/IRG (NSAM 341)
system set up the same month and which he scarcely used. The lack of
11. William I. Bacchus, "Obstacles to Reform in Foreign Affairs: the Case
of NSAM 341," ORBIS, XVIII, 1 (Spring 1974).
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Presidential interest was also a major reason for the withering of the
White House pacification office after CORDS was set up. The force of per-
ceived Presidential interest carried through to the actual CORDS operation
in Vietnam. While Komer may have felt constrained in using his White House
connections once in the field, their mere existence added substantially to
his position in the Mission.
The fact that the decision took into account bureaucratic strengths and
the realities of each agency's capabilities was a third and most complex
factor. The CORDS decision was generally in concert with what the largest
and most powerful bureaucracy, the Department of Defense, wanted. What would
have been the result if President Johnson had turned all of pacification
management over to civilians with strong directive powers over pacification
programs, including those of the military? Who can gauge Westmoreland's
reaction if over half of his field advisors and their Saigon staffs had been
torn away and strong civilians, both willing and able to interfere in de-
tailed military business, had been placed above him? Would the military
have sabotaged implementation by non-compliance, foot-dragging, or appealing
back to their Washington base of support with its strong roots in Congress?
The President might have chosen such a course, but enforcing compliance
would have sorely taxed his energies.
These points raise the question of whether Johnson indeed avoided the
real test of Presidential power by not taking the military on. Yet while
we cannot know for certain what went through the President's mind as he de-
cided to give pacification support responsibility to the military, there is
little doubt that he chose the most bureaucratically feasible solution, and
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that it was constructed in such a manner as to end up providing an
extraordinary and subtle degree of control over the military. This is a
key point. Giving formal responsibility meant that the military had to
perform; yet placing a strong civilian as the operational deputy meant that
the officers could not just run off in the direction that their service
affiliations and inclinations would have let them, Far more than the civil-
ians, it was the military who were eventually co-opted, and there is no doubt
that they underestimated the effect that Komer and CORDS would have upon
them. The result was the capture of enormous military personnel and funding
resources and the ability to influence military operational emphasis from
within. Thus, the structuring of the solution to take advantage of bureau-
cratic strengths and realities had much to do with its success.
In connection with this last point, it is interesting to observe how
much the CORDS decision was conditioned by existing structures and power
relationships. The war and the separate agencies had become behemoths;
Johnson did not have the extra-bureaucratic Lansdale alternative available
to him as did Kennedy; he had to work through the instruments available.
The weight of past accretions and on-going programs was such that by 1966
Komer's operational definition of pacification was determined by what pro-
grams were already underway for security, development, and winning popular
support.12 His concept of mass recognized exactly how the GVN and the
United States were fighting the war and which organizations had the power
and ability within this context. This conception and this view of reality
12. See Appendix II, p. 22.
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drew Komer and thence the President into the CORDS solution.
Finally, implementation succeeded because CORDS leaders, particularly
Komer and his two key assistants, John Vann and Colonel Montague, played
bureaucratic politics with great skill, following the same four bureaucratic
strategies that Sapolsky later identified in his study of the Polaris pro-
gram: differentiation, co-optation, moderation, and managerial innovation.1 3
They set out to give pacification identity and visibility, building morale
and concentrating on one mission only. They lured officers away from other
jobs, changing career patterns so that service with CORDS would count equally
as that with regular prestige branches. Offices were brought to CORDS from
other staff sections. Yet, they did not challenge the military directly in
certain key organizational roles and strategies such as the large-unit war
or the air war except when these had immediately deleterious effects of
pacification. CORDS, with a certain amount of bureaucratic rambunctiousness,
acted as part of the MACV headquarters and not as an office apart. By per-
ceived managerial innovation and competence, CORDS developed the reputation
for handling its own affairs, even shouldering other burdens where necessary,
and hence it was allowed relative freedom from much day-to-day oversight and
interference.
The history of the U.S. Government's attempts to organize for pacifica-
tion advice and support make possible a series of inferences about the role
of the President.
13. Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1972), chapter 2.
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The first is that the President must forcefully perceive the need for a
solution. Many issues never attain his level and are fought out and resolved
among the bureaucracies. This is a question of information which was not
usually the case with pacification management. But other issues are brought
before the President either as specific decisions to be made, such as the
options presented by the Gilpatric Task Force, or as more generalized infor-
mation on a problem without an exact resolution requested -- witness the
repeated complaints about US. organization from the Forrestal-Hilsman period
on. Often the President will express a wish, usually briefly, and then not
follow it up, or say nothing, storing the issue away and letting it die.
Decisions that entail political costs and risks usually get put off until
the President is persuaded that their urgency (1) overrides these costs and
risks and (2) merits his detailed involvement. Thus the real issue is com-
petition for the President's time, attention, and perceived political capital.
Bureaucratic politics does exist as a reality confronting the President and
every official beneath him. But when the President becomes involved, the
outcome is not foreordained on issues that he deems important. His percep-
tion, a variable, eliminates predictability and determinism.
The second is the importance of the President's choice of officials, a
major and underemphasized power of his office and a vehicle by which he can
manipulate the government beneath him. He can choose men who are responsive
to his wishes and needs. This is obviously true of his White House staff
and his Cabinet officials. He can also inject at least some of his choices
down into the operating bureaucracies as he did with Komer in 1967. Used
with forethought, this capability gives the President a measure of power
over the subordinate organizations.
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A third observation is that the President is rarely involved in
details. The most precious commodity in the U.S. Government is the Presi-
dent's time. Too many other issues are continually pressing at him from all
sides for him to take detailed interest in more than a few for very long.
This applies especially to implementation. It is on this phase of any ac-
tion that the President must either find the time to oversee results himself,
and such instances are extremely rare, or he must set up some mechanism to
follow up his decisions. This can be done through his White House staff over
a broad range of issues as Kennedy did, through specially responsive and
trusted cabinet officers, or through ad hoc delegations of power from the
President to officials or offices closely tied to him as Johnson did with
Komer in both 1966 and 1967. This lack of involvement means that many issues
will be re lved on the basis of bureaucratic politics, organizational re-
sponse, and lower-level compromise unless the President's personal staff
monitors events closely and brings Presidential influence of the threat of
his intervention to bear.
This last point brings one to another observation -- the importance of
Presidential Special Assistants. If they are aggressive and skillful at
their job, they can demonstrably inject the will of the President into the
workings of the bureaucracy. They are a major tool by which the Chief Execu-
tive can manipulate the rest of the Executive Branch. They can oversee im-
plementation. An able Special Assistant, with any Washington experience,
develops his own set of sympathetic sources in the bureaucracy. He does
not have to depend solely on conditioned reports from the agencies, none of
which are monoliths anyway. These Special Assistants can inform the Presi-
dent and then either get him to act or act for him, or they can go ahead,
speaking in the President's name and reflect what they perceive to be his
intention. This last practice is a daily fact of White House life; the
staff would grind to a halt waiting for the President's word if this were
not possible. But it is still a risky business, for at any moment a recal-
citrant cabinet officer may call the Special Assistant's bluff and take the
issue to the President if he feels strongly enough. So the successful Assis-
tant is one who can confidently reflect the President's views without forever
having to consult him. Fortunately, cabinet officials do not make it a reg-
ular practice to question the word of the President's staff, so its members
can often play a strong role in reaching decisions and overseeing their im-
plementation. Thus a President who wants to spread his power as widely as
possible in the Executive Branch will continually reinforce the impression
that these Assistants speak for him.
However, the officials he appoints to important posts throughout his
Administration can also be a major constraint on the President. He can di-
rectly control his own staff, but many cabinet and sub-cabinet officials are
chosen for political reasons that conflict with strict managerial competence
or total loyalty to the President. If they do not arrive with their own base
of support, many develop it on the job with the bureaucracy they come to
identify with. Nowhere is this problem illustrated more clearly than in two
of the President's choices for Ambassador to Vietnam -- Lodge and Taylor.
For various reasons, the President needed each far more than they needed
either their positions or the President. Until well into Lodge's second
tour, these reasons weighed heavily on the President's mind, and he continu-
ally backed off from a direct confrontation with either of them. Finally,
when Johnson was persuaded that the necessity for organizational change and
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a fresh Ambassador outweighed his original reasons for appointing Lodge,
he acted. But the length of time he took shows what a constraining factor
powerful subordinate officials can be, especially those with direct ties to
domestic politics.
In addition, the President, when dealing with subordinate officials,
faces a restraint common to the head of any large organization. Almost any
action that the President wants carried out must go through a subordinate
appointee to whom the President has supposedly entrusted his confidence.
Capable or influential people are not going to stay long in jobs where they
do not have some freedom of action and sense of responsibility. Too much
Presidential interference, whether by himself or his staff, will soon violate
this. This was most graphically shown in the resentment that the field
representatives in Saigon felt toward "Washington interference." It is
natural for those on the ground, seeing problems with daily immediacy, to
resent advice and direction from remote officials in Washington. This ten-
dency appears to be universal, and it is telling that Komer, who aggressively
prodded the Mission while in Washington, was quick to resist interference as
soon as he reached Saigon. While this resentment by field officials was
never directed at the President himself, it did fall on his appointed offi-
cials and sometimes even on those in the White House itself.
A key lesson from the U.S. experience with organization and management
for pacification has been the importance of the individual as opposed to
organizational or bureaucratic determinism. This is not to say of course
that organizational and bureaucratic factors are not constantly at work and
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do not affect many decisions. In a majority of instances one can look back
at an event and see their effects. But, the intervention of personality
makes prediction difficult if not impossible. Several examples prove this
point.
If he had followed the normal bureaucratic rules, Dean Rusk would have
zealously guarded the primacy of State over Defense in Vietnam. Not only did
he fail to assert State's leadership role as primus inter pares, but on sev-
eral occasions he was perfectly willing to let the Defense position prevail
against the wishes of his departmental subordinates. As much as any other
single factor, two Presidents let Defense have the pre-eminent role in Viet-
nam because of their confidence in Robert McNamara. The same department in
another's hands might not have produced the same result. Komer, whose orga-
nizational background was CIA and White House, hence civilian, recommended
and then actively pursued placing pacification under the military. Westmore-
land, on several key organizational and conceptual issues, went entirely
against what an organizational model would have led one to expect and over-
ruled his most senior staff in Komer's favor. Even General Peers, the Joint
Chiefs' top counterinsurgency staff officer, recommended at the Warrenton
Conference that all military advisors be placed under a civilian Deputy
Ambassador. In many cases officials will behave as their organizational
background or responsibilities would suggest. But others, whether simply
because they believe another solution is better or for reasons not related
to organizational influences or bureaucratic bargaining, will defy straight
predictability. Where one sits does not always determine where one stands.
Key bureaucratic actors will go against their organizational grain.
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Bureaucratic behavior is not consistent.14 Zeroing in on these
inconsistencies offers a way to accomplish change and centrally directed
action.
In another sense the importance of the individual is a constraint on
the applicability of the bureaucratic and organizational politics paradigms.
The calibre, character, and flexibility of the official appointed to a post
are key factors. Lodge and Taylor had the opportunity to unify the Mission
but neither chose to do so. Beyond question, Lodge's inability was due to
his own personality, not to any habitual State disinterest in administration;
William L. Sullivan, who ran a tight wartime Mission in Laos and who insisted
in controlling the massive air war, certainly did not show the effects of
State's well-remarked lack of stress on management or unwillingness to take
on the Defense Department. In his White House position and at CORDS, Komer
was critical to the ability of both officers to function as the President
intended. Merely operating out of the White House was also no guarantee of
success, witness the fate of the Special Group/Counterinsurgency or of the
White House pacification office after May 1967; nor was the mere stamp of
Presidential approval adequate as the Vietnam Coordinating Committee showed.
The organizational structures devised were important but only with the right
men to lead them. For this reason the history related in this dissertation
14. Thomas L. Hughes, "The Power- to Speak and the Power to Listen: Reflec-
tions on Bureaucratic Politics and Information Flows," Secrecy and
Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 21. Hughes came to this same con-
clusion in a detailed study of United States Intelligence Board inter-
actions over assessing the situation in Vietnam.
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is not just one of changing organizational structure but of overall
management -- an area where the individual is still the critical component.
At the opening of this final chapter I noted two conclusions which
hitherto I have not addressed directly. The first is a rejection of bureau-
cratic/organizational determinism and the second, closely tied to the first,
is the possibility of achieving change in even the most complex and difficult
bureaucratic situations. I have already observed how important Presidential
perception of the need for a decision or action is and how the individual
will again and again defy predictive modeling. If however one rejects deter-
minism or inevitability and accepts that the President is not necessarily a
prisoner of the bureaucracies, a slave to organizational repertoires, or
even a co-equal bargainer, then from there the analyst must search for how
the President can achieve change or decide on an action and have it carried
out as he intends. Though the CORDS decision was taken in an unusual wartime
situation, it still offers valid insights.
All observers of government behavior note how often actual outcomes
differ from those intended by policy decisions, but in the CORDS case this
was not true. I have shown already that success for the President in the
CORDS decision and its implementation depended on a fortuitous combination
of perceived and real Presidential interest and the individual characters of
the actors involved. It is also important to see that the decision was
tailored to fit organizational capabilities and repertoires. These capabil-
ities and repertoires to a large extent do set the parameters of choice in
any decision. This certainly was true of the three alternatives Komer
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presented in August 1966; indeed, his advocacy for the CORDS solution was
based on his assessment of capabilities. For him the determining factor was
which organizations were effective in translating pacification decisions into
effective action, and both he and the President realized the Department of
Defense to be superior in this respect. Yet Komer constructed the organiza-
tion itself with both eyes open to the constraining effects of each agency's
standard operating procedures, especially those of the military. By digging
into the personnel and resources of several agencies, he was able to avoid
accepting any bureaucracy's repertoire as an unchangeable given. Thus one
saw civilians as managers, military intermingled with civilians, increased
civilian influence on the conduct of military operations, CIA officers
operating overtly, and the changing of promotion policies (a sacred organiza-
tional prerogative) to reflect equal emphasis given to service with CORDS.
This was one of the reasons that CORDS prospered. It took roles and capabil-
ities into account but was not stultified by them.
Another route out of the theoretical impasse between the President and
the bureaucracies he is supposed to control can be found in the action rela-
tionship between the President and the bureaucracies. Most supporters of
the paradigm see persuasion and bargaining as the dominant methods of Presi-
dential control of decisions. Persuasion is of course the preferred course
in human relationships and bargaining a fact of government life though it
characterizes better the relationship between the bureaucracies themselves
or between the President and groups outside the Executive Branch.
Bargaining does not explain either the years of inaction or the CORDS
decision. There is no evidence from the experience with pacification
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management to prove that bargaining was a major factor between the President
and the bureaucracies, though it was a constant practice among the bureau-
cracies themselves on the second, separate level of action. The competition
was really for the President's mind, his attention, his decision. Walt
Rostow's view of the President as "weighing in one man s mind the conflict-
ing interests, imperatives, priorities, and allocation of resources" appears
to hold true in the reaching of this decision,15 but after the President made
up his mind in September 1966, a different process was at work. Here there
was a direct adversary relationship between the Chief Executive and the
civilian bureaucracies. If outwardly he appeared to be bargaining with the
agencies, manipulation was really the form of action.
The CORDS decision was not truly a case of multiple advocacy once the
President had made up his mind in September 1966. The advocacy was.a sham
and merely a means for bringing the agencies on board with as little disrup-
tion and resentment as possible. Komer and McNamara had won from the start.
In setting up CORDS President Johnson wanted not just organizational order
but better management to achieve visible progress in pacification itself.
To attain these two ends he manipulated every agency involved, even the
military, with varying degrees of subtlety. He was not persuading them.
He and his staff were guiding them to achieve his policy ends. The civilians
were given an opportunity to "hang" themselves which they promptly did, and
the military were given direct responsibility and a civilian they could not
easily control. Few officials appear to have realized what was happening
15. Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972),
p. 364.
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even though it was but lightly masked. Admittedly, such a strategy took
time and was dependent on key personalities. But, the fact that it occurred
at all shows its utility. While it places a higher premium of bureaucratic
skill on the President and his staff, this does not at all preclude its
viability as a method of conducting government business. This is not a
claim to have discovered the wheel. Manipulation of the bureaucracies and
officials is not new; it just has not received enough attention in recent
years by those who are seeking a new approach to understanding how the U.S.
Government functions. Manipulation should certainly be given the same at-
tention as bargaining. It offers a positive approach to action and change.
The history of U.S. organization for pacification advice and support
in Vietnam is both depressing and enlightening...depressing in that it took
so many years for the U.S. Government to arrive at a satisfactory solution
that integrated its effort and enlightening in that despite all the difficul-
ties change was possible. In analyzing the CORDS decision, I have not sought
to overturn the bureaucratic and organizational politics paradigms. Much of
what they offer is valid and certainly is important to understanding govern-
ment decisions. They explain, even if they do not predict, many decisions;
all observers would agree that policymakers should be aware of them. Yet
these models need broadening, to emphasize the possibility of change more,
and to reject a paralyzing determinism.
While the study of bureaucratic politics should enhance one's apprecia-
tion of the complexities of decision-making in the Executive Branch and the
difficulties of ensuring proper implementation, it also should not lead to
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absolving leaders from personal responsibility nor be an excuse for inaction
or abdication to the standard procedures of organizations and bureaucratic
interests. These are not easy to overcome, but they are also not immutable,
as the CORDS decision showed. President Johnson succeeded where most would
have believed the task impossible. With close attention to bureaucratic
realities and organizational capabilities, careful choice of officials, and
active Presidential interest, the CORDS experience need not be unusual.
These paradigms must now go beyond describing the problems and complexities
and search for solutions and similar case studies where change has been
achieved. CORDS is but one such example.
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Appendix I
TERMS AND ACRONYMS1
Agency for International Development
Army of the Republic of Vietnam -- the regular Vietnamese
army, not local forces
see 'main force war"
The South Vietnamese Government's program to attract,
re-educate, and resettle Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
deserters
Central Intelligence Agency
Commander-in-Chief Pacific -- the U.S. overall commander
in the Pacific, stationed in Hawaii
Counterinsurgency Plan (1960)
village and district-based Vietnamese local defense
forces, known from 1964 on as Regional Forces. Some-
times known merely as "CG".
Commander, United States Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam -- the overall U.S. military commander in
Vietnam from 1962 on
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
a military and administrative division of South Vietnam
headed by a Vietnamese Lieutenant General. It came
between the national government in Saigon and the
provincial governments. There were four corps areas
in Vietnam. This was not a traditional Vietnamese
administrative division; it came in when the Americans
took over the advisory effort from the French in 1954.
The U.S. senior advisor to the Vietnamese corps commander.
With the exception of one civilian late in the war, this
was always a U.S. military man. After 1965 he was usu-
ally of three-star rank and was also the commander of
all U.S. military forces in the particular corps area.
1. Some appear only in the footnotes.
CTZ
DCM
DEPCORDS
Deputy Senior
Advisor
district
DOD
DSA
Field Force
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Corps Tactical Zone -- another name for corps
Deputy Chief of Mission -- the Ambassador's deputy,
after 1964 known as the Deputy Ambassador
Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support -- the formal title of the U.S. military com-
mander's deputy for pacification. This term was also
used to refer to the U.S. corps commander's deputy for
pacification.
a U.S. military position at corps level. This officer
was the U.S. corps commander's deputy in charge of all
advice to the Vietnamese forces in the corps, excluding
those assigned to pacification after 1967,
a Vietnamese governmental and administrative unit roughly
equivalent to an American county
Department of Defense
District Senior Advisor -- the senior U.S. advisor in
each Vietnamese district usually a U.S. military major
but occasionally a civilian. This precise term came in
after CORDS was set up in May 1967.
a U.S. military term for a corps in Vietnam. I Field
Force was the Vietnamese 2d corps; II Field Force was
the Vietnamese 3d corps. Sometimes this was abbreviated
as FFORCEV.
Government of the Republic of Vietnam
International Security Affairs - an office of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense headed by an Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense. This was a major policy planning
office under Secretaries McNamara and Clifford.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint General Staff -- the Vietnamese Armed Forces High
Command
Joint United States Public Affairs Office
Military Assistance Advisory Group sometimes known also
USMAAG
GVN
ISA
JCS
JGS
JUSPAO
MAAG
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MACCORDS Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support -- the MACV staff
section in charge of pacification after May 1967
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - sometimes also
known as USMACV. This was the U.S. military headquarters
and command in Vietnam after early 1962. Often it was
used to denote the entire U.S. military advisory chain
down to the districts.
main force war This was the war of battalions, regiments, and divisions
often fighting only each other. In many instances each
side's local and paramilitary forces would fight against
main force elements however, but generally this refers
to the conventional, regular military war of large units.
NLD New Life Development -- an amalgamation of the USAID
field programs that were managed by CORDS after 1967.
Health and education are examples.
NSAM National Security Action Memorandum -- These were the
most important final decision, action documents of the
White House during the Presidencies of Kennedy and
Johnson.
NSC National Security Council
OCB Operations Control Board -- the branch of President
Eisenhower's National Security Council that oversaw
implementation of decisions.
OCO Office of Civil Operations -- the office in the U.S.
Embassy that unified civilian pacification advice and
support from November 1966 to May 1967.
OPB Operations Planning Board -- the branch of President
Eisenhower's National Security Council that oversaw
planning.
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense -- staff offices in
the Department of Defense working directly for the
Secretary of Defense, as opposed to the service staffs
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PF Popular Forces -- local village and hamlet defense
forces in Vietnam usually drawn from the immediate
area in which they served. Prior to 1964 they were
called the Self Defense Corps.
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province a Vietnamese governmental and administrative unit
roughly equivalent to am American state
PSA Province Senior Advisor -- the senior U.S. advisor in
each Vietnamese province. This precise term came in
after CORDS was set up in May 1967. These positions
were divided roughly in half between U.S, civilians
and military.
Public Safety the formal name given to USAID's police advisory program
in Vietnam
RC Rural Construction -- a substitute term for pacification
used in 1965, See text.
RD Revolutionary Development -- a substitute term for
pacification used in 1966 and 1967. It also referred
specifically to the program of teams of government
pacification cadres that were sent out to work in the
hamlets and villages.
RDSD Revolutionary Development Support Directorate -- the
staff section in MACV Headquarters that handled pacifica-
tion from November 1966 to May 1967
RF Regional Forces -- local district defense forces usually
drawn from the areas in which they served. Prior to
1964 they were called the Civil Guard.
region the U.S. and Vietnamese civilian equivalent of the
military corps areas. They were identical.
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SACSA Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
sector the military term for province
Self Defense Corps see PF or Popular Forces
sub-sector the military term for district
TRIM Training Relations Instruction Mission -- the joint
U,S./French training mission for the Vietnamese military
forces from 1954-1956
USAID the Agency for International Development's field mission
in Saigon
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USIS United States Information Service -- the field operating
arm in Vietnam of the United States Information Agency
USOM United States Operations Mission -- the field operating
arm of the Agency for International Development in
Vietnam. After 1965 this same office was known as
USAID.
USVNR United States-Vietnam Relations -- this was the formal
title of what was later known as the Pentagon Papers.
It is used extensively in the footnotes of this dis-
sertation.
VNCC Vietnam Coordinating Committee
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Appendix II
WHAT IS PACIFICATION?
Pacification is difficult to define precisely. As a term in the
English language one can date it back at least to the 15th Century; as a
technique of warfare, it is as old as man's political organization. The
Oxford English Dictionary says that it means "to reduce to peaceful submis-
sion, to establish peace and tranquility in a country or district." This
is pacification in its broadest sense, and this meaning is what generally
comes to mind when one thinks of the word, but it is only the base for the
more refined definitions discussed below.
Pacification -- to make peace. Peace, but whose peace? To some it is
but another name for repression and subjugation. Just after World War II,
George Orwell said, with much truth:
... political language has to consist largely of
euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy
vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded
from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the
countryside, the cattle machinegunned, the huts
are set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is
called pacification.2
Hitler, Stalin, and even some Americans used and conceived pacification as
brutal suppression. For many today this is what the mind conjures up when
one hears of pacification in Vietnam. Despite the fact that all of Orwell's
images came true many times over in Vietnam, pacification, as a concept and
as a program of the French and Americans, was not that aspect of the struggle.
1. Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), VII, p. 361.
2. George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language," in A Collection of
Essays (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1954), pp. 166-167.
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I will not attempt to present a personal definition. It is more
instructive for this dissertation to see what the actual practitioners and
policymakers considered pacification to be. Examining also the place of
pacification as a program in the overall struggle should assist in compre-
hending the term. Definitions and perceptions are one prism; the reality of
what belonged to pacification in terms of organization and operational empha-
sis is quite another. Since the actual organizational responsibilities have
been discussed in the dissertation, they are treated only generally here.
There has never been exact agreement on just what pacification was.
To different actors at different periods in the French and American involve-
ment pacification had varied meanings. Yet while it has been a fluid term,
one still can see certain concepts appearing and reappearing with regularity
over the years:
the combination of force and politics;
gaining popular allegiance -- winning "hearts and
minds";
bringing peace and order to the countryside;
control of the population;
the spread of organized central government -- an
administrative connotation;
nation building or national political/economic/
social development;
an extended civil/military process;
a specific operation, usually military, to gain
control;
active self-involvement of the population against
the insurgents;
security of the population as its most important
element.
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That list could easily be extended, and some or all of the above were
in everyone's definition of pacification. The problem in meaning lies, of
course, in how one combines them and which elements deserve priority and
emphasis. For example, subordination to the view of the necessity of popular
allegiance would mean restrictions on the conduct of military operations. An
overemphasis on security often means that security becomes an end in itself.
If control is primary, then political reforms and popular support can get
lost.
The following definitions, all three by persons at one time or another
officially connected with pacification, show how widespread the umbrella of
pacification has been:
... pacification refers to a comprehensive government
effort to bring law, order, and effective administra-
tion to the countryside. It may involve multiple
social and political activities that could culminate
in revolutionary change in the rural areas, leading
to improved living conditions and increased self-
government. It is a complex process which requires
various civilian and military resources of the coun-
terinsurgent government to be applied in a carefully
coordinated sequence. 3
... "pacification" denotes an array and combination
of action programs designed to extend the presence
and influence of the central government and to re-
duce the presence and influence of those who threaten
the survival of the government through propaganda,
terror, and subversion. The pacification process
incorporates a mix of programs and activities that
may vary in composition and relative emphasis from
time to time and from place to place...the program
mix comprises two broad types of activities. They
are designed, on the one hand, to establish and
maintain a significant degree of physical security
3. William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (New York:
Praeger, 1968), p. 1.
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for the population and, on the other, to increase
the communication and ties between the government
and the people through a variety of selected non-
military programs,4
Although security is its primary element, pacifica-
tion is a complex process that by no means should
be equated simply with destruction of an enemy.
Pacification... advances more rapidly with the re-
duction of the enemy's capability to disrupt the
government and society of the Republic of Vietnam,
but its goal is a healthy, viable community. Paci-
fication aims at reducing hostility toward the GVN
through a spectrum of programs which strike both
at hostile elements and the roots of that hostility.5
Sir Robert Thompson who since the British success in Malaya has come to
be viewed as the foremost exponent of pacification said that pacification was:
an offensive campaign designed to restore the
government's authority by a sustained advance in
accordance with national priority areas and, at
the same time, to protect the individual against
a selective reprisal attack so that he can safely
play his part within the community, in cooperation
with the government, against the Viet Cong.6
Thompson here has stressed two key elements: pacification as offensive not
defensive and the vital importance of eliminating the grip of the insurgent's
clandestine infrastructure on the population. He saw military operations as
defensive -- a perimeter for pacification which he called offensive since it
struck at the insurgent's real strength, his base among the population.
4. Chester Cooper, et al., An Overview of Pacification, Vol. I of The
American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Report R-185
(Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972), p. 1.
5. MACCORDS Briefing prepared for Admiral John McCain, mid-1969, CONFI-
DENTIAL.
6. Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New York: David McKay Co.,
1969), p. 151.
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Pacification has been a term that officials, despite Orwell, have often
tried to avoid. It was seen as having brutal and colonialist connotations.
For this reason the process on occasion has been given cosmetic labels such
as "national security action," "rural construction," and "revolutionary
development." Yet try as they might, both Americans and Vietnamese kept
coming back to the word pacification. If it was felt to be unsatisfactory,
no other term described the process better.
Finally, as this chapter progresses, the reader should observe how many
times pacification was divided into civil and military elements, It was not
often that pacification was seen as a civil/military process. This dichotomy
was a persistent one and reflected the organizational split between the
civilians and the military. The lack of organizational unity ensured this
conceptual divergence which in reality meant an operational one as well.
Pacification as a modern term began with the French in the 19th and
early 20th Centuries. Its two greatest proponents were veterans of France's
colonial wars in Tonkin, Madagascar, and North Africa, Marshal Hubert Lyautey
and General Joseph Gallieni. Lyautey saw military cooperation not as a
conventional operation with columns searching for organized resistance but
as governmental organization on the march, spreading out from a central core
(the famous "tache d'huile" or "oil spot") in a series of coordinated civil/
military actions. One of his key principles was that the occupier always
must judge military operations and the method of conquest by their future
7. Jean Gottman, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French
Colonial Warfare," Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Meade Earle
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 234-259. This is
an excellent introduction. General Gallieni was the same man who in
1914 helped save Paris with troops brought to the front in the city's
taxicabs.
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effect on the area being conquered:
A colonial expedition should always be under the
command of the chief appointed to be the first
administrator of the country after its conquest...
If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the
market that he will establish there on the morrow,
one does not take it in the ordinary way.8
His chief at the time the then-Colonel Gallieni, stressed that the best
method for pacification was the "combined application of force and politics."
Political action was of consummate importance; he was adamant in his dislike
for destructive military operations, For him pacification was not mere sub-
rogation and a terrorized population. It was a sweeping process of political,
economic, and social organization with military measures to be used if neces-
sary but always bearing in mind the future administration of the country
rather than speed or ease of military conquest. He saw the French solider
not as an occupier but as a politico-economic administrator. Pacification
was meant to be attractive rather than repressive.
The French returned to Indochina after World War II with this heritage
of successful pacification precepts. Now however they faced a full-blown
political/military nationalist insurgency. At first pacification meant
"hammering into submission,"9 reconquering their lost colony from a nation-
alistic movement already in place, In 1946 however, the French set out to
8. Ibid., p. 243.
9. Lawrence J. Legere, "Pacification Lessons Learned by the French in
Indochina, 1945-1954" (unpublished paper originally prepared for the
Institute for Defense Analyses now in the files of the Center of
Military History, 22 July 1971), p. 10. This is the only work that
pulls together the literature in French pacification during this
period. It is most useful and instructive,
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pacify Indochina in earnest, incorporating the lessons of Gallieni and
Lyautey. One French general after the war stated the results of pacification
as follows:
For a province to be considered pacified, it is
necessary for the authority of the legal government
to manifest itself by the restoration of normal
political institutions, for the clearing of the
area to have been conducted by the people them-
selves, and, finally, for the centers of popula-
tion to have organized self-defense units.1 0
Note that pacification here is not mere administration or control but active
self-involvement by the local population. This reflects the existence of
continuing threats to security from outside the local area and from internal
politico-military forces -- problems that plagued pacification more and more
as the years went on. Five main lessons were incorporated into basic
French directives on pacification during the war:
a. Armed force is never an end in itself; only a
means to achieve pacification.
b. Neither the political nor the military effort
can do the pacification job by itself.
c. The military man must act as a pacifier, only
occasionally as a soldier.
d. The close coordination of military and political
arms with unity of authority at all levels 11
e. An increasingly greater role for the Vietnamese.
The French emphasized pacification more in southern Indochina and gen-
erally were more successful there than in the north, but, as in the later
U.S. experience, the pressure of the big unit war in Tdnkin diverted French
10. (French Indochina High Command), A Translation from the French; Lessons
of the War in Indochina, trans. V. J. Croziat (Santa Monica, California:
RAND Corporation, 1967), p. 110, This was originally the second volume
of a lengthy study commissioned and issued by General Paul Ely, Comman-
der-in-Chief, French Forces, Indochina, in May 1955.
11. Legere, op. cit., p. 18.
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resources away from pacification. Of even greater consequence was the lack
of an acceptable political program for the Vietnamese. Despite promises
the French never really gave power to the Vietnamese, even their puppet
Bao Dai. They did not provide the fledgling Vietnamese Army the freedom
and responsibility that were necessary to improve its effectiveness and
give it political authenticity among the population. Confronted by modern
nationalism and organized political opposition, both of which Gallieni had
not faced, French pacification over the long term could not work despite
local successes in the south.
In the wake of the Indochina War, many French officers set out to re-
examine the causes of failure and try to develop principles to combat Com-
munist revolutionary warfare. This process of intellectual re-evaluation
reached its peak in 1956 and 1957. Pacification was a principal concern,
and its central tenet was to be that all operations, military and civil, had
winning the people as their raison d 'etre and should be judged on that
basis. Security was taken as the essential prerequisite, but popular parti-
cipation must be a key element in its maintenance. All of the writers
stressed unequivocally that elimination of the enemy's political/military
infrastructure was vital -- a lesson that was adhered to with great vigor
in Algeria. Legere observed that the French, in drawing their lessons on
pacification, concentrated more on security than political/economic develop-
ment, on techniques such as the "oil spot," local defense forces, inducing
defectors, regrouping of the population and anti-infrastructure programs.
Yet, he notes that even in these specifics there was a "constant imperative"
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of turning over as much of the program as possible to the loyal population.12
In Algeria the French perfected pacification as a technique for re-
establishing government control. They gradually exterminated organized
guerrilla opposition but still lost the war politically. While the reasons
for the outcome in Algeria were extremely complicated, it should be clear
that pacification must be accompanied by an attractive political goal. In
the era of nationalism it could not succeed by substituting enlightened
colonialism for independence.
A different era began in 1954 when the United States Government replaced
the French as the patron of the fledgling Republic of Vietnam. Pacification
and guerrilla war were not new to Americans or totally foreign to the U.S.
Army's institutional heritage. The long Indian Wars and the suppression of
the Philippine Rebellion in the early 20th Century were crude examples.
Americans stayed behind to operate as guerrillas in the Philippines after
the Japanese invaded in 1941, and in the Burma Theater the United States
was involved in large-scale irregular warfare. Indeed, some of the partici-
pants in that campaign, such as Dean Rusk and Roger Hilsman, later became
well-known policymakers on Vietnam. Other Americans, especially those who
later rose to prominence in U.S. intelligence, helped plan or actually im-
plement rebellions and guerrilla warfare against Nazi Germany. After World
War II, Colonel Lansdale was intimately involved in the successful effort
to defeat the Hukbalahap Insurgency in the Philippines. At the same time
as the French were losing in Indochina, the British were bringing about a
different outcome in Malaya.
12. Ibid., p. 42.
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During the Indochina War the United States had small military and civil
assistance missions stationed there, and some of the members of these, such
as William Rosson, held high ranking military positions in Vietnam fifteen
years later, Colonel Lansdale and General John O'Daniel (later the first
Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Group in 1954) visited Vietnam in 1953
and early 1954 on detailed fact-finding missions.
From the above, one can lay to rest the myth that Vietnam was foreign
to American experience. We may not have learned the right lessons, but we
had been exposed to the problems. Despite this exposure, few of the French
lessons percolated directly into U.S. doctrine. Coupling a sense of superi-
ority left over from World War II with the French defeat in Indochina, not
to mention their distasteful hue as "colonialists," most American officials
and soldiers ignored the French experience. Some U.S. military, such as
General O'Daniel, even criticized the French for not having operated as
divisions rather than regiments and battalions1 3 -- a criticism that unfor-
tunately reflected the predominant military desire to apply the practices of
World War II and Korea rather than the lessons of Mao and guerrilla warfare
in Indochina to the new struggle. In the 1960's when "counterinsurgency"
came into vogue, studies that drew on the French experience, such as the
works of Bernard Fall and Peter Paret,14 did gain a wider audience but did
not substantially affect institutional doctrine. The situation appeared to
13. Report of Joint U.S. Mission to Indochina, 15 July 1953, TOP SECRET, p.
2. This is the first "O'Daniel Report."
14. See Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina (Harris-
burg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Company, 1961) and Peter Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Alegeria: the Analysis of a
Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Praeger, 1964).
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be different to most Americans who did not see themselves as colonialists
but as supporters of a free government. Many also viewed the French defeat
in military and technological terms. The French had been too weak and not
possessed our weaponry. U.S. technology and overall military strength
smothered the development of doctrine and a political strategy.
If the larger institutions of the U.S. Government were not directly
affected by what happened to the French in Indochina and Algeria, pacifica-
tion concepts still traversed the gulf, primarily through the Vietnamese
medium and a small number of Americans who did bother to learn. Indeed
there was little more in the American definitions and concepts of pacifica-
tion that had not been already well thought out by the French. The Vietna-
mese who actually carried out the program made use of their experiences on
both sides in the Indochina War. Often ex-Vietminh were the most prescient
15
and capable pacifiers.
A persistent element in official and unofficial conceptions of pacifica-
tion has been that of control of the population. While physical control is
heavily stressed, the mental dimension has received attention also, espec-
ially after 1954. Coercive thought control was not the objective; rather
the population undergoing pacification was to receive clear benefits, or at
least the promise of them, to dispose them favorably towards the government.
In connection with this, perhaps the most striking post-French conceptual
emphasis was that on "nation-building" or long-term social/economic/political
15. For example, Kieu Cong Cung who led "Civic Action" in 1955-56, Colonel
Nguyen Be the head of the National Training Center at Vung Tau after
1966, and Tran Ngoc Chau.
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development. Both the Americans and the Vietnamese heavily emphasized this
aspect of pacification in their public statements, though it has always taken
second place to security matters. They felt that the non-security measures
contained in pacification plans were at least the initiation of development.
Operationally, long-term development tended to be elbowed aside by the imme-
diate emergencies of the war and, more often than not, was left to normal
Vietnamese government ministries and uninnovative, traditional, or Saigon-
oriented branches of U.S. agencies, especially USAID.16 Development was
however the general end toward which pacification was supposed to be heading.
Only in 1969 when the security situation in much of the countryside had
radically improved did some of the operational emphasis embrace this concept.
After the Geneva Conference in 1954 the nascent South Vietnamese govern-
ment was faced with the Herculean task of establishing its authority in the
countryside. Unlike the French-sponsored Bao Dai regime, it had a genuine
claim to nationalism though this was weakened by its dependence on foreign
support. The government faced not only a skeptical population, many of whom
had lived under de facto Vietminh rule for years, but also dissident reli-
gious and bandit sects. President Ngo Dinh Diem personally disliked the
word "pacification" with its French colonialist overtones, so he named the
process "national security action."17 His closest American advisor during
this period, Colonel Lansdale, admitted that the terms were interchangeable
16. See "Glossary of Terms and Acronyms."
17. Memorandum, Edward G. Lansdale to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Subj.:
Historical Note, 13 May 1967, CONFIDENTIAL.
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and that in common parlance the French term was still used.18
Operationally, from 1954 to 1959 pacification meant the entire govern-
ment internal security effort (rural), though in the very beginning it was
seen as merely a rather military first step to restore control in the coun-
tryside. Soon, however, it included the whole program to extend administra-
tion and for this had its own sub-program called "civic action" which in-
volved the rotation of civil service personnel out into the country to work
among the people.1 9 The objective of pacification was to bring peace and
order to the country and to combat dissidence by a multi-faceted political-
psychological/economic/military response with all interested Vietnamese
agencies (except the military) under the Commissioner General of Civic
Action. 20
During these years there was no recognized main-force, large-unit war,
but the principal threat still was perceived as external -- an overt North
Vietnamese invasion, and the Vietnamese Army trained and equipped for this
threat. 21 Yet the Army's only operational occupation was security within
South Vietnam's borders. As late as 1959 General Lionel C. McGarr, soon to
be chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in Vietnam, used "pacification"
18. Memorandum for Record, Lansdale, Subj.: "Pacification" in Vietnam,
16 July 1958. This same phenomenon occurred in 1967 when pacifica-
tion returned to official parlance after two years of cosmetic re-
labeling.
19. Memorandum, Lansdale to Bunker, 13 May 1967, op. cit., CONFIDENTIAL.
20. HQS. USMAAG, Monthly Activities Report No. 27 for February 1965, 15
March 1955, SECRET.
21. USVNR, IV.A.4., pp, 1.1-5.1.
and "internal security" interchangeably. 2 2
By 1960 the internal effort was divided into two wars, pacification and
conventional fighting against the growing threat of the Viet Cong who were
beginning to operate in battalions and regiments. The joint U.S./GVN Coun-
terinsurgency Plan, developed in 1960, exemplified this new trend. The
external threat was viewed as a real but now more remote possibility. 2 3 The
Vietnamese Army (Army of the Republic of Vietnam or ARVN for short) was seen
as a conventional offensive and defensive force to deal with enemy main
forces, and the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps24 as the static defense
force for pacification and local security. Here we see pacification as
"defensive," to be allotted to lesser forces with less emphasis and less
glamour.
One point is clear. The U.S. Government did not have an agreed defini-
tion. In April 1961 General Lansdale described the goal of pacification as
"to end the internal Communist threat in South Vietnam," thus including the
entire internal effort.25 Yet at the same time he went on to describe a
22. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Study on Aspects of the
Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1960), SECRET, p. 12.
The paragraph in question is CONFIDENTIAL. General McGarr commissioned
and sponsored this study.
23. Message, Saigon 276 to State, 4 January 1961, as quoted in USVNR, IV.A.
5., p. 88.
24. The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps were the antecedents of the
Regional and Popular Forces; the names were changed in 1964. Recruited
locally for local (village, hamlet, district) defense, they were poorly
paid and equipped, yet because of the nature of the early part of the
war, they bore the brunt of the fighting between 1956-1960.
24. Memorandum, (Lansdale), Subj.: Vietnam, 19 April 1961, as referred to
in USVNR, IV.B.4., p. 29.
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second phase called "stabilization" which involved administration, health,
community and political development, education, and agriculture -- some of
which were intimate parts of past and future pacification processes. Paci-
fication for most observers was thought to encompass both security and what
Lansdale called "stabilization." In addition, most of the U.S. Government
appears to have viewed pacification as a sub-process in the larger "counter-
insurgency" -- a term that was just gaining currency in early 1961 and which
meant the entire effort against the insurgents and definitely incorporated
the main-force war and the pacification process. Roger Hilsman in 1962 saw
pacification as the point at which military and social action meet, a phase
in the overall strategic concept of counterinsurgency. 26 Much later, a
writer in the Pentagon Papers noted that security was seen as a precondition
to political, economic and social reforms to ensure the viability of South
Vietnam and that the two combined were known and widely accepted throughout
the U.S. Government as the "pacification process."27 While not necessarily
inaccurate, this agreement is not reflected in the documents. In 1964 the
President formally accepted counterinsurgency as the strategy for the entire
conflict in South Vietnam of which pacification was but a part,28 but by
this point the former term was used less and less while the latter soon was
to be hidden under a series of cosmetic labelings. Indicative of the lack
of conceptual agreement, later in the same year the Army's Chief of Staff,
26. Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967),
pp. 451-452. This was contained in a State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research study of 19 December 1962 sent by Hilsman
to Averell Harriman, the President, and the National Security Council.
27. USVNR, IV.B.3., p. 14.
28. National Security Action Memorandum No. 288, 17 March 1964, SECRET.
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General Harold K. Johnson, who devoted a great deal of thought and attention
to improving the U.S. response in Vietnam, saw pacification as but a military
first phase of securing and control to be followed by civil measures, more
a specific operation than an extended civil/military process.29
The confusion over definition persisted. In 1964 the South Vietnamese
government stated that:
the pacification of an area is the restoration of
public security and improvement of the living con-
ditions of the inhabitants of that area in all fields,
political, economic, and social.3 0
They viewed it all-inclusively as the central method for defeating the insur-
gency, yet while its Chien Thang national pacification plan stressed "clear
and hold" operations, it noted the need for prior military screening action.
This need raises a problem with organizational ramifications that never was
resolved, and it intensified when the American troops arrived in 1965. Con-
ceptually, it was clear to all that military operations and pacification
were, or should be, part of an integrated whole. Yet as the enemy main
force threat grew, military operations quickly were separated from pacifica-
tion at operational levels. The South Vietnamese and Americans were not just
pacifying native tribes or countering a local insurgency but fighting a reg-
ular war as well. For reasons of organizational repertoire (i.e., military
units preferring to do what they are trained and equipped to accomplish) and
29. Memorandum, Johnson to Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations,
Subj.: Situation in Vietnam, 12 September 1964, TOP SECRET.
30. Commander-in-Chief, Vietnamese Armed Forces, Annex E to Chien Thang
Plan, 22 February 1964, CONFIDENTIAL, p. l-E. See also Major Paul E.
Suplizio, "A Study of the Military Support of Pacification in South
Vietnam, April 1964-April 1965" (Unpublished Master's dissertation for
the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, 1966), pp. 2-3.
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genuine need, the preliminary military screening received the lion's share
of attention, and pacification, which most admitted to be the heart of the
problem, trailed like a dinghy in the wake of the conventional war.
Throughout the history of American involvement in Vietnam there was a
running debate, still unresolved, among agencies of the government, and even
between officials within each agency, over the relative importance of secur-
ity versus economic/social/political development. The military and some
civilians believed that one had to have security before development could
work or survive. The converse, which many civilians adhered to, was that
political allegiance combined with economic and social development would
bring military success (the people would cease support of the insurgents who
would then be deprived of their base). This dichotomy reflected the even
more basic one in the whole U.S. approach to the conflict: was the war
primarily military to be fought with essentially military means or was it a
political struggle? While the government never formally resolved this ques-
tion, the resources and emphasis devoted to the military side comprised a
de facto policy decision in its favor. Yet the "security first" solution to
pacification may have been the only realistic path since the late 1950's.
The people had seen too many programs, too many governments, been prey too
often to the changing flow of the struggle in their villages to put their
trust in anyone who could not protect them first, To expect otherwise was
unrealistic. Still, despite all of the emphasis on security (the pursuit
of which often became an end in itself), pacification continued to founder
on inadequate sustained security, and the two wars for the Americans flowed
on in separate streams rarely becoming a single river. By 1966 the
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separation was so great that the President began to term pacification "the
other war" to give it more visibility. One cannot help but ask why, if
pacification was felt to be so important and military operations had as their
general goal the creation of a climate of security in South Vietnam, was the
military war not subordinated more firmly to political direction and better
coordinated with the pacification effort?
Though there were clearly two operational wars (a third if one includes
the air war against the North Vietnamese), the confusion persisted as to what
pacification was. In February 1965, before the advent of large numbers of
U.S. and North Vietnamese soldiers, the U.S. Mission was able to agree on
the following definition of pacification:
all civilian, military, and police actions to eliminate
organized Viet Cong military activity, to detect and
eliminate the overt and covert Viet Cong political ap-
paratus, and nurture the economic, Aolitical, and social
development of a viable community.
This can only be the entire war, yet in no sense did those responsible for
pacification on both the U.S. and GVN sides ever have control over the range
of forces that this definition implied. In September the U.S. Mission agreed
with the Vietnamese definition of pacification as consisting of five strate-
gic principles: "internal defense and security, economic progress to better
the standard of living, improvement of social services such as education and
health facilities, establishment of political institutions and a positive
ideology, and amelioration of the administrative system."32 Again, the same
31. Airgram, Saigon 602 to State, February 1965, CONFIDENTIAL.
32. Airgram, Saigon 165 to State, 7 September 1965, CONFIDENTIAL. This
quotation is from Appendix 1 to Enclosure 1 of the airgram. The ap-
pendix consists of a GVN memorandum on pacification presented to a joint
U.S. Mission Council/GVN National Security Council meeting of 28 August,
1965. The GVN memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.
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wide definition. Note that political and economic development are included.
To further confuse the issue both governments went through one of their
periodic cosmetic rewordings of pacification. In April 1965 "Rural Recon-
struction" (soon changed to "Rural Construction") supplanted pacification
as the official term for the same process. In the same year the Rural Con-
struction Cadres (59-man teams sent out to work in the hamlets) became the
public symbol of pacification and to most journalists and uninformed observ-
ers were synonymous with the entire pacification program. Pacification dis-
appeared under the cloak of Revolutionary Development (or "RD") which in
1966 supplanted Rural Construction as the new name for the same program even
in many official classified documents, so much so that experienced researchers
can be misled as to whether a government official is discussing the specific
RD cadre program or the larger effort. Indicative of the confusion at this
time was the important Army Staff's PROVN (Program for the Pacification and
Long-Term Development of Vietnam) study of March 1966. The title contained
"pacification" but nowhere was it defined, yet Rural Construction was given
the February 1965 Mission definition of pacification. Counterinsurgency
was described as: "those military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions undertaken by the government to defeat sub-
versive insurgency."3 3 This and the February 1965 definition of pacification
are virtually the same. By mid-1966 an interagency "Roles and Missions"
33. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Depart-
ment of the Army, A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term
Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) (Washington, D.C.: Department
of the Army, 1966), CONFIDENTIAL, II, pp. xxvi-xxvii. This page is
UNCLASSIFIED.
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study group went further than ever before and said that:
Revolutionary Development consists of those military
and civil efforts designed to liberate the population
of South Vietnam from Communist coercion; to restore
public security; to initiate economic and political
development; to extend effective GVN authority
throughout South Vietnam; and to win the willing
support of the people to these ends.3 4
It is not easy to ascertain what the President thought pacification was,
to discern the difference between memorandums drafted by his Special Assis-
tants and his personal views. His remarks at the Honolulu Conference in
February 1966 do however provide illumination on this point. There he
divided the war into three facets: "military pressure on Hanoi," pacifica-
tion to "bring a better program to the people of South Vietnam," and the
search for peace.35 He went on to say: "a better pacification program that
includes everything." And this it did.. .agriculture, health, education,
democracy-building, industry, refugees, improving the life-span, and even
rural electrification. While this expansive vision of pacification, almost
a Vietnamese "New Deal," may have reflected a calculated desire to build up
the "other war" that was being overwhelmed by the military struggle, it seems
safe to surmise that he genuinely viewed pacification as a wide-ranging
process. He was not conceptualizing the detail of hamlet war or specific
phased plans to regain control of the countryside. Those were for his
lieutenants to solve. He was looking at it broadly.
34. USVNR, IV.C.8., p. 84.
35. Ibid., p. 38. This interpretation of Johnson's view of pacification
is confirmed in Henry F. Graff, The Tuesday Cabinet (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 104.
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Others had to devise and manage pacification programs. In August 1966,
Mr. Robert Komer, then his Special Assistant in charge of pulling together
Washington support for the "other war," observed that while pacification
could be used to encompass the whole military, political, and civil effort
in Vietnam, the term needed to be narrowed down for operational purposes.
Pacification meant "securing the countryside and getting the peasant involved
in the struggle against the Viet Cong."3 6 For him, it was a long-haul, low-
cost strategy and one that concentrated on winning the war in the South. His
operational definition was influenced by what programs were already underway
for security, development, and winning popular support. Pacification was to
be rural and not urban-oriented. It was interested in short and medium-term
actions, not long-term programs such as nation-building or national political
development; and it encompassed all military operations related to local,
village/hamlet security (a gray area and one that he admitted was difficult
to separate out from main force operations). Pacification, however, was not
to be mere military suppression, but during 1966 to 1968 security was felt
to be paramount. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese strength in the country-
side demanded it. Komer became the operational manager of the U.S. pacifica-
tion program in Vietnam, but while the U.S. Mission did adopt an official
definition, not all troops marched to the beat of the same drum.
As indicative of the lack of common understanding as to just what
pacification was, here are three interpretations from 1967. A CIA official
36. Ibid., p. 66. This definition was confirmed and elaborated upon during
an interview with Ambassador Komer on 26 September 1974.
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noted that the military gave pacification an essentially administrative,
imposed connotation whereas the civilians placed it in a political context.
He went on to say that security, social and economic development, adminis-
trative control, and democracy were all subordinate to the basic political
objective of turning the people against the Viet Cong and gaining their sup-
port.3 7  A high-level civilian CORDS offical briefing prepared for the Sec-
retary of Defense stated that: "to the peasant, pacification means security,
peace, social justice, and personal involvement with his government."3 8 A
MACV Headquarters Planning Directive, issued under General Westmoreland's
name, said that pacification was but the third part of the overall strategy
and should be preceded by military offensives and neutralization of enemy
base areas. 3 9 This came, I might add, during the heyday of the "search and
destroy" strategy. In each case the definitions quite faithfully reflect
the organizational perspective of the authors.
General Westmoreland's personal understanding of pacification, as
expressed in post-war reflections, was far broader than that of his staff.
He viewed it as a complex military/psychological/political/economic process,
the end purpose of which was to have a viable community free of physical
harassment. Security, he believed, was fundamental and divided into two
37. Draft Memorandum, CIA (author unknown), Subj.; Pacification and
Nation Building in Vietnam; Present Status, Current Trends and
Prospects, 17 February 1967, SECRET,
38. Briefing, L. Wade Lathram prepared for McNamara, 7 July 1967. SECRET.
Lathram was the Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS.
39. Planning Directive 9-67, HQS. MACV, Subj.: Planning Guidance for
Commanders for the Period 1 November 1967 - 30 April 1968, 29 October
1967, TOP SECRET.
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elements: local, close-in security to defend against small enemy units or
hold off for reinforcements and the security provided by large units that
intercepted enemy battalions and regiments in advance. Once security in the
hamlets has improved beyond the precarious, the civil, benefit side of paci-
fication could work: roads, schools, medical help, economic assistance, im-
proved communications, and political organization (elections). 40
In early 1968 CORDS promulgated an official definition;
Pacification is the military, political, economic, and
social process of establishing or re-establishing local
government responsive to and involving the participa-
tion of the people. It includes the provision of sus-
tained, credible territorial security, the destruction
of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or
re-assertion of political control and involvement of
the people in government, and the initiation of economic
and social activity capable of self-sustenance and ex-
pansion.41
Here we have a wide-ranging concept that clearly encompassed military
security, yet in overall U.S. operations pacification was subordinate to
security and not the opposite. And, while in 1967 and 1968 pacification did
not include long-term political and economic development, in the following
years these aspects gained more emphasis, so much so that by 1970 the GVN's
yearly pacification plan included "community development" in its title.
While this change was part of a deliberate effort by Ambassador Colby to
re-orient pacification away from security which was felt by then to be less
42
precarious, it nonetheless shows how fluid the term was.
40. Interview, Charles B. MacDonald with Westmoreland, 17 April 1973.
41. HQS. MACV (AcofS, CORDS), Guide for Province and District Advisors,
1 February 1968, p. 2-1.
42. Personal Interview with Ambassador William Colby, 6 February 1970.
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I wish to stress again that U.S. and, GVN organization rarely reflected
responsibility for what current definitions stated or implied. To some,
pacification meant control, military occupation, and administration; others
included political and economic development and popular participation. Was
it a process to begin from the bottom up or to be imposed from the top down?
Or was it a combination of all of these? Everyone concerned in the Govern-
ment had their own vague understanding as to what pacification was, but there
never was precise agreement. On few occasions was the definition kept lim-
ited, yet the organizational arrangements set up to handle it seldom encom-
passed all of its aspects.
In retrospect pacification which began simply as a restoration of con-
trol in 1954 soon became the entire government program to root out the re-
maining Vietminh and then to deal with the emerging insurgency after 1956.
By 1960 the Viet Cong military threat had grown to such a level of danger and
organization that pacification became the second part of a larger war. When
the U.S. ground troops arrived in 1965, the regular unit war divided into
American and Vietnamese components. It was only late in the conflict that
some semblance of unity among all of them was achieved, and even then paci-
fication was always placed in a subordinate position despite wide-ranging
definitions and lofty statements that it was the heart of the matter.
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